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dc.contributor.authorRea, Michael C.
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-26T00:08:20Z
dc.date.available2019-09-26T00:08:20Z
dc.date.created2017-10-28 23:24
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifieroai:philpapers.org/rec/REARIT
dc.identifierhttps://philpapers.org/rec/REARIT
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/616695
dc.description.abstractThe paper will have three sections. In section one I briefly present and respond to Byrne’s argument against theological realism. In section two, I present van Fraassen’s argument against analytic metaphysics and I show how, if sound, it constitutes a reason to reject both metaphysical and theological realism. In section three, I show how van Fraassen can be answered. Obviously what I am doing here falls far short of a full-blown defense of realism in either metaphysics or theology. But the objections raised by van Fraassen and Byrne are tokens of a type of objection that I think is rather widely endorsed among those who are suspicious of these two brands of realism. Thus, responding to those objections constitutes an important first step in the direction of a defense.
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleRealism in Theology and Metaphysics
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
ge.collectioncodeGA
ge.dataimportlabelOAI metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:11847103
ge.identifier.permalinkhttps://www.globethics.net/gtl/11847103
ge.lastmodificationdate2017-10-28 23:24
ge.lastmodificationuseradmin@pointsoftware.ch (import)
ge.submissions0
ge.oai.exportid147102
ge.oai.repositoryid4212
ge.oai.streamid5
ge.setnameGlobeTheoLib
ge.setspecglobetheolib
ge.linkhttps://philpapers.org/rec/REARIT


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