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dc.contributor.authorLindauer, Matthew
dc.contributor.authorSouthwood, Nicholas
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-26T00:37:07Z
dc.date.available2019-09-26T00:37:07Z
dc.date.created2019-04-14 23:34
dc.date.issuedforthcoming
dc.identifieroai:philpapers.org/rec/LINHTC
dc.identifierhttps://philpapers.org/rec/LINHTC
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/633908
dc.description.abstractEmpirical support is offered for the claim that the original Knobe effect, whereby our intentional action ascriptions exhibit certain asymmetries in light of our moral attitudes, can be successfully cancelled. This is predicted by the view that the Knobe effect can be explained in purely pragmatic terms (Adams and Steadman 2004a, 2004b, 2007). However, previous cancelling studies (Adams and Steadman 2007; Nichols and Ulatowski 2007) have failed to identify evidence of cancellability. The key to the successful cancelling strategy presented here is to provide subjects with the opportunity to assent to statements that involve sufficiently strong forms of moral censure.
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleHow to cancel the Knobe effect: the role of sufficiently strong moral censure
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
ge.collectioncodeGA
ge.dataimportlabelOAI metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:16157223
ge.identifier.permalinkhttps://www.globethics.net/gel/16157223
ge.lastmodificationdate2019-04-14 23:34
ge.lastmodificationuseradmin@pointsoftware.ch (import)
ge.submissions0
ge.oai.exportid149453
ge.oai.repositoryid4212
ge.oai.streamid2
ge.setnameGlobeEthicsLib
ge.setspecglobeethicslib
ge.linkhttps://philpapers.org/rec/LINHTC


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