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dc.contributor.authorBertini, Daniele
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-26T00:05:37Z
dc.date.available2019-09-26T00:05:37Z
dc.date.created2017-10-27 23:04
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifieroai:philpapers.org/rec/BERFDP-2
dc.identifierhttps://philpapers.org/rec/BERFDP-2
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/614635
dc.description.abstractMy main claim is that, in order to account for the nature of human mind, philosophy of mind should embody topics usually treated by disciplines as ethics or applied philosophy so as to enrich the pure notion of cognitive experience to the extent of treating the whole of human experience. I begin with considering the Cartesian approach to the "cogito". I argue for the claim that cartesian-like dualists (Descartes and Locke, Kant and Husserl) fail in treating the opposition of internalism and externalism concerning experience. This failure commits them to a form of epistemological idealism unable to manage the "veil of perception" objection. I then settle a provisional account for the mind, mainly dependent on a Berkeleyan-Humean deflationist approach to it, showing the necessity to incorporate in it robust practical topics from an ontological point of view.
dc.languageit
dc.language.isoita
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleFondazione del problema del pensare
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
ge.collectioncodeGA
ge.dataimportlabelOAI metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:11814773
ge.identifier.permalinkhttps://www.globethics.net/gel/11814773
ge.lastmodificationdate2017-10-27 23:04
ge.lastmodificationuseradmin@pointsoftware.ch (import)
ge.submissions0
ge.oai.exportid149453
ge.oai.repositoryid4212
ge.oai.streamid2
ge.setnameGlobeEthicsLib
ge.setspecglobeethicslib
ge.linkhttps://philpapers.org/rec/BERFDP-2


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