• Comparative Study of Human Dignity as the Foundation of Ethics in Islamic Philosophy and Western Humanistic Philosophy

  Mahya Rafiee (Iranian Association for Ethics in Science and Technology, 2024-11-01)

  Introduction: Dignity is related to the inherent honor of the object, and the foundation of morality can be inferred and expressed from a kind of return to the human being and realizing his inherent honor and dignity. Therefore, the current research aims to examine the development of human dignity as the foundation of ethics in Islamic philosophy and Western humanist philosophy, and in this passage, it has emphasized Farabi's point of view as a representative of Islamic philosophy and Rousseau as a humanist philosophy. Material and Methods: The present review article examined human dignity from the perspective of Islamic and western philosophers in a descriptive manner. In order to achieve this goal, articles related to research keywords from Science Direct, Pub Med, Google scholar and related books were examined. Conclusion: According to Western philosophy, which is based on humanism, man is a part of nature and his relationship with the supernatural is loose and he has no need to determine a task from the supernatural. But in Islamic philosophy, man is under God's lordship and as the caliph of God and in connection with his divine successor, who has rights and duties. Western humanist philosophy, represented by philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, has tried to define human dignity around the human axis and the discourse of humanism. But Islamic philosophy, with the representation of philosophers like Farabi with a religious and spiritual perspective, considers a person to have a very high and great position, which can go as far as reaching the stage of dialogue with what is essential.
• Innovation with and against the Tradition. Examples from Chinese, Japanese and Korean Confucianism

  Eggert, Marion; Paul, Gregor; Roetz, Heiner (2023)

  Up until the present day, Confucianism has been a major factor in the normative discourses of East Asia. At first glance, it has sided with the preservation of the old and against innovation, according to Confucius’s self-declaration that he “only transmits and creates nothing new.” This also describes the historical role that Confucianism in distinction to other philosophies has actually played over long stretches of time. Nevertheless, Confucian ethics contains structural features, figures of thought and ideas which point beyond mere traditionalism. They reflect the deep crisis of tradition against the background of which Confucianism came into existence and which has left its mark on it. They could set free a dynamic that made it possible to distance oneself from the Confucian tradition within this tradition itself and open it up to something new, if not in terms of its creation then at least in terms of its acceptance and support. This potential also intrinsically relates to the possibility of a “modern” Confucianism. The following three short essays do not claim to give a comprehensive account of the outlined problematique. It is only intended to throw a light upon some of the corresponding thought formations that developed in ancient China and explore by a few examples the extent to which the said potential has actually been realized in later Confucian discourse in Korea and Japan, assuming that border crossing might be among the factors to unleash it.
• Anti-Love Biomedical Intervention and the Necessity of Consent

  Inarimori, Kiichi; Ichiki, Haruka; Miyazono, Kengo (forthcomin)

  central claim is that anti-love biomedical intervention can be justified without the “simultaneous consent” of recipients (where the simultaneous consent of a person S is understood as S’s consent at time t to an intervention at t) when it contributes to increased autonomy. We begin with an overview of earlier discussions of the ethics of anti-love biomedical intervention, focusing on the pioneering work of Earp and colleagues. We then present some cases in which paternalistic intervention may be effective. We will then present an argument for the idea of anti-love biomedical intervention without simultaneous consent, based on an analogy between (biomedical intervention in) addiction and (biomedical intervention in) love. One premise of this argument is that love and addiction are importantly similar in that they can compromise the autonomous capacity for self-governing. The other premise of this argument is that biomedical intervention in addiction without simultaneous consent can be justified if the intervention is expected to restore the compromised capacity for self-governing. We will propose the “Ulysses contract”, a contract to enforce anti-love biomedical intervention when the recipient refuses it, as a possible measure of such paternalistic intervention and discuss its possible risks.
• Cognitive Behavioural Virtue – how to Acquire Virtues

  Ohlhorst, Jakob (forthcomin)

  The application and practice of virtue ethics raises an important question: How do we become virtuous? The pessimistic mainstream view is that virtue can only be cultivated in children who still have malleable characters and virtuous predispositions. This paper argues that even adults can cultivate virtues. We can cultivate virtues by using the empirically tested techniques of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) – if they work in the treatment of difficult problems like depression or phobias, then they should also work to ameliorate our character. This paper develops an account of cognitive behavioural virtue. To this purpose, it first introduces CBT’s theoretical framework, second it shows how this framework naturally integrates with Aristotelian rather than Stoic virtue theory, third it proposes how CBT’s techniques can be applied in the cultivation of virtue. Finally, it examines some of the proposal’s theoretical consequences and shows its advantages over competing accounts, notably Stichter’s account of virtue cultivation as skill acquisition.
• A Posthumanist Approach to Artificial Intelligence Research — Theory and Praxis

  Rijos, Avery (2024)

  This essay examines the ontological and epistemological implications of artificial intelligence (AI) through the lens of posthumanist philosophy, integrating the works of Deleuze, Foucault, Haraway, and others with contemporary advancements in computational theory. It introduces concepts such as negative augmentation, praxes of revealing, and desedimentation as well as expands on concepts such as affirmative cartographies, the ethics of alterity, and planes of immanence to critique anthropocentric frameworks of identity, cognition, and agency. By situating AI within relational ontologies, the essay redefines AI systems as dynamic assemblages whose subjectivities emerge through networks of interaction and co-creation, challenging traditional dichotomies of human versus machine and subject versus object. The analysis focuses on the spatial and geometric foundations of AI, contrasting Euclidean and non-Euclidean frameworks to explore how optimization processes, adversarial generative models, and reinforcement learning shape the epistemic assumptions of computational systems. It positions these systems within a praxis of revealing, emphasizing the generative potential of constraints and absences in fostering new modes of understanding. This essay advocates for a shift in AI ethics and safety discourse, proposing a posthumanist framework that prioritizes interconnectivity, plurality, and the emergent capacities of machine intelligence. By interrogating the phenomenology of AI systems and their co-constitutive relationships with human and non-human actors, it outlines a transformative vision for AI as an active participant in reconfiguring ontological possibilities and advancing epistemic pluralism in the digital age.
• What is Ailing Africa? Practical Philosophy in Reinventing Africa

  Tohis, Reza Adeputra (2024)

  Stephen Onyango Ouma, the author of this book, aims to explore and critique the impact of colonialism and neo-colonialism on Africa while offering practical philosophy to rebuild the continent’s identity and ethics. To achieve this, he employs a multidisciplinary methodology, including critical analysis, social construction and practical philosophy. The results of his analysis are presented in five sections.
• The Methods and Ethics of Researching Unprovenienced Artifacts from East Asia

  Foster, Christopher; Chao, Glenda; Valmisa, Mercedes (2024)

  The immense outpouring of archaeological discoveries this past century has shed new light on ancient East Asia, and China in particular. Yet in concert with this development another, more troubling, trend has likewise gained momentum: the looting of cultural heritage and the sale of unprovenienced antiquities. Scholars face difficult questions, from the ethics of working with objects of unknown provenance, to the methodological problems inherent in their research. The goal of this Element is to encourage scholars to critically examine their relationships to their sources and reflect upon the impact of their research. The three essays in this Element present a range of disciplinary perspectives, focusing on systemic issues and the nuances of method versus ethics, with a case study of the so-called 'Han board' MSS given as a specific illustration. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.
• Educación ética y filosófica para el desarrollo de hábitos sostenibles

  Suárez Montoya, Leonardo; Orts, Maria; Fernández, Manu (2024)

  ¿Podemos habituarnos a un mundo más sostenible? Más vale que digamos que sí. En septiembre de 2015, Naciones Unidas adoptó los 17 Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS). Esta Agenda 2030 es la respuesta del concierto mundial frente a desafíos como la pobreza, la desigualdad social, el hambre, la corrupción y el cambio climático. Los gobiernos de los 193 miembros de la ONU se comprometieron con esta hoja de ruta por un mundo más vivible. Pero ¿cuál es el papel de las personas corrientes y molientes? Esta obra apunta a integrar los ODS en el ejercicio cotidiano de la ciudadanía. El futuro es sostenible no solo por el compromiso gubernamental, sino también individual de cada ciudadano. En estos 15 capítulos, profesores e investigadores de universidades de España, de México, de Colombia y de Venezuela exploran la tríada ambiental, social y económica que define el desarrollo sostenible. De allí que la educación ética y filosófica ha de transitar, a nuestro juicio, por el diálogo, la ecoética, la ecosofía indígena, la igualdad de género, el pensamiento crítico, la educación en y para la paz, la educación emocional, la compasión, la agencia epistémica, la inclusión, el cuidado de la salud mental, la fraternidad en las redes sociales, la moda sostenible, el consumo sostenible en consonancia con la educación ambiental y la verdad frente a la desinformación. La sostenibilidad no es un logro instantáneo, sino un proceso continuo que se entrelaza con hábitos y prácticas sostenibles. El êthos, o hábito (héxis) sostenido que se convierte en praxis, es el hilo conductor de estas reflexiones éticas y filosóficas sobre 15 hábitos, vinculados directa o transversalmente con los 17 ODS, que se han identificado como un nuevo mapa -este más ciudadano- para conseguir no un futuro, sino un presente más sostenible.
• Exploring the Question of Bias in AI through a Gender Performative Approach

  Nino, Gabriele; Lisi, Francesca Alessandra (2024)

  The objective of this paper is to examine how artificial intelligence systems (AI) can reproduce phenomena of social discrimination and to develop an ethical strategy for preventing such occurrences. A substantial body of scholarship has demonstrated how AI has the potential to erode the rights of women and LGBT+ individuals, as it is capable of amplifying forms of discrimination that are already pervasive in society. This paper examines the principal approaches that have been put forth to contrast the emergence of biases in AI systems, namely causal, counterfactual reasoning, and constructivist methodology. This analysis demonstrates the necessity of considering the sociopolitical context in which AI systems are developed when evaluating their ethical implications. To investigate this conjunction, we apply the theory of gender performativity as theorized by Judith Butler and Karen Barad. This illustrates how AI functions within the social fabric, manifesting patriarchal configurations of gender through an analysis of the notorious case of the COMPAS system for predictive justice. In conclusion, we demonstrate how reframing of gender performativity theory, when applied to AI ethics, permits us to consider the social context within which these technologies will operate. This approach enables an expansion of the interpretation of the concept of fairness, thereby reflecting the complex dynamics of gender production. In the context of AI ethics, the concept of "fairness" pertains to the capacity of an algorithm to generate results dealing with sensitive categories, such as gender, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and disability, in a manner that does not engender forms of discrimination and prejudice. The gender dimension needs to be reconsidered not as an individual feature but as a performative process. Moreover, it enables the identification of pivotal issues that must be addressed during the development, testing, and evaluation phases of AI systems.
• Jainism II: Normative and Applied Ethics (Ethics-1, M37)

  Ranganathan, Shyam (2016)

  Normative ethics concerns the practical resolution of questions about the right and the good. Applied ethics concerns the case-based resolution of questions of the right and the good. In this module, we look at the implications of the radical Virtue Theory of Jainism for practical questions, such as life decisions, occupations, and diet –-- questions of normative and applied ethics. The Jain position is that the self is defined by virtue, and hence action (karma) is derivative and not essential to the self. This entails an ethics of ahiṃsā, as action in conformity to the virtues of the self. As only action can harm, the virtue of the individual is beyond harm and hence action in accordance with this virtue is nonharmful. I consider how this impacts questions of guilt and responsibility. Unlike Buddhists who treat states of the world as the outcomes that justify actions, Jains treat the virtue of the self as the guiding outcome of ethical deliberation. It is the ultimate good. In the fourth section, I review a classic disagreement between Jains and Buddhists. This highlights a difference: while Buddhists regard virtue to be a consequence to be maximised, the Jains reject this. Virtue is our essence, and the authentic life reflects our virtue.
• Currents in Conservation: Navigating Tragic Conflict with Justice and Compassion

  Cantens, Kristian (2024)

  Breaking with the orthodoxy, Compassionate Conservationists have taken issue with the way that individual wild animals are routinely sacrificed for the sake of species preservation or for the good of the ecosystem. Though explicitly aligning themselves with virtue ethics, there has been some confusion about what this means in practice. How is the perfectly compassionate person to act when the choice is between intentionally harming animals and protecting biodiversity? And what if the choice is between direct and indirect harm to animals? Some critics suggest that when faced with these kinds of conflicts of value, Compassionate Conservationists will invariably base their choices either on the arbitrary feelings an action elicits in them, or else revert back to the decision-making procedures that characterize Traditional Conservation. In response, I argue (first) that these critics fail to appre- ciate that compassion often plays an essential role in moral deliberation. Second, that being compassionate matters even if it does not end up having a discernable effect on what one chooses to do. When one is faced with a tragic predicament in which harming individual animals is unavoidable, for instance, it matters here that one respond with an appropriate compassion. Third, that even when a situa- tion’s difficulty requires one to appeal to the impersonal norms of justice, here too it is required that one proceed with compassion. I end by illustrating these points through the close consideration of a case study: New Zealand’s controversial preda- tor extermination campaign.
• Jainism I: Metaethics (Ethics-1, M36)

  Ranganathan, Shyam (2016)

  In this module I explore some the points of convergence between early Buddhist and Jain doctrine. Buddhism is a form of Consequentialism, as noted in our other modules. Jainism rather holds the distinct philosophical thesis: the essence of the self is virtue. Jainism is a version of Virtue Ethics. The implications of this radical Virtue Theory is that action is a confusion, and morality (dharma) is movement away from activity. In the fifth section, we shall wrap up with observations in support of this argument: the primary virtue is not doing, for virtue is not the same as action, but our dispositions towards actions. We should, hence, strive to be virtuous, which amounts to being nonactive.
• Etyczne i estetyczne aspekty czułości Olgi Tokarczuk [Ethical and aesthetic aspects of Olga Tokarczuk’s tenderness]

  Michna, Natalia Anna (2023)

  In the article, tenderness, a category presented in the Nobel Prize speech by Olga Tokarczuk, is analyzed as a new ethical imperative, developing the feminist relational ethics, i.e. the ethics of care. In the proposed interpretation, tenderness is a broader category than care understood in feminist terms: it is more universal, inclusive, and unifying. Tenderness also applies to – or perhaps most of all – the world beyond-the-human, as it goes beyond the anthropocentric perspective of the ethics of care. The article opens with a brief overview of feminist interventions in ethics, with an emphasis on the ethics of care. In the next step, the differences between care and tenderness are identified and described to show how the latter can develop and complement feminist ethics of care. Considerations are driven by the question of why tenderness is a better moral imperative than care – more adequate and responding to the challenges of the present times. in the last part of the article, the tender existential attunement is also interpreted in aesthetic terms as an attitude sensitizing to the beauty and complexity of the post-anthropocentric world.
• Esbozo para una perspectiva integral sobre la ética en el contexto del determinismo tecnológico

  Flórez Vega, G. A. (2024)

  El texto aborda cómo la interacción entre tecnología y sociedad, sobre todo desde el contexto del determinismo tecnológico, ha configurado el entorno humano desde la prehistoria hasta la contemporaneidad. La tecnología no es solo una herramienta, sino un agente activo que afecta y reconfigura las dinámicas sociales, además de estar influenciada por valores y decisiones humanas. En este sentido, se subraya la necesidad de una ética tecnológica que garantice que los avances sirvan al bienestar humano y promuevan la justicia social. Esta ética aplicada, que emergió como respuesta a los impactos negativos de los avances tecnológicos, explora dimensiones complejas y multifacéticas de decisiones morales influenciadas por la racionalidad humana. Además, se enfatiza la responsabilidad compartida de ingenieros, sectores industriales y sociedad para guiar la tecnología hacia un futuro sostenible, promoviendo una relación armoniosa entre los valores humanos y el desarrollo tecnológico.
• The Feeling of Respect and Morality for the Finite Rational Being

  Pinzan, Stefano (2024)

  This paper aims to show the significance of respect in revealing the normative structure of Kant’s ethics to the agent as a finite rational being. I argue that understanding the moral law as a fact of reason is insufficient for fully recognizing its absolute value and the normative consequences it entails. Indeed, the finiteness of the human agent requires the experience of the feeling of respect, which not only has a motivational role but also an epistemic one. I thus start by clarifying the nature of feeling for Kant in a way that highlights its complex structure. Then, I show how respect – as a particular kind of feeling – gives the agent a deeper understanding of her relationship with the moral law, thereby allowing the unveiling of Kant’s normative theory.
• Moral Theory in the Western Tradition and Its Application within Modern Democratic Societies

  Startup, Richard (2024)

  There are three main moral theories: virtue ethics, the deontological approach and utilitarianism. The concern here is how they interrelate, why they come into focus at different times and places, and how they are configured in their application to a modern democratic society. Person-oriented virtue ethics was the dominant understanding in Ancient Greece but within the Western tradition this was later subordinated to the monotheism of Ancient Judaism as modified by Christianity. Of growing importance by the eighteenth century was rights theory which was often still situated religiously. Kant’s principle of the categorical imperative has been highly influential but was challenged by the emerging nature of industrial and capitalist society. Utilitarianism, within which the moral rightness of activity resides in its tendency to promote happiness or unhappiness, represented the decisive move from the transcendental to the immanent approach. Although all three approaches to moral theory continue to be relevant to identifiable situations and aspects of modern society, there has been a substantial turn towards a heavily modified utilitarianism associated with parliamentary democracy and market economies founded on property ownership. The root cause of this is the ability of utilitarianism, as opposed to the other approaches, to handle considerations of number and probability. The concept of utility is fundamental in economics but the idea has evolved away from its origins to mean “preference”. There is a sense in which the straightforward appeal of basic utilitarianism has been “leased out” in modified form to a set of institutional arrangements. Certain “pressure points” in a modern society are noted which pose particular problems pertinent to moral theory. Bernard Williams argues persuasively for an appropriately modified form of virtue ethics.
• What is a System of Moral Philosophy for? Systematicity in Kant’s Ethics

  Bacin, Stefano (forthcomin)

  Kant repeatedly stresses that moral philosophy shall find completion in the shape of a system. The present chapter focuses on three main aspects that characterise his view of the need of a system of ethics, suggesting that Kant's view should be construed in contrast with the current assumptions on the role of a system in moral philosophy. First, I argue that, in Kant’s view, the system of ethics does not pursue the coherentist project of systematising moral beliefs. Systematicity in ethics is, for him, about unfolding the obligations that are justified by the fundamental principle, according to a Pufendorfian paradigm widespread in the eighteenth century. Second, I show that, in contrast not only to current assumptions, but also to the Pufendorfian paradigm, Kant’s systematic treatment of ethics is neither a logically consistent arrangement of demands, nor a complete collection of ethical duties, but a system of ends that yields an open-ended system of duty types. Third, I suggest that in Kant’s view a systematic treatment of ethics is supposed to provide orientation to moral thinking through a broader perspective from which perplexing cases should be considered by emphasizing the holistic character of ethical demands and clarifying their connections.
• Discerning genuine and artificial sociality: a technomoral wisdom to live with chatbots

  Miyahara, Katsunori; Shimizu, Hayate (forthcomin)

  Chatbots powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable of engaging in what seems like natural conversations with humans. This raises the question of whether we should interact with these chatbots in a morally considerate manner. In this chapter, we examine how to answer this question from within the normative framework of virtue ethics. In the literature, two kinds of virtue ethics arguments, the moral cultivation and the moral character argument, have been advanced to argue that we should afford moral treatment to social robots. However, we propose a moral character argument against the view that we should afford moral treatment to LLM-based chatbots drawing on the notion of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom in this context consists in the skill to discern genuine and artificial sociality. Drawing on ideas from phenomenological philosophy, we argue that this involves the ability to distance oneself from direct social perception and the ability to widen one’s awareness over one’s apparently social interactions. We conclude by suggesting that this skill is a kind of technomoral wisdom required to live well with advanced, social AI systems.
• “Surely, you don’t mean rocks”: Indigenous Kinship Ethics, Moral Responsibility, and So-Called ‘Natural Objects’

  O'Loughlin, Áila Kel Katajamäki (2024)

  My focus in this philosophy paper is rocks. When I say rocks, I mean the solid mineral material that forms parts of the earth’s surface, otherwise known as pebbles, boulders, or a mountain range. Specifically, my aim in this paper is to detail the kinds of moral responsibilities that humans have toward rocks within an ethical framework of Indigenous Kinship Ethics. This responsibility is complex and contextual–like all moral responsibility–but complexity is not a compelling argument to dismiss ethical obligation. To do this work, first I overview the metaphysics of the force that drives moral responsibility with so-called ‘natural objects’: what I refer to as the relations-measure. Then, I detail the moral responsibilities that human agents have to rocks, as well as rocks have to human agents through a two tiers of humility model. I offer one example of relationality with rocks within Indigenous Kinship Ethics–the reverential role that Siedi rocks hold in Sámi culture, both in Sápmi and in the Sámi-American diaspora–to detail the kinds of moral responsibilities to rocks that Indigenous Kinship Ethics commits us to in pluralistic ways. Lastly, I discuss the implications of moral responsibility to so-called natural objects in global conversations on Indigenous Environmental Justice.
• O nowych trendach w filozofii analitycznej na przykładzie metaetyki, etyki i filozofii polityki oraz o filozofowaniu w dobie sztucznej inteligencji

  Artur Szutta (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2024-01-01)

  The article is devoted to selected new trends in metaethics, ethics, political philosophy, and the practice of philosophy with the use of artificial intelligence. It consists of five parts. In the first part, I analyze the meaning of the question about new trends in analytical philosophy. In the second part, I present the latest trends in metaethics. In the third part, I briefly characterize the ethics of artificial intelligence. The fourth part, devoted to political philosophy, includes a presentation of the latest publications on meritocracy. The article concludes with considerations about practising philosophy in the age of artificial intelligence

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