The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, 1935-1965: Lost in Time
Author(s)Runde, Jr, Richard J.
Contributor(s)ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
KeywordsGovernment and Political Science
Humanities and History
Military Forces and Organizations
Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
BATTLE GROUP LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS
REGIMENT LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS
PLATOON LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS
BRIGADE LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON
ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE
POST KOREAN WAR PERIOD
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AbstractThis study investigates the roles, missions, and functions of the infantry regiment's Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) platoon. The investigation begins in 1935 and ends with the I&R platoon's disappearance from infantry force structure in 1965. The present infantry brigade remains the only tactical formation without an organic human intelligence collection and reconnaissance organization. What were the reasons that it was removed from the infantry brigade force structure? Period I&R platoon doctrine, training, and tables of organization are compared and contrasted with first hand combat experiences from World War II and Korea. The impact of national security policy, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and intraservice rivalries about individual U.S. armed forces capabilities and missions during the Cold War are also examined. The study concludes that the I&R platoon's disappearance began with its tactical employment during the Korean War. Later during the PENTANA study in the late 1950s, the I&R platoon had lost so many personnel billets, that it was no longer a tactically effective organization. Intelligence and reconnaissance platoon, Brigade reconnaissance.
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