Online Access
https://philpapers.org/rec/MATWOUAbstract
‘Heritage’ is a concept that often carries significant normative weight in moral and political argument. In this article, I present and critique a prevalent conception according to which heritage must have a positive valence. I argue that this view of heritage leads to two moral problems: Disowning Injustice and Embracing Injustice. In response, I argue for an alternative conception of heritage that promises superior moral and political consequences. In particular, this alternative jettisons the traditional focus on heritage as a primarily positive relationship to the past, and thus offers resources for coming to terms with histories of injustice.Date
forthcomingType
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleIdentifier
oai:philpapers.org/rec/MATWOUhttps://philpapers.org/rec/MATWOU