Keywords
CONTINUITY OF POLICIESEFFECTS OF GOVERNANCE
AGGREGATION METHODOLOGY
EFFECTS OF GOVERNANCE ON GROWTH
EXCHANGE OF IDEAS
GOVERNANCE ESTIMATE
DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE
COMPARISONS OF GOVERNANCE
GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE OF COUNTRIES
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY RELATIVE
GOVERNANCE PERCEPTIONS
EFFECT OF GOVERNANCE
DIRECTIONS BETWEEN GOVERNANCE
FOREIGN TRADE
FEEDBACK FROM INCOMES TO GOVERNANCE
POLITICAL RIGHTS
COUNTRY RANKINGS
REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNANCE
GOVERNANCE SCALE
SET OF WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
LAW INDICATOR
GRAND CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION CONTROL
CIVIL SOCIETY
COUNTRY COMPARABILITY
GOVERNANCE DIAGNOSTIC
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
CAPITA INCOMES TO GOVERNANCE
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS
CAPITA INCOME TO BETTER GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
POLITICAL ECONOMIC RISK
COMPOSITE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
UNOBSERVED COMMON COMPONENT OF GOVERNANCE
CAUSAL EFFECTS
GOVERNANCE RATING
QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE
DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNANCE
COUNTRY RISK GUIDE
CRIME
SET OF GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
BROAD DEFINITION OF GOVERNANCE
POLITICAL STABILITY
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
CORRUPTION
GOVERNANCE ESTIMATES
CHOICE OF UNITS FOR GOVERNANCE
CAUSAL EFFECT
GOVERNANCE ABSENCE
GOVERNANCE DATABASE
UNOBSERVED COMPONENTS MODEL
GOVERNANCE CLUSTERS
CORRUPTION INDICATORS
PER CAPITA INCOME
PURCHASING POWER PARITY
DEPENDENCE OF GOVERNANCE ON INCOMES
CAPITA INCOME TO GOVERNANCE
GRAFT
GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE
GOVERNANCE INDICATOR
AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
FINAL SET OF GOVERNANCE ESTIMATES
REVERSE CAUSATION
CIVIL SERVICE
MISGOVERNANCE
CAPITA INCOMES ON GOVERNANCE
CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT
COMPARISONS ACROSS SOURCES
FOREIGN INVESTORS
BROADER ASPECT OF GOVERNANCE
COLONIES
GOVERNANCE CLUSTER
SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
FAILURE OF GOVERNANCE
ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURE
SUBJECTIVE GOVERNANCE DATA
NEGATIVE FEEDBACK FROM INCOMES TO GOVERNANCE
ANTICORRUPTION LEGISLATION
GOOD INSTITUTIONS
EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION
CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNANCE
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS
IMPROVEMENTS IN GOVERNANCE
AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATOR
EFFECTS OF INCOME ON GOVERNANCE
NATIONS
CIVIL LIBERTIES
MEASURES PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION
JUDICIARY
COUNTRY COVERAGE
QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE ACROSS COUNTRIES
OBSERVABLE PROXY FOR GOVERNANCE
ANTICORRUPTION
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
PUBLIC POWER
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
PRESENCE OF CORRUPTION
MEASUREMENT ERROR
EFFECTS OF GOVERNANCE ON INCOMES
PURCHASING POWER
INCIDENCE OF MARKET-UNFRIENDLY POLICIES
CITIZENS
COUNTRY RISK SERVICE
ENFORCEABILITY
QUALITY OF PUBLIC
POLITICAL RISK
MEASUREMENT ERROR IN GOVERNANCE
MEDIA
DISTURBANCE TERM
PUBLIC OFFICIAL
RISK RATING AGENCIES
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
CIVIL SERVANTS
PUBLIC POLICY
DECLINES IN GOVERNANCE
RULE OF LAW
DIAGNOSTIC SURVEYS
LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE
CAPITA INCOME ON GOVERNANCE
DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNANCE ESTIMATES
GOOD POLICIES
SET OF GOVERNANCE MEASURES
PRIORITIES
COMMITMENT TO POLICIES
PUBLIC GOODS
SET OF AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
MEASURE OF GOVERNANCE
REGULATORY QUALITY
COUNTRY RATINGS
GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES
GOOD GOVERNANCE
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
BUREAUCRACY
AGGREGATION PROCEDURE
COUNTRY RISK REVIEW
POLICY RESEARCH
AUTHORITY
GOVERNANCE DATA
AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION
INCOME LEVELS
PUBLIC SERVICE
UNOBSERVED GOVERNANCE
NOTIONS OF GOVERNANCE
CITIZEN
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
SUBJECTIVE PERCEPTIONS
PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION
AGGREGATE INDICATORS
MEASURING GOVERNANCE
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNANCE
LEGISLATION
PER CAPITA INCOMES
CIVIL SOCIETY AT LARGE
CRIMINALS
SUBJECTIVE INDICATORS
DETERIORATION IN GOVERNANCE
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http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19206Abstract
It is well known that there is a strong positive correlation between per capita incomes and the quality of governance across countries. the authors propose an empirical strategy that allows separation of this correlation into (1) a strong positive causal effect running from better governance to higher per capita incomes, and, perhaps surprisingly at first, (2) a weak and even negative causal effect running in the opposite direction from per capita incomes to governance. The first result confirms existing evidence on the importance of good governance for economic development. The second result is new and suggests the absence of a "virtuous circle" in which higher incomes lead to further improvements in governance. This motivates the authors' choice of title, "Growth Without Governance." They document this evidence using a newly updated set of worldwide governance-indicators covering 175 countries for the period 2000-01, and use the results to interpret the relationship between incomes and governance focusing on the Latin America and Caribbean region-within a worldwide empirical context. Finally, the authors speculate about the potential importance of elite influence and state capture in accounting for the surprising negative effects of per capita incomes on governance, present some evidence on such capture in some Latin American countries, and suggest priorities for actions to improve governance when such pernicious elite influence shapes public policy.Date
2014-08-01Identifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/19206http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19206
Copyright/License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/Collections
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