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AbstractInstrumental reasons play a central role in our practical deliberations because we apply the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable not only to beliefs, but to actions also. The question of what one has an instrumental reason to do is an important substantive question that is relevant to the general theory of practical reasoning and to ethics, too. It will be my object in the present study to show that we have different kinds of instrumental reasons, which depend solely on their logical structure. To this end, I shall in the first section deal with the validity of instrumental reasoning in general. In the remainder of the paper I outline five types of instrumental reasons and show how they depend on their logical structure. In so doing, I hope to shed some light on the concept of instrumental reasons, which is not well understood.
Georg Spielthenner, "Logical Varieties of Instrumental Reasons", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XIV (2012) 2, pp. 197-213
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Raciocínio Moral (Moral Reasoning) e Raciocínio Jurídico (Legal Reasoning) no Exercício da Jurisdição Constitucional / Moral Reasoning and Legal Reasoning in the Exercise of Constitutional JurisdictionRafael de Oliveira Costa; Bruno Starke Buzetti; Lanaira da Silva (Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, 2017-01-01)Resumo: O presente estudo pretende analisar a relação existente entre o raciocínio moral e o raciocínio jurídico nos processos de tomada decisão dos Tribunais Constitucionais, objetivando solucionar o embate entre validade e legitimidade no exercício da jurisdição constitucional. Trata-se de pesquisa que faz uso do raciocínio hipotético-dedutivo, valendo-se de dados de natureza primária (acórdãos e leis) e secundária (entendimentos doutrinários), permitindo concluir ser indispensável a construção de uma teoria não meramente descritiva dos processos de tomada de decisão, mas analítico-hermenêutico-argumentativa, no sentido de ser capaz de fixar parâmetros para o julgador avaliar a correção do raciocínio adotado na solução de casos concretos, substituindo a arbitrariedade pela justificação racional. Abstract: This study examines the relationship between moral reasoning and legal reasoning in decision-making processes of Constitutional Courts. The aim is to establish parameters to understand how they occur, resolving the conflict between validity and legitimacy in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. This research makes use of hypothetical-deductive reasoning, drawing on primary (judgments and laws) and secondary data (doctrinal understandings). It concludes that it is essential to build not a merely descriptive theory of decision-making processes, but analytic-hermeneutic-argumentative, to be able to set parameters for the judge to assess the correctness of the reasoning adopted in the solution of a concrete case.
A generall charge or, impeachment of high-treason, in the name of justice equity, against the communality of England; [electronic resource] : as was presented by experienced reason, Anno 1647. With the speech of experienced reason to the communality of England, before the delivery of the said charge. Likewise, the communalities objections to the said articles. With the answer of experimental reason to the communalities objections. By the appointment of Justice-equity, now Governour of the Land of Righteousnesse; and by his authority, ordered to be published, for the redemption of the long lost freedom of the free-born subjects of the Kingdome of England. /Claxton, Laurence,1615-1667. (London : Printed for the use and happinesse of all the communality of England, if by them impartially perused, and without delay justly practised,, anno 1647.)Annotation on Thomason copy: "October 7th".