Online Access
https://philpapers.org/rec/REPBRAAbstract
A critical review of Mark Siderits's arguments in support of a compatibilist Buddhist theory of free will based on early Abhidharma reductionism and the two-truths distinction between conventional and ultimate truths or reality, which theory he terms 'paleo-compatibilism'. The Buddhist two-truths doctrine is basically analogous to Sellers' distinction between the manifest and scientific images, in which case the argument is that determinism is a claim about ultimate reality, whereas personhood and agency are about conventional reality, both discourse domains are semantically insulated, and thus there cannot be any issue of the incompatibility.Date
2012Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleIdentifier
oai:philpapers.org/rec/REPBRAhttps://philpapers.org/rec/REPBRA