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dc.contributor.authorLange, Benjamin
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-26T00:39:12Z
dc.date.available2019-09-26T00:39:12Z
dc.date.created2019-07-14 23:46
dc.date.issuedforthcoming
dc.identifieroai:philpapers.org/rec/LANOO-2
dc.identifierhttps://philpapers.org/rec/LANOO-2
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/635288
dc.description.abstractI argue that you can be permitted to discount the interests of your adversaries even though doing so would be impartially suboptimal. This means that, in addition to the kinds of moral options that the literature traditionally recognises, there exist what I call other-sacrificing options. I explore the idea that you cannot discount the interests of your adversaries as much as you can favour the interests of your intimates; if this is correct, then there is an asymmetry between negative partiality toward your adversaries and positive partiality toward your intimates.
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleOther-Sacrificing Options
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
ge.collectioncodeGA
ge.dataimportlabelOAI metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:16277720
ge.identifier.permalinkhttps://www.globethics.net/gel/16277720
ge.lastmodificationdate2019-07-14 23:46
ge.lastmodificationuseradmin@pointsoftware.ch (import)
ge.submissions0
ge.oai.exportid149453
ge.oai.repositoryid4212
ge.oai.streamid2
ge.setnameGlobeEthicsLib
ge.setspecglobeethicslib
ge.linkhttps://philpapers.org/rec/LANOO-2


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