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dc.contributor.authorHand, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-25T23:31:59Z
dc.date.available2019-09-25T23:31:59Z
dc.date.created2018-08-13 18:05
dc.identifierIXTHEO-https://ixtheo.de/Record/501314830
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/13617672.2015.1013817
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/593050
dc.description.abstractAccording to the "religious choice case" for compulsory religious education, pupils have a right to be made aware of the religious and irreligious paths open to them and equipped with the wherewithal to choose between them. A familiar objection to this argument is that the idea of religious choice reduces religion to a matter of taste. I argue, first, that this familiar objection fails and, second, that we nevertheless have good reason to reject the religious choice case. Religious and irreligious views have a core cognitive dimension that makes it inappropriate to talk of choosing between them. What I have elsewhere called the "possibility-of-truth case" remains the strongest justification for compulsory religious education.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofUniversity Library Tübingen / Index Theologicus
dc.rightsAll rights reserved
dc.sourceJournal of beliefs and values
dc.subjectdoxastic voluntarism
dc.subjectleap of faith
dc.subjectpersonal autonomy
dc.subjectreligious belief
dc.subjectreligious choice
dc.subjectreligious education
dc.titleReligious education and religious choice
dc.typeArticle
dc.source.volume36
dc.source.issue1
dc.source.beginpageS. 31
dc.source.endpage39
dcterms.accessRightsopen access
ge.collectioncodeFG
ge.dataimportlabelIXTHEO metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:14858365
ge.identifier.permalinkhttps://www.globethics.net/gtl/14858365
ge.journalyear2015
ge.lastmodificationdate2018-08-13 18:05
ge.lastmodificationuseradmin@novalogix.ch (import)
ge.submissions0
ge.setnameGlobeTheoLib
ge.setspecglobetheolib
ge.linkhttps://ixtheo.de/Record/501314830


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