Author(s)
Vallentyne, PeterContributor(s)
University of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of PhilosophyKeywords
Fortune -- Moral and ethical aspectsDecision making -- Moral and ethical aspects
Responsibility -- Philosophy
Equality -- Philosophy
Distributive justice -- Philosophy
justice
Responsibility -- Moral and ethical aspects
social and political philosophy
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http://hdl.handle.net/10355/10159Abstract
In Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, Susan Hurley defends a reason-responsive account of responsibility, argues that appeals to responsibility cannot provide a justification or non-trivial specification of brute luck egalitarian theories of justice, and sketches her own cognitive-bias-neutralizing theory of justice. Throughout, Hurley is concerned with normative (as opposed to causal) responsibility, where this is understood as that which licenses (moral or prudential) praise, blame, and other reactive attitudes and which implies at least partial (substantive) moral accountability in principle for choices and their results. I shall focus on her arguments about the role of responsibility in brute luck egalitarian theories of justice.http://klinechair.missouri.edu/on-line%20papers/hurley.doc
Date
2011-03-07Type
ArticleIdentifier
oai:mospace.umsystem.edu:10355/10159http://hdl.handle.net/10355/10159
0031-8205
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72 (2006): 433-438