Post-Macroeconomics : Reflections on the Crisis and Strategic Directions Ahead
Author(s)
Monga, CelestinKeywords
LIQUIDITYBORROWER
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
DERIVATIVE
MONETARY AUTHORITIES
MARKET DISCIPLINE
RECESSION
AMOUNT OF CAPITAL
BALANCE SHEETS
CENTRAL BANK
INTERNATIONAL BANK
MUTUAL FUNDS
PRODUCTIVITY
EXPECTED RETURNS
CAPTIVE MARKETS
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
DEBT
BANKING SUPERVISION
BORROWING COSTS
LONG TERM CAPITAL
MULTIPLIERS
PROPERTY RIGHTS
TREASURY BILLS
MACROECONOMIC POLICIES
HEDGE FUNDS
ECONOMIC POLICIES
ASSET PRICE
NATIONAL INCOME
TRADE POLICIES
DERIVATIVE SECURITY
PRODUCTION FUNCTION
RISK OF DEFAULT
TAX
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
TRANSACTION
GDP PER CAPITA
SECONDARY MARKETS
GLOBALIZATION
ASSETS
KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
EXCESS LIQUIDITY
PENSION
INFLATION RATES
DEPOSIT
MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY
FINANCIAL MARKET
ECONOMIC HISTORY
INTERNATIONAL BANKING
CREDITWORTHINESS
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT
MACROECONOMIC MODELS
MONEY SUPPLY
BOND
GOVERNMENT REVENUE
HOLDING
BONDS
MARKET FAILURES
OPTIMIZATION
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
MORTGAGE LOANS
STOCK PRICES
PORTFOLIO
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
NATURAL RESOURCES
ECONOMISTS
BOND OBLIGATION
CAPITAL FLOWS
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
FINANCIAL RISKS
STATISTICAL DATA
BID
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
BANKING SYSTEM
INCOME GROWTH
BANKRUPTCY
TRANSPARENCY
CREDIT SYSTEMS
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
KEYNESIAN THEORY
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
ISSUANCE
EXCHANGE RATES
TRADE UNIONS
INTEREST RATES
AGGREGATE DEMAND
FINANCIAL CONTAGION
LEVEL OF RISK
DEFLATION
STICKY PRICES
TAX REVENUES
ACCOUNTING
HEDGE FUND
MACROECONOMIC ANALYSES
LENDERS
PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
FINANCIAL CRISIS
KEYNESIAN ECONOMISTS
CREDIT CARD
SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
PRIME RATE
HUMAN CAPITAL
INSURANCE
EXPORTS
ECONOMIC THOUGHT
TRADING
PARETO OPTIMUM
VULTURE FUNDS
DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
INSTRUMENT
FINANCIAL ASSETS
MONETARY POLICY
LINES OF CREDIT
VARIABLE INTEREST RATES
MACROECONOMICS
ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES
DEBT BURDEN
COMMERCIAL LOANS
PROTECTIONISM
UNEMPLOYMENT
WEALTH
DEBTS
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
EXPENDITURES
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
MARKET ECONOMIES
SECURITIES
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
CONSUMERS
ECONOMIC MODELS
PRIVATE CAPITAL
RESERVES
IMPERFECT COMPETITION
COMMERCIAL BANK
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
BALANCE SHEET
POLITICAL ECONOMY
CENTRAL BANKS
UNDERLYING ASSETS
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
INFLATION RATE
PRIVATE RATING AGENCIES
DEBT REDUCTIONS
CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS
BROKER
BUDGET DEFICITS
GROWTH POTENTIAL
BORROWING CAPACITY
MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
INVESTMENT HORIZON
PURCHASING POWER
INVESTMENT VEHICLE
INSURANCE COMPANIES
INVESTING
BUSINESS CYCLES
INFLATIONARY PRESSURES
PRICE INCREASES
MONETARY POLICIES
LABOR MARKET
OPEN ECONOMIES
MORTGAGE
STOCK MARKETS
CREDIT RISK
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
LOW INTEREST RATES
LIQUID ASSETS
EQUILIBRIUM THEORY
WAGES
PRICE STABILITY
PORTFOLIOS
PRICE LEVELS
FREE MARKET ECONOMY
MATHEMATICAL MODELS
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
CLASSICAL ECONOMISTS
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
EXPENDITURE
PROFIT MARGIN
FOREIGN EXCHANGE
FINANCIAL MARKETS
LOAN OBLIGATION
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
STOCK EXCHANGE
FUNDS FLOW
GDP
TREASURY
REMITTANCES
LOAN
GROWTH RATE
INCOME
ECONOMIC THEORY
BANKRUPTCIES
UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
FISCAL POLICY
FEDERAL RESERVE
EQUIPMENT
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
INFLATION
MORTGAGES
RATE OF RETURN
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
LOAN PORTFOLIOS
BUSINESS CYCLE
INTEREST RATE
COMPETITIVE MARKETS
REINVESTMENT
DIMINISHING RETURNS
LONG-TERM COSTS
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
MACROECONOMIC POLICY
CREDIBILITY
RETURN
PRICE CONTROLS
FOREIGN DEBT
FULL EMPLOYMENT
PRICE RISK
GROWTH THEORY
HOUSEHOLD WEALTH
ECONOMIC HISTORIANS
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http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4178Abstract
For decades, many researchers argued
 that economics had nothing to fear from enriching itself
 with lessons and advances from other disciplines.
 Unfortunately, these suggestions were either neglected or
 dismissed upfront in what was then arbitrarily considered
 mainstream economics. The global crisis has led even Nobel
 Prize winners to acknowledge that the problem facing
 economists and policy makers today is mostly intellectual -
 it is the need to confront the systematic failure of
 thinking, especially on the part of macroeconomists. Despite
 its unprecedented magnitude and heavy financial, human, and
 intellectual cost, the crisis certainly does not invalidate
 everything that has been learned about macroeconomics.
 However, the costs highlight some of mistakes of the
 dominant intellectual macroeconomic framework.
 Post-macroeconomics should not be understood as another
 metanarrative of the end of metanarratives. The use of the
 prefix post here suggests and emphasizes much more than
 temporal posterity. Post-macroeconomics should follow from
 macroeconomics more than it follows after macroeconomics.
 The theorizing of post-macroeconomics is therefore neither
 systematically oppositional nor hegemonic. It does not
 advocate a - dialectic opposition - between macroeconomics
 and post-macroeconomics. Rather, it suggests that the latter
 builds on the former and goes beyond it.Date
2012-03-19Type
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working PaperIdentifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/4178http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4178
Copyright/License
CC BY 3.0 IGOCollections
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