Horrendous-Difference Disabilities, Resurrected Saints, and the Beatific Vision: A Theodicy
Author(s)
Scott M. WilliamsKeywords
theodicyproblem of evil
horrendous evil
disability
rational moral wish satisfaction
Marilyn McCord Adams
Religions. Mythology. Rationalism
BL1-2790
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Show full item recordAbstract
Marilyn Adams rightly pointed out that there are many kinds of evil, some of which are horrendous. I claim that one species of horrendous evil is what I call horrendous-difference disabilities. I distinguish two subspecies of horrendous-difference disabilities based in part on the temporal relation between one’s rational moral wishing for a certain human function F and its being thwarted by intrinsic and extrinsic conditions. Next, I offer a theodicy for each subspecies of horrendous-difference disability. Although I appeal to some claims made by Marilyn Adams for this theodicy, I reject one particular claim. I deny that one must be aware that one participates in a horrendous evil when the horrific event occurs. To develop this point and its relevance for a theodicy for horrendous-difference disabilities, I engage with Andrew Chignell’s work on infant suffering. In doing so, I show that what partly motivates the claim is a time-bias, i.e., near-bias. By rejecting this time-bias, I show how it is possible, given post-mortem life, for persons with profound cognitive disabilities to participate in horrendous evils and how these might be defeated by God.Date
2018-02-01Type
ArticleIdentifier
oai:doaj.org/article:df531c5b21494e5fac597a2b65321f6d2077-1444
10.3390/rel9020052
https://doaj.org/article/df531c5b21494e5fac597a2b65321f6d