But What IS the 'Right Thing'?: Ethics and Information Systems in the Corporate Domain
Author(s)
Smith, H. JeffKeywords
jeffsmith
wake
forest
university
thing
ethics
information
systems
corporate
domain
information
systems
executives
executives
prodded
thing
face
ethical
quandaries
determine
ethically
ethical
quandaries
occur
corporate
domain
individuals
rely
solely
emotions
hard
time
convincing
rational
thinkers
embrace
position
individuals
rely
traditional
philosophical
theories
approach
seldom
optimal
corporate
domain
traditional
philosophical
theories
specifically
address
corporate
setting
theories
address
ethical
quandaries
private
sector
stockholder
theory
stakeholder
theory
article
discusses
theories
stockholder
theory
holds
executives
resolve
ethical
quandaries
taking
actions
maximize
long-term
profits
stockholders
violating
law
engaging
fraud
deception
stakeholder
theory
claims
executives
resolve
ethical
quandaries
balancing
stakeholder
interests
violating
rights
stakeholder
theories
explored
applying
specific
real-world
quandary
blockbuster
videos
reported
plans
market
customer
lists
theories
applied
current
quandaries
finally
article
explores
action
steps
applying
theory
ethics
stakeholder
theory
stockholder
theory
jeff
smith
wake
forest
university
thing
ethics
information
systems
corporate
domain
information
systems
executives
executives
prodded
thing
face
ethical
quandaries
determine
ethically
ethical
quandaries
occur
corporate
domain
individuals
rely
solely
emotions
hard
time
convincing
rational
thinkers
embrace
position
individuals
rely
traditional
philosophical
theories
approach
seldom
optimal
corporate
domain
traditional
philosophical
theories
specifically
address
corporate
setting
theories
address
ethical
quandaries
private
sector
stockholder
theory
stakeholder
theory
article
discusses
theories
stockholder
theory
holds
executives
resolve
ethical
quandaries
taking
actions
maximize
long-term
profits
stockholders
violating
law
engaging
fraud
deception
stakeholder
theory
claims
executives
resolve
ethical
quandaries
balancing
stakeholder
interests
violating
rights
stakeholder
theories
explored
applying
specific
real-world
quandary
blockbuster
videos
reported
plans
market
customer
lists
theories
applied
current
quandaries
finally
article
explores
action
steps
applying
theory
ethics
stakeholder
theory
stockholder
theory
Ethics, Stakeholder Theory, Stockholder Theory
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Show full item recordOnline Access
https://aisel.aisnet.org/misqe/vol3/iss2/6https://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=misqe
Abstract
Information systems executives, and other executives, are often prodded to "do the right thing" when they face ethical quandaries. But how do they determine what is "right" ethically, especially when the ethical quandaries occur in the corporate domain? Some individuals rely solely on their own emotions, but they often have a hard time convincing rational thinkers to embrace their position. Other individuals rely on traditional philosophical theories, but this approach is seldom optimal in the corporate domain because the traditional philosophical theories do not specifically address the corporate setting. However, two theories do address ethical quandaries in the private sector: stockholder theory and stakeholder theory. This article discusses these two theories. Stockholder theory holds that executives should resolve ethical quandaries by taking actions that maximize the long-term profits to stockholders without violating the law or engaging in fraud or deception. Stakeholder theory claims that executives should resolve ethical quandaries by balancing stakeholder interests without violating the rights of any stakeholder. These theories are explored by first applying them to a specific real-world quandary: Blockbuster Video's reported plans to market its customer lists. Then the theories are applied to several other current quandaries. Finally, the article explores action steps for applying each theory.Date
2008-02-08Type
textIdentifier
oai:aisel.aisnet.org:misqe-1033https://aisel.aisnet.org/misqe/vol3/iss2/6
https://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=misqe
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