At the Frontier of Practical Political Economy : Operationalizing an Agent-Based Stakeholder Model in the World Bank's East Asia and Pacific Region
Keywords
SIMULATIONSCOMPANY
CONDITIONALITY
DATA COLLECTION
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
ACCOUNTABILITY
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT
MANDATES
DATA ANALYSIS
POLICE
TAX REVENUE
BUDGET TRANSPARENCY
ANTI-CORRUPTION
POLITICAL ECONOMY
ANTICORRUPTION AGENCY
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
DISCRETION
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE
POLITICIANS
AUDITS
PRIVATE COMPANIES
TAX REFORM
BUDGET PROCESS
INITIATIVE
STAKEHOLDERS
ANTICORRUPTION
PARTICIPATORY ACTIVITIES
DECISION MAKING
FLEXIBILITY
MEDIA
CIVIL SERVICE
RECONSTRUCTION
EX ANTE
CIVIL SERVANT
CAPACITY BUILDING
PROCUREMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
WAGES
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
CORRUPT
CONSENSUS
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
SERVICE DELIVERY
STAKEHOLDER
DEMOCRACY
POLICY DECISIONS
PROTECTED AREAS
TAX COMPLIANCE
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
CIVIL SOCIETY
CONSULTATION
OPENNESS
POVERTY REDUCTION
DEMONSTRATION EFFECTS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
INDIVIDUALS
INTERVIEWS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
GOVERNANCE REFORMS
TRANSPARENCY
CONFIDENCE
ANALYTICAL APPROACH
EX POST
LEGISLATION
SANCTIONS
POLITICAL PARTIES
TAX REFORMS
PATRONAGE
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
LIMITED
TRADEOFFS
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
PROJECT DESIGN
STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
BUILDING CONSENSUS
PARTNERSHIP
MINISTER
PUBLIC ACCESS
TAX ADMINISTRATION
FEASIBILITY
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
JOINT VENTURE
CONSULTATIONS
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
ENVIRONMENTS
EFFECTIVE USE
CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS
PREPARATION
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
CIVIL SERVANTS
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
TAX COLLECTION
Full record
Show full item recordOnline Access
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19940Abstract
Reform programs sometimes falter because
 they are politically infeasible. Policy change inevitably
 creates winners and losers, so those with vested interests
 strike bargains to determine how far and how quickly reform
 should advance. Understanding these micro political dynamics
 of reform can mean the difference between a successful
 intervention that gains political traction and a
 well-intentioned gambit that falls short of achieving its
 developmental objectives. Donors like the World Bank have
 been searching for ways to take these political factors more
 fully into account as they design programs to support
 country reforms. This initiative sought to introduce a
 rigorous and operationally usable political analysis tool
 that could be systematically integrated into the World
 Bank's country programming cycle. The East Asia and
 Pacific region carried out a multi-country pilot of the
 Agent-Based Stakeholder Model. This innovative analytical
 approach entails a quantitative simulation of the complex
 bargaining dynamics surrounding reform. The model
 anticipates stakeholder coalition formation and gauges the
 political feasibility of alternative proposed interventions.
 This paper provides a review of the Agent-Based Stakeholder
 Model pilot experience, exploring what sets this model apart
 from more traditional approaches, how it works, and how it
 fits into the Bank's operational cycle at various
 stages. An overview of the Mongolia, Philippines, and
 Timor-Leste country cases is followed by an examination of
 policy-related insights and lessons learned. Finally, the
 paper builds on this East Asian pilot experience, offering
 ideas on a potential way forward for organizations like the
 World Bank to deepen and extend their political analysis
 capabilities. The paper argues that the Agent-Based
 Stakeholder Model, utilized thoughtfully, offers a powerful
 addition to the practical political economy toolkit.Date
2014-09-02Type
Publications & ResearchIdentifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/19940http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19940
Copyright/License
CC BY 3.0 IGORelated items
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
-
Lao PDR - Civil Service Pay and Compensation Review : Attracting and Motivating Civil ServantsWorld Bank (World Bank, 2012-03-19)Lao PDR is at a point on its development
 trajectory where strategic attention to administrative
 performance is crucial. An efficient and high-performing
 civil service, with the compensation and human resource
 management systems to attract and motivate qualified
 personnel, will be essential to Lao PDR's development
 efforts. The ministerial-level Public Administration and
 Civil Service Authority (PACSA) is currently spearheading
 the drafting of a comprehensive new civil service management
 strategy that will be implemented over the period 2010-2020,
 with a number of important reforms to strengthen the civil
 service anticipated to take place within the next five
 years. Key objectives include improvements in human resource
 policies and planning, salary reform, and enhanced
 performance management. In order to present as comprehensive
 a picture as possible of the Lao civil service pay and
 compensation system, and its strengths and challenges, this
 report comprises four chapters. The first characterizes the
 Lao civil service in perspective. The second examines how
 civil servants are compensated. The third assesses whether
 they are compensated adequately. The fourth summarizes civil
 servants own characterization of their incentives in both
 compensation- and non-compensation-related terms. A brief
 conclusion points to a set of principles for civil service
 reform and outlines three sequenced steps toward achieving a
 more rational civil service pay and grading system.
-
Is Class I Top Tier? Can the Civil Service be a Key to Progress in Bangladesh?World Bank (Washington, DC, 2006-12)The purpose of this study is to help the government of Bangladesh establish a more effective and efficient civil service to move the country toward its goals for social and economic development. The report begins by examining the scope of previous civil service reform initiatives in Bangladesh and the reasons why their track record has been so poor. This investigation focuses on civil service management practices, such as recruitment, training, performance evaluation, promotion, and career management. The rules and practices guiding these elements of personnel management most directly affect civil servants behavior and their approach to their tasks. Although Bangladesh s civil service comprises nearly a million officials, this study is deliberately restricted to a small group - the Class I officers, who make up only 10 percent of the civil service. This group is at the tip of the civil service pyramid; it has the potential to function as the spearhead of reform. The study makes two major recommendations: Give additional emphasis to merit in managing the civil service; and focus on the fundamentals of civil service reform, where tinkering at the edges has been unproductive, by building a stronger legal framework, more independent oversight, and better tools for managing performance.
-
Civil Society and Peacebuilding : Potential, Limitations and Critical FactorsWorld Bank (Washington, DC, 2012-06-11)This report develops and discusses a new analytical framework to understand the functions of civil society in peace building. In theory and practice, there is a wide variety of ways to categorize civil society contributions to development and peacebuilding. Donors tend to employ actor-oriented perspectives, focusing on supporting activities of different types of civil society organizations in a given situation. This report proposes to move toward a functional perspective, centered on the roles that different actors can play in conflict situations. The analysis shows that civil society can make numerous positive contributions and have unique potential to support peacebuilding and conflict mitigation. It can do so independently as actor in its own right, or in relation to peacebuilding processes and programs led by Governments or the international community. Despite many successful initiatives on the ground, however, civil society should not be considered a panacea. The existence of civil society per se cannot be equated with the existence of peacebuilding actors. Similarly, civil society strengthening and support does not automatically contribute to peacebuilding. While civil society organizations are frequently actors for peace, they equally have the potential to become actors of violence. So far, outcomes and impacts of different civil society peace interventions have not been sufficiently evaluated. Civil society and donors need to more strategically identify the objectives and demonstrate the relevance of the particular approaches they propose to engage in different phases of conflict/peacebuilding. Without greater clarity regarding objectives and intended impacts, and, without addressing existing institutional constraints and distortions, activities run the risk of being well-intentioned, but unlikely to achieve sustainable results.