Revenue Sharing of Natural Resources in Africa : Reflections from a Review of International Practices
Keywords
CAPITAL COSTSPUBLIC EXPENDITURE
ENTITLEMENTS
ECONOMIC RENT
SHAREHOLDER
TAXABLE INCOME
BENEFICIARY
CENTRAL BANK
INTERNATIONAL BANK
SURCHARGES
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
TAX PURPOSES
DISCOUNT RATES
TAX REVENUE
EXPLOITATION ACTIVITIES
SUSTAINABLE EXPLOITATION
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
RISK AVERSION
DEBT
DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES
SHARE OF EQUITY
SUBNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT
PENSION FUND
TAX REVENUE SHARING
CENTRALIZATION
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
CASH FLOWS
TIMBER
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING
TREATY
TAX
TAX BASE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
NATIONAL BUDGET
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
PROVINCES
MARKET PRICE
OPPORTUNITY COSTS
OPEC
PUBLIC
EXPLOITATION
PENSION
SUBNATIONAL UNITS
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY
ELECTRICITY
TAX LIABILITIES
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
PRODUCTION COSTS
GOVERNMENT REVENUE
HOLDING
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
NATURAL RESOURCES
DEBT REDEMPTION
REGULATORY POWERS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
PRODUCERS
BID
FEDERAL COUNTRIES
CASH PAYMENTS
FEDERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
BIDS
LANDOWNERS
EQUALIZATION
TRANSPARENCY
TAX CONCESSION
ISSUANCE
EXCHANGE RATES
POLICY OBJECTIVES
LEVY
PRESENT VALUE
MARKET PRICES
PUBLIC GOODS
PROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTURE
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT
FINANCES
PROVEN RESERVES
DISTRICT
TAX REVENUES
SHARE OF INVESTMENT
RETURNS
CASH PAYMENT
POTENTIAL INVESTORS
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
REVENUE FLUCTUATIONS
RISK AVERSE
TAX ADMINISTRATION
INSURANCE
EXPORTS
CURRENT EXPENDITURES
MUNICIPALITIES
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
TAX LIABILITY
INSTRUMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE
PUBLIC SECTOR
CLAIMANTS
GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
DIVIDENDS
LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE
AUCTION
CORPORATE PROFIT TAX
PROVINCE
PRICE FLUCTUATIONS
INEFFICIENCY
SUB-NATIONAL
SAVINGS
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES
WEALTH
SOVEREIGN RISK
EXTERNAL DEBT
CONSUMERS
MINISTRY OF ENERGY
BENEFICIARIES
PUBLIC GOOD
POLICY INSTRUMENTS
COLLUSION
EFFICIENCY LOSSES
COAL
DOMESTIC MARKET
CURRENCY
BLOCK GRANTS
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
MINES
FRAUD
TOXIC SUBSTANCES
CORPORATE INCOME TAX
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
COMPENSATION FUND
DISCOUNT RATE
PRODUCTION RATES
FISCAL FRAMEWORK
EXCHANGE RATE
TAX CREDIT
RENEWABLE RESOURCES
CHECKS
REVENUE SHARING
REVENUE VOLATILITY
SECTOR MINISTRY
TAXPAYERS
INVESTING
OIL
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
EMISSIONS
PRICE INCREASES
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
ENVIRONMENTAL
TAXATION
TAX BASES
INCOME TAX
NET REVENUES
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
TOTAL REVENUE
DISBURSEMENT
FORESTRY
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
FEASIBILITY STUDIES
EXPENDITURE
OIL PRICE
GDP
MUNICIPALITY
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
REVENUE SHARING SCHEMES
VALUE OF OUTPUT
MICROENTERPRISES
ECONOMIC THEORY
SAL
EXPECTED VALUE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
TAX INSTRUMENTS
CAPITAL LOSSES
TAX OBLIGATION
TAX RATE
TOTAL COSTS
EQUIPMENT
CASH TRANSFERS
PORTS
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ROADS
DISTRICTS
ELECTRICITY PRICES
MACROECONOMIC IMPACT
EXPENDITURE CUTS
PUBLIC FINANCE
EXTERNALITIES
CASH FLOW
REVENUE MANAGEMENT
DOMESTIC MARKETS
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
INTERMEDIATION
TAX RATES
RETURN
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
TREATIES
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
DECENTRALIZATION
Full record
Show full item recordOnline Access
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20062Abstract
The African continent is one of the
 world richest regions in oil, gas and minerals. Proven
 reserves have expanded and prospects improved recently
 making the continent an important player on the world stage.
 The share of natural resources in GDP is increasing rapidly.
 Exports of minerals and hydrocarbons account for more than a
 quarter of total exports in half of the sub-Saharan
 economies and the share of natural resources revenue (NRR)
 on total government revenue is expected to become dominant
 for an increasing number of countries. Wealth of natural
 resources offers opportunities but it also brings in
 challenges. Natural resources have generally been linked to
 a series of negative outcomes like economic decline,
 corruption and autocratic rule (McNeish, 2010). Oil and
 minerals reserves are often point source natural
 resources, being usually very spatially concentrated. Their
 discovery becomes almost inevitably a potential source of
 conflict between the governments, the people of the
 producing areas and those of the rest of the country (Fearon
 and Laitin, 2003). In other words, intergovernmental sharing
 is a big issue that needs a solution when natural resources
 are discovered and exploited. Full centralization of NNR is
 the exception rather than the rule, as we will observe in
 the paper. It is practiced for oil and gas by both
 autocratic regimes (such as Saudi Arabia and other Middle
 East countries), and fully fledged democratic systems, such
 as Norway and the UK. Full centralization does not imply,
 however, the absence of compensating mechanisms, or of
 indirect transfers in favor of the governments of the
 producing areas. In the UK, for example, Scotland receives
 no share of oil taxes, but is compensated with a larger
 share of block grants to local governments (the Barnett
 formula ). Norway rewards the local governments closer to
 the producing areas with generous infrastructure projects,
 such as tunnels and bridges linking very sparsely populated
 areas and islands. Autocratic countries may also use
 repression to quench the request for a share of NRR from
 their producing areas.Date
2014-09-10Type
Economic & Sector Work :: Mining/Oil and GasIdentifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/20062http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20062
Copyright/License
CC BY 3.0 IGOCollections
Related items
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
-
Implementing EITI at the Sub National Level : Emerging Experience and Operational FrameworkSeiler, Verena; Caspary, Georg; Aguilar, Javier (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2011-10)The fundamental rationale behind Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is that increased transparency and knowledge of revenues from the extractive industries will empower citizens and institutions to hold governments accountable. By implementing EITI at the sub national level, countries could reduce opportunities for mismanagement or diversion of funds from sustainable development purposes, especially for prominent oil, gas, or mining regions. It is also an effective way of strengthening EITI local ownership among stakeholders. This report presents a preliminary analysis of emerging experiences in EITI countries implementing sub national EITI. Six countries have been selected as case studies: Ghana, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Peru. Based on these experiences, the report proposes a common operational framework for implementing EITI at the sub national level, laying the ground for further practical guidelines on deepening or strengthening the sub national plans or activities of implementing countries.
-
Autonomy with Equity and Accountability : Toward a More Transparent, Objective, Predictable and Simpler (TOPS) System of Central Financing of Provincial-Local Expenditures in IndonesiaShah, Anwar (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014-08-29)During the past decade, Indonesia has
 transformed itself from centralized governance to
 decentralized local governance. Local governments were given
 extensive expenditure responsibilities while keeping the tax
 system centralized. To finance decentralized
 provincial-local expenditures, Indonesia implemented a new
 system of intergovernmental finance. This paper provides a
 review of the equity and efficiency implications of the
 current system of central-provincial-local transfers. It
 finds that the system of intergovernmental finance
 represents one of the most complex systems ever implemented
 by any government in the world. The system is primarily
 focused on a gap-filling approach to provincial-local
 finance to ensure revenue adequacy and local autonomy but
 without accountability to local residents for service
 delivery performance. This is done through a great degree of
 academic rigor using highly complex procedures. The
 complexity leads to a lack of transparency, inequity and
 uncertainty in allocation as well as creating incentives for
 jurisdictional fragmentation and reducing own-tax effort.
 Simpler alternatives are available that have the potential
 to address equity objectives while also enhancing efficiency
 and citizen-based accountability. Such alternatives would
 represent a move away from complex gap filling and special
 allocation approaches to simple, output based transfers to
 finance operating expenditures. These would be complemented
 by capital grants to deal with infrastructure deficiencies,
 and fiscal capacity equalization as a residual program with
 an explicit standard to ensure that all local jurisdictions
 have adequate means to deliver reasonably comparable levels
 of public services at reasonably comparable levels of tax
 burdens across the country. The paper argues that such an
 alternative system of intergoveernmental finance would
 preserve autonomy, while enhancing equity, simplicity,
 objectivity, transparency and accountability.
-
Sudan : World Bank Review of 2008 Budget Performance and 2009 Budget Preliminary AnalysisWorld Bank (Washington, DC, 2013-02-13)As a follow-up to the first Public Expenditure Review (PER), this note reviews fiscal management by the Government of National Unity (GoNU) through 2008 budget performance, including pro-poor spending, and how do its main features compare to the fiscal management under the first phase of the post-CPA interim period (2005-07)? The note also runs through the highlights of the key features of the GoNU 2009 budget and what has been the impact of the global crisis on the budget performance through the first quarter. The main objective is to highlight fiscal lessons for the remaining period of the post-CPA interim period. The note is structured around the following six sections: review of the economic assumptions underlying the 2008 budgets, aggregate fiscal performance, revenue performance, expenditure performance, pro-poor spending, and the 2009 budget analysis followed by actual outturns through the first quarter.