Wie ist Verantwortungsethik möglich?

Abstract

This dissertation consists of two shorter parts (I and II) and a longer main part III. Part I explains why an ethics of responsibility ("Verantwortungsethik") is necessary in a technologically dominated age. In part II the nature and limits of an ethics of responsibility are discussed. Part III begins with a survey of the development of discourse-ethical ("Diskursethik") strategies to justify an ethics of responsibility. Then it argues that a transcendental-pragmatic ("transzendentalpragmatisch") strategy is successful as a foundation for an ethics of responsibility, for this strategy avoids the solipsistic pitfalls of kantian ethics while incorporating its deontological universalism. If this argument succeeds, then: 1) Max Weber´s challenge that ethics must relate to concrete consequences can be met on a universalistic basis, 2) Hans Jonas´ question how ethical responsibility of the future should be assumed can be answered, 3) philosophical solipsism can be avoided by means of a speech act theory, and 4) a conceptual frame for the synthesis of kantian morality and hegelian "Sittlichkeit" can be developed.