A Stable and Secure Africa: Leveraging the State Partnership Program
Author(s)Smith, David A.
Contributor(s)ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
KeywordsGovernment and Political Science
Military Forces and Organizations
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
*NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM
*AFRICOM(UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND)
*THEATRE SECURITY COOPERATION
SPP(NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM)
CIVIL SECURITY COOPERATION
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AbstractSecurity and stability in Africa continue to be challenged by numerous factors, including poverty, weak governance, and persistent violent conflict, all of which have national security implications for the United States. In 2007, President Bush, recognizing the emerging strategic importance of Africa, formally announced the formation of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). In support of AFRICOM's Theatre Security Cooperation Plan, the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is using its unique capabilities to assist in building capacity across the military and civilian sectors of Africa. This Strategy Research Project examines how the capabilities of the SPP can be leveraged to enhance security and stability in Africa. The paper begins by reviewing the legacies of the colonial and Cold War periods in Africa's history to provide a full appreciation of the current situation and challenges in Africa today. It then describes Africa in the 21st century, stating that although advances are being seen in the areas of democratization, economics, and conflict prevention, humanitarian crises and violent conflict stemming from weak governance, limited access to adequate health and education services, and extreme poverty continue to restrict further progress. Subsequent sections discuss U.S. interests in the continent and how they relate to the U.S. National Security Strategy, the U.S. National Defense Strategy, the Department of State Strategic Plan, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, and National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44). The paper also provides background on AFRICOM and its primary missions and activities, and on the SPP and its founding. Of the 62 SPPs worldwide, 8 are in AFRICOM. The final section details the missions and activities of the SPPs and how they can be leveraged to achieve the strategic goals of the United States with respect to Africa.
Strategy Research Project.
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