Hersendood. Mackies leibniziaanse herinterpretatie van Lockes theorie van persoonsidentiteit

Abstract

In his book, 'Problems from Locke', John Leslie Mackie presents a theory of personal identity (pi) that is meant to be a supplement and correction of Locke's pi-theory. In a first part I introduce the criterion of pi that was standard before Locke's pi-theory. By showing in a second part how Locke reacted against this traditional criterion, I show wherein the singularity of Locke's pi-theory exists. In a third part I explain how Leibniz is moved by the same solicitude as Locke, but also how he at the same time undermines that solicitude by giving it a place in his monadic system. By doing that, Leibniz - in his own distinctive way - harks back to the traditional pi-approach.

Leibniz' thoughts on pi do not form an integral part of the contemporary debate on pi. Still, also in this matter, he exercised a lot of influence. In the last part I demonstrate this by analyzing Mackie's pi-theory - that puts the identity of the brain central. I show how Mackie's theory, because it reinterprets Locke's theory in a leibnizian way - with the intention to improve Locke's theory - neglects the crux and main concern of that theory.

status: published