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dc.contributor.authorHubin, D. Clayton
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-26T00:04:47Z
dc.date.available2019-09-26T00:04:47Z
dc.date.created2017-10-27 23:04
dc.date.issued1980
dc.identifieroai:philpapers.org/rec/HUBPR
dc.identifierhttps://philpapers.org/rec/HUBPR
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/613988
dc.description.abstractSeveral authors, including Thomas Nagel and David Gauthier, have defended the view that reasons of self-interest (prudential reasons) are rationally binding. That is, there is always a reason, bearing on the rational advisability, based on one's self-interest and, as a result, a person may act irrationally by knowingly acting against such reasons regardless of the person's desires or values. Both Nagel and Gauthier argue from the rationally mandatory nature of prudential reasons to the conclusion that moral reasons can be rationally mandatory, challenging the neo-Humean position that practical reasons that bear on an agent's rationality are essentially grounded on the agent's subjective, contingent, conative states. I argue, pace Nagel and Gauthier, that prudential reasons are not rationally mandatory--that the rational requirement to act in one's own interest, when it exists, is, as the neo-Humean insists, grounded on one's subjective, contingent, conative states. Prudential reasons are not reasons for every (conceivable) agent--not in the sense that bears on the rational advisability of action.
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titlePrudential Reasons
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
ge.collectioncodeGA
ge.dataimportlabelOAI metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:11814113
ge.identifier.permalinkhttps://www.globethics.net/gel/11814113
ge.lastmodificationdate2017-10-27 23:04
ge.lastmodificationuseradmin@pointsoftware.ch (import)
ge.submissions0
ge.oai.exportid149453
ge.oai.repositoryid4212
ge.oai.streamid2
ge.setnameGlobeEthicsLib
ge.setspecglobeethicslib
ge.linkhttps://philpapers.org/rec/HUBPR


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