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dc.contributor.authorHicks, Amelia
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-26T00:35:18Z
dc.date.available2019-09-26T00:35:18Z
dc.date.created2019-02-15 00:35
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifieroai:philpapers.org/rec/HICMUA
dc.identifierhttps://philpapers.org/rec/HICMUA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/632755
dc.description.abstractSeveral philosophers have recently argued that decision-theoretic frameworks for rational choice under risk fail to provide prescriptions for choice in cases of moral uncertainty. They conclude that there are no rational norms that are “sensitive” to a decision-maker's moral uncertainty. But in this paper, I argue that one sometimes has a rational obligation to take one's moral uncertainty into account in the course of moral deliberation. I first provide positive motivation for the view that one's moral beliefs can affect what it's rational for one to choose. I then address the problem of value comparison, according to which one cannot determine the expected moral value of one's actions. I argue that we should not infer from the problem of value comparison that there are no rational norms governing choice under moral uncertainty.
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleMoral Uncertainty and Value Comparison
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
ge.collectioncodeGA
ge.dataimportlabelOAI metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:16088925
ge.identifier.permalinkhttps://www.globethics.net/gel/16088925
ge.lastmodificationdate2019-02-15 00:35
ge.lastmodificationuseradmin@pointsoftware.ch (import)
ge.submissions0
ge.oai.exportid149453
ge.oai.repositoryid4212
ge.oai.streamid2
ge.setnameGlobeEthicsLib
ge.setspecglobeethicslib
ge.linkhttps://philpapers.org/rec/HICMUA


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