Author(s)
World BankKeywords
BUREAUCRATIC INTERFERENCEREFERENDUM
TAX PAYERS
MAYORS
EXCESSIVE DEFICITS
COURT SYSTEM
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES
ACCOUNTABILITY
BUREAUCRACY
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
REVENUE ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM
TAX LAW
MINISTERS
HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
TAX REVENUE
MUNICIPAL DEBT
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
CITIZENS
PUBLIC ENTITY
DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS
LOCAL EXPENDITURES
SUBNATIONAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
FISCAL TRANSPARENCY
FINANCIAL CAPACITIES
TRANSPORT
BUDGET REVENUES
MORAL HAZARDS
CENTRALIZATION
MARKET ECONOMY
PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY
ACCESS TO CAPITAL
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES
TAX BASE
LEVIES
DECISION MAKING
DECENTRALIZATION OBJECTIVES
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
ASSETS
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY
CAPITAL INVESTMENT
PUBLIC
CAPITAL MARKETS
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
CAPACITY BUILDING
ARREARS
TOWN
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
CREDITWORTHINESS
RATIONALIZATION
BONDS
HOUSING
PROVISIONS
AUTHORITY
NATIONAL SERVICE
LOCAL REVENUE
BUDGETING
DEMOCRACY
DECISION-MAKING
TAX EFFORT
TAX EFFORTS
COUNCILS
TAX BURDEN
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
BANKS
TAX EXEMPTIONS
DEBT SERVICE
PRIVATE SECTOR
EQUALIZATION
SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
TRANSPARENCY
LEGISLATION
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL SYSTEM
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
SUB-NATIONAL AUTHORITIES
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE
JUDICIARY
POLICY OBJECTIVES
CENTRAL AUTHORITIES
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
GOVERNMENT POLICY
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
HUMAN RESOURCES
STATE INSTITUTIONS
DEBT MANAGEMENT
REVENUE SOURCE
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
EXECUTIVE BODIES
MUNICIPALITIES
GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET
PUBLIC SERVANTS
PUBLIC SERVICES
GOVERNMENT LEVELS
SUBNATIONAL AUTHORITIES
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
TAX LIABILITY
FISCAL TRANSFERS
LAWS
SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
PUBLIC SECTOR
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
PUBLIC COMPANIES
REVENUE RATIO
SUB-NATIONAL
LOCAL FEES
SAVINGS
FISCAL INCENTIVES
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
POLICY FORMULATION
FINANCIAL CRISES
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
FISCAL REPORTING SYSTEMS
CAPITAL GRANTS
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
POLICY INSTRUMENT
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
BUDGET SYSTEM
POLICY OUTCOMES
BLOCK GRANTS
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
EFFICIENCY OF SERVICE DELIVERY
SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC PROPERTY
EFFICIENT RESOURCE ALLOCATION
LOCAL TAX
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
GARBAGE COLLECTION
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY
STATE BUDGET
FISCAL AUTONOMY
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
SUPERVISORY POWERS
DECENTRALIZATION REFORM
CIVIL SERVICE
GOVERNMENT FINANCE
EMPLOYMENT
REVENUE STRUCTURE
DEVOLUTION
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
TAX SHARING
LEGALITY
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
PUBLIC DEBT
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
TAXATION
CAPITAL MARKET
TOWNS
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
PUBLIC ENTITIES
LOCAL BUSINESSES
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
LOCAL TAXES
REVENUE MOBILIZATION
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
EXPENDITURE PRIORITIES
EXPENDITURE
MARKET VALUE
LOCAL AUTONOMY
REVENUE AUTONOMY
NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE
REVENUE CAPACITY
DECREES
POLICY REFORM
REVENUE ASSIGNMENT
GOVERNMENT LEVEL
STATE ADMINISTRATION
FISCAL MANAGEMENT
FISCAL TRANSFER
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS
NATIONAL TAXES
GOVERNMENT STRATEGY
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
WATER SUPPLY
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
ROADS
SOCIAL COST
PUBLIC RESOURCES
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS
VERTICAL BALANCE
STATE AUTHORITIES
POLICY RESULTS
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
MUNICIPAL
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
INVESTMENT GRANTS
CONSTITUTION
SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
MACROECONOMIC POLICY
UNFUNDED MANDATES
EXECUTIVE POWER
BUDGETARY AUTONOMY
CREDIBILITY
EXPENDITURE ALLOCATION
LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICE
RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS
DECENTRALIZATION
Full record
Show full item recordOnline Access
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12511Abstract
This report discusses the contours of a
 possible strategic direction, the necessary basic
 institutional set up for implementation, and key reform
 policy options to be tackled in order to complete the
 foundations of the decentralization reform initiated in
 2001. Croatia is still a highly centralized country in terms
 of decision making on public service financing and delivery,
 as compared to most of the new European Union members. One
 indicator is that the sub-national Government's budget
 still corresponds to five percent of GDP, while in the newly
 accessed countries it was about eight percent on average in
 their immediate pre-accession phase. The Government of
 Croatia is conscious about the critical importance of
 improving citizens' voice, transparency and
 accountability on public affairs, especially on matters of
 local interest, in order to increase efficiency on public
 service delivery and rapidly converge to European Union
 standards on a sustainable basis. The Government started its
 decentralization reforms in July 2001, although they have
 not yet adequately implemented them to make the reform
 process sustainable.Date
2013-02-26Type
Economic & Sector WorkIdentifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/12511http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12511
Copyright/License
CC BY 3.0 IGOCollections
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