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A realist and internalist response to one of Mackie’s arguments from queerness

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Author(s)
Tännsjö, Torbjörn
Keywords
internalism
moral realism
mackie
olson
tresan

Full record
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/644908
Online Access
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-101367
Abstract
If there is such a thing as objectively existing prescriptivity, as the moral realist claims, then we can also explain why — and we need not deny that — strong (conceptual) internalism is true. Strong conceptual internalism is true, not because of any belief in any magnetic force thought to be inherent in moral properties themselves, as Mackie argued, but because we do not allow that anyone has (in the practical sense) ‘accepted’ a normative claim, unless she is prepared to some extent to act on it (to see to it that it is satisfied).
Date
2015
Type
Article in journal
Identifier
oai:DiVA.org:su-101367
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-101367
doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0306-z
ISI:000349021600004
DOI
10.1007/s11098-014-0306-z
Copyright/License
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1007/s11098-014-0306-z
Scopus Count
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Philosophical Ethics

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