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Libertad divina, posibilidad y contingencia en Duns Escoto

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Author(s)
Pérez Estévez, Antonio
Keywords
DUNS SCOTUS, JOHN - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO
LIBERDADE
VONTADE
CONTINGÊNCIA (FILOSOFIA)
Philosophy (General)
B1-5802
Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
B
DOAJ:Philosophy
DOAJ:Philosophy and Religion

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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/611504
Online Access
https://doaj.org/article/c3f00c4691f74f0cbb1e633f430cf6aa
Abstract
A vontade humana, em razão de sua indeterminação e da sua capacidade interna de produzir atos volitivos contrários e de querer objetos contrários, é aquilo que nos distingue como seres humanos em relação à natureza e nos faz semelhantes a Deus. A vontade divina, por ser infinitamente perfeita, pode, com um único ato volitivo, querer simultaneamente e produzir objetos contrários (a e -a). Portanto, Deus no mesmo instante da eternidade, pôde, com a sua potência absoluta, ter querido a e/ou -a, o que implica que pôde ter querido este mundo e/ou outro e outros mundos, que são lógica e realmente possíveis. Esta potência divina para, com um único ato volitivo, querer objetos contrários é a causa da contingência radical de todos os entes criados. <br> Human will, because of its indetermination and internal capacity for producing contrary volitive acts e for willing contrary objects, is that which makes us different from nature and similar to God. The divine will, since it is infinitely perfect, with a sole volitive act can will simultaneously and produce contrary objects (a and -a). Therefore, God could have willed in the same instant of eternity, with his absolute potency, a and/or -a, what implies that he could have willed this world and/or another and other worlds, which are logically and really possible. This divine potency for willing, with a sole volitive act, contrary objects is the cause of the radical contingency of all created beings.
Date
2005-01-01
Type
Article
Identifier
oai:doaj.org/article:c3f00c4691f74f0cbb1e633f430cf6aa
0042-3955
https://doaj.org/article/c3f00c4691f74f0cbb1e633f430cf6aa
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Philosophical Ethics

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