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AbstractIn this diploma paper its author explored the use of human mind (intellect) concerning the rights. The demand for the arguments based on justified reasons appeared in the beginning of new age, later these requirements for the reasonable arguments were discussed by the rationalism and irrationalism courses of philosophy. There has been such a rationalization in the science of rights too. Therefore in this paper there were searched and examined the elements of rational and irrational in the rights. The aim of this work is to realize the rational and irrational elements and to examine their necessary presence in the rights, i.e., to investigate the level of balance of rational and irrational at the rights as the cognitive science; the dynamics of such balance between rational and irrational, as well as to state the rational and irrational aspects in such a practical expression of rights like application of rights and their observance by the individuals. The tasks to reach the aim of this work were – to collect and examine the works and opinions of the different philosophers (empirical and rational philosophers, classical rationalists and contemporary philosophers), and different right philosophers; to analyze the previous mentioned opinions, to make the conclusions on these opinions, their mutual compliance, their possible accuracy or inaccuracy and their compliance with the opinion of the author of this work. There were made several conclusions on the presence of rational and irrational in the cognition of the rights, lawmaking and their application during the work. One of the main and most general conclusions were that the science of rights is more irrational science, because its basic elements and conceptions are irrational themselves (the justice, equality, morality etc.) though for the valuable functioning in theory and in practice there is the balance required between the rational and irrational. Otherwise the rights would become either only materially calculable matter or only subjective source of interpretations.