Online Access
http://lup.lub.lu.se/record/3131797Abstract
The term discriminate, in itself, simply means to make distinctions or discern differences. In that sense, to discriminate is to discern the difference between red and green when picking a red apple out of a fruit basket or to discern differences in physical appearance when noticing a friend in a crowd. Morally and legally, however, discrimination is used to denote a differentiation that is unfair or arbitrary; it is that use which is of concern here. Discrimination appears at the level of international, constitutional, and statutory law, which is important since the meaning and use of the term do not remain static over these different contexts. Discrimination would not be the object of law were it not regarded as an instance of unfairness, but the two issues cannot be separated. They are closely intertwined, even to the extent that legal technicalities – like the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination – appear also as moral features. I focus on vexed issues surrounding the following components: Discrimination is essentially comparative; it represents or results in disadvantage; it is group related.Date
2012Type
textIdentifier
oai:lup.lub.lu.se:3131797http://lup.lub.lu.se/record/3131797
3131797