• English
    • français
    • Deutsch
    • español
    • português (Brasil)
    • Bahasa Indonesia
    • русский
    • العربية
    • 中文
  • English 
    • English
    • français
    • Deutsch
    • español
    • português (Brasil)
    • Bahasa Indonesia
    • русский
    • العربية
    • 中文
  • Login
View Item 
  •   Home
  • Philosophy collections
  • Philosophical Ethics
  • View Item
  •   Home
  • Philosophy collections
  • Philosophical Ethics
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Browse

All of the LibraryCommunitiesPublication DateTitlesSubjectsAuthorsThis CollectionPublication DateTitlesSubjectsAuthorsProfilesView

My Account

Login

The Library

AboutNew SubmissionSubmission GuideSearch GuideRepository PolicyContact

Statistics

Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors

Making the Morally Relevant Features Explicit: A Response to Carson Strong

  • CSV
  • RefMan
  • EndNote
  • BibTex
  • RefWorks
Author(s)
Gert, Bernard
Keywords
Philosophical Ethics
Bioethics

Full record
Show full item record
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/644910
Online Access
http://worldcatlibraries.org/registry/gateway?version=1.0&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&atitle=Making+the+morally+relevant+features+explicit:+a+response+to+Carson+Strong&title=Kennedy+Institute+of+Ethics+Journal+&volume=16&issue=1&date=2006-03&au=Gert,+Bernard
https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ken.2006.0003
http://hdl.handle.net/10822/974340
Abstract
Carson Strong criticizes the application of my moral theory to bioethics cases. Some of his criticisms are due to my failure to make explicit that both the irrationality or rationality of a decision and the irrationality or rationality of the ranking of evils are part of morally relevant feature 3. Other criticisms are the result of his not using the two-step procedure in a sufficiently rigorous way. His claim that I come up with a wrong answer depends upon his incorrectly regarding a weakly justified violation as one that all impartial rational persons would agree was permitted, rather than as one about which rational persons disagree.
Date
2016-01-08
Identifier
oai:repository.library.georgetown.edu:10822/974340
doi:10.1353/ken.2006.0003
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 2006 March; 16(1): 59-71
http://worldcatlibraries.org/registry/gateway?version=1.0&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&atitle=Making+the+morally+relevant+features+explicit:+a+response+to+Carson+Strong&title=Kennedy+Institute+of+Ethics+Journal+&volume=16&issue=1&date=2006-03&au=Gert,+Bernard
http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ken.2006.0003
http://hdl.handle.net/10822/974340
DOI
10.1353/ken.2006.0003
ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1353/ken.2006.0003
Scopus Count
Collections
Philosophical Ethics

entitlement

 
DSpace software (copyright © 2002 - 2022)  DuraSpace
Quick Guide | Contact Us
Open Repository is a service operated by 
Atmire NV
 

Export search results

The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.

To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.