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dc.contributor.authorPhillips, Owen R.
dc.contributor.authorMenkhaus, Dale J.
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-24T08:26:02Z
dc.date.available2019-10-24T08:26:02Z
dc.date.created2017-02-28 00:09
dc.identifieroai:RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:76:y:2010:i:3:p:705-715
dc.identifierRePEc:eee:jeborg:v:76:y:2010:i:3:p:705-715
dc.identifierhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-2681(10)00149-6
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/913012
dc.description.abstractUsing bilateral bargaining data from laboratory experimental markets, this paper demonstrates how common knowledge about price averages from past bargains impacts current negotiated prices. This common information creates an endogenous and declining anchor for bargaining agents. The culture of private negotiation leads parties to agreements below the anchor. Currently negotiated prices below the anchor cause reported averages in the next period to fall. The relation between the endogenous anchor and the negotiating culture leads to a downward drift in negotiated prices. Through at least 20 periods of bargaining, relative earnings are distributed toward buyers and away from sellers.
dc.description.abstractNegotiation Anchoring Bargaining experiments
dc.titleThe culture of private negotiation: Endogenous price anchors in simple bilateral bargaining experiments
dc.typeArticle
ge.collectioncodeOAIDATA
ge.dataimportlabelOAI metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:10525668
ge.identifier.permalinkhttps://www.globethics.net/gtl/10525668
ge.lastmodificationdate2017-02-28 00:09
ge.lastmodificationuseradmin@pointsoftware.ch (import)
ge.submissions0
ge.oai.exportid149000
ge.oai.repositoryid1228
ge.oai.setnameRePEc
ge.oai.setspecRePEc
ge.oai.streamid5
ge.setnameGlobeTheoLib
ge.setspecglobetheolib
ge.linkhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-2681(10)00149-6


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