Prekršeni ugovor. Etičko istraživanje stida

Abstract

Fenomen stida može se analizirati aparatom prirodnih, društvenih i humanističkih znanosti. Filozofske rasprave o fenom.enu i emociji stida protežu se od m.etafizičkih i antropoloških pa sve do društveno- političkih Etička analiza stida može biti m.etaetičkog karaktera, pri čemu bi se analizirao sam pojam ‘stid’ i njegova upotreba u moralnom jeziku; deskriptivnog karaktera, pri čemu bismo pitali u kojem moralnom kontekstu ljudi osjećaju stid Također, stid se može tematizirati kao predmiet individualne etike, i to u kontekstu pojedinačne savjesti, ili društvene etike, u kontekstu društvene moralne osude za neki čin čije moralne kakvoće pojedinac postaje svjestan upravo pojavom osjećaja stida. U ovom tekstu stidu se pristupa u kontekstu normativne etike, pokušajem odgovora na pitanje: Kada je prigodno osjećati stid? Kako bi odgovorio na to pitanje, autor poseže za etičko-političkom tradicijom društvenog ugovora. U ponuđenom odgovoru koji pokušava argumentirati tvrdi da je prigodno mjesto stida u onim instancama u kojima pojedinac prekrši implicitni ili ekplicitni, pisani ili nepisani ugovor s drugom stranom “Druga strana” može biti društvo u cjelini, Bog, priroda i planet, vlastiti spol, sam pojedinac. Ukratko, “drugu stranu” može predstavljati svaka zbilja koja u umu prekršitelja može predstavljati onog “drugog”.

The phenomenon of shame can be analysed with the apparatus of natural and social sciences, and humanities. Philosophical discussions about the phenomenon and emotion of shame extend across a wide range of disciplines, from metaphysics and anthro-pology, to the social and political disciplines. An ethical analysis of shame can be meta-ethical, meaning that the concept of ‘shame’ would be analyzed in terms of its usage in our moral language; descriptive, meaning that we would ask questions about the moral context in which people feel shame. Also, shame can be the subject matter of individual ethics, as it refers to the development of per¬sonal conscience, or social ethics, as it refers to social moral con¬demnation of certain acts, inasmuch as the person responsible for them becomes aware of their moral quality through the feeling of shame. In this text, the author approaches the subject through the context of normative ethics, thus attempting to answer the question: When is it proper to feel shame? In order to answer this question, the author invokes the ethical and political social contract tradition. The answer that he attempts to defend says that the proper occasion to feel shame is in those instances in which an individual breaks an explicit or implicit, written or verbal contract with the other. “The other” can be the whole of society, God, nature and the planet, one’s gender, one’s self. In short, “the other” can be any reality that can be represented as “another” in the mind of the person breaking the contract.