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dc.contributor.authorUnnsteinsson, Elmar
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-26T00:08:00Z
dc.date.available2019-09-26T00:08:00Z
dc.date.created2017-10-28 23:19
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifieroai:philpapers.org/rec/UNNAGT
dc.identifierhttps://philpapers.org/rec/UNNAGT
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/616459
dc.description.abstractGricean intentionalists hold that what a speaker says and means by a linguistic utterance is determined by the speaker's communicative intention. On this view, one cannot really say anything without meaning it as well. Conventionalists argue, however, that malapropisms provide powerful counterexamples to this claim. I present two arguments against the conventionalist and sketch a new Gricean theory of speech errors, called the misarticulation theory. On this view, malapropisms are understood as a special case of mispronunciation. I argue that the Gricean theory is supported by empirical work in phonetics and phonology and, also, that conventionalism inevitably fails to do this work justice. I conclude, from this, that the conventionalist fails to show that malapropisms constitute a counterexample to a Gricean theory.
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleA Gricean Theory of Malaprops
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
ge.collectioncodeGA
ge.dataimportlabelOAI metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:11839831
ge.identifier.permalinkhttps://www.globethics.net/gel/11839831
ge.lastmodificationdate2017-10-28 23:19
ge.lastmodificationuseradmin@pointsoftware.ch (import)
ge.submissions0
ge.oai.exportid53
ge.oai.repositoryid4212
ge.oai.streamid1
ge.setnameGlobeEthicsLib
ge.setspecglobeethicslib
ge.linkhttps://philpapers.org/rec/UNNAGT


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