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dc.contributor.authorColin Camerer
dc.contributor.authorSera Linardi
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-24T08:22:55Z
dc.date.available2019-10-24T08:22:55Z
dc.date.created2017-02-28 00:09
dc.identifieroai:RePEc:pit:wpaper:483
dc.identifierRePEc:pit:wpaper:483
dc.identifierhttp://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp1340.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://www.linardi.gspia.pitt.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/RelationalContracting_CamererLinardi.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/912375
dc.description.abstractThis paper tests the robustness of the "two-tiered market" in which efficient bilateral contracts emerge between firms and workers (Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004). Our experiment introduces stochastic interruptions in firms' ability to offer contracts. Involuntarily laid off workers are eager to be reemployed; they are not selective about job offers and do not shirk. Firms' preference for these "temp workers" induces all workers to compete harder to enter relational contracts. Wages in low-tier markets rise dramatically, suggesting the stigma of unemployment is removed. The results show that interruptions may shorten relational contracts without harming market efficiency.
dc.description.abstractexperiments, labor market, relational contracts, organizational design, layoffs
dc.titleCan Relational Contracts Survive Stochastic Interruptions? Experimental Evidence
dc.typepreprint
ge.collectioncodeOAIDATA
ge.dataimportlabelOAI metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:10525017
ge.identifier.permalinkhttps://www.globethics.net/gtl/10525017
ge.lastmodificationdate2017-02-28 00:09
ge.lastmodificationuseradmin@pointsoftware.ch (import)
ge.submissions0
ge.oai.exportid149000
ge.oai.repositoryid1228
ge.oai.setnameRePEc
ge.oai.setspecRePEc
ge.oai.streamid5
ge.setnameGlobeTheoLib
ge.setspecglobetheolib
ge.linkhttp://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp1340.pdf
ge.linkhttp://www.linardi.gspia.pitt.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/RelationalContracting_CamererLinardi.pdf


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