Making the Morally Relevant Features Explicit: A Response to Carson Strong
Online Access
http://worldcatlibraries.org/registry/gateway?version=1.0&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&atitle=Making+the+morally+relevant+features+explicit:+a+response+to+Carson+Strong&title=Kennedy+Institute+of+Ethics+Journal+&volume=16&issue=1&date=2006-03&au=Gert,+Bernardhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ken.2006.0003
http://hdl.handle.net/10822/974340
Abstract
Carson Strong criticizes the application of my moral theory to bioethics cases. Some of his criticisms are due to my failure to make explicit that both the irrationality or rationality of a decision and the irrationality or rationality of the ranking of evils are part of morally relevant feature 3. Other criticisms are the result of his not using the two-step procedure in a sufficiently rigorous way. His claim that I come up with a wrong answer depends upon his incorrectly regarding a weakly justified violation as one that all impartial rational persons would agree was permitted, rather than as one about which rational persons disagree.Date
2016-01-08Identifier
oai:repository.library.georgetown.edu:10822/974340doi:10.1353/ken.2006.0003
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 2006 March; 16(1): 59-71
http://worldcatlibraries.org/registry/gateway?version=1.0&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&atitle=Making+the+morally+relevant+features+explicit:+a+response+to+Carson+Strong&title=Kennedy+Institute+of+Ethics+Journal+&volume=16&issue=1&date=2006-03&au=Gert,+Bernard
http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ken.2006.0003
http://hdl.handle.net/10822/974340
DOI
10.1353/ken.2006.0003ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1353/ken.2006.0003