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dc.contributor.authorMiller, Mitchell
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-26T00:08:00Z
dc.date.available2019-09-26T00:08:00Z
dc.date.created2017-10-28 23:19
dc.date.issued1992
dc.identifieroai:philpapers.org/rec/MILUAL-4
dc.identifierhttps://philpapers.org/rec/MILUAL-4
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/616460
dc.description.abstractA close reading of Socrates’ arguments against the proposed definition of knowledge as true opinion together with a logos (“account”). I examine the orienting implications of his apparently destructive dilemma defeating the so-called dream theory and of his apparently decisive arguments rejecting the notions of “account” as verbalization, as working through the parts of the whole of the definiendum, and as identifying what differentiates the definiendum from all else. Whereas the dilemma implies of the object of knowledge that it must be both simple and complex, the last two notions of “account” point to the kinds of discursive analysis that can do justice to its complexity; together the refutations suggest the relation between noesis, that is, eidetic intuition of the object in its simplicity, and discursive analysis of the object in its complexity that knowledge requires.
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleUnity and Logos: A Reading of Theaetetus 201c-210a
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
ge.collectioncodeGA
ge.dataimportlabelOAI metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:11839832
ge.identifier.permalinkhttps://www.globethics.net/gel/11839832
ge.lastmodificationdate2017-10-28 23:19
ge.lastmodificationuseradmin@pointsoftware.ch (import)
ge.submissions0
ge.oai.exportid53
ge.oai.repositoryid4212
ge.oai.streamid1
ge.setnameGlobeEthicsLib
ge.setspecglobeethicslib
ge.linkhttps://philpapers.org/rec/MILUAL-4


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