What it Takes to Lower Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Industries : An Assessment and Benchmarking of Brazilian Regulators
Author(s)
Correa, PauloKeywords
ACCOUNTABILITYACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
ATTORNEY GENERAL
BENCHMARKING
BOARD MEMBERS
BUDGETARY RESOURCES
CONSENSUS
DECISION MAKERS
DECISION MAKING
DECISION-MAKING
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
DISCRETIONARY POWER
ECONOMIC REGULATION
ELECTRICITY MARKET
ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM
FEDERAL AGENCIES
FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
FINANCIAL AUTONOMY
FIRM PERFORMANCE
GOVERNANCE INDEXES
GOVERNMENT POLICY
HUMAN RESOURCES
INFORMAL MEETINGS
INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRIES
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION
JURISDICTION
LATIN AMERICAN
LEGAL PROVISIONS
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
LEGISLATURES
LEGITIMACY
MARKET STRUCTURES
MISMANAGEMENT
POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
PRIVATE CAPITAL
PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE
PRIVATE INVESTMENT
PRIVATE INVESTORS
PRIVATE SECTOR
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC HEARINGS
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
REGULATED INDUSTRY
REGULATOR
REGULATORS
REGULATORY AGENCIES
REGULATORY AGENCY
REGULATORY AUTHORITY
REGULATORY DECISIONS
REGULATORY DESIGN
REGULATORY DISCRETION
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE
REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS
REGULATORY MECHANISMS
REGULATORY POWERS
REGULATORY PROCESS
REGULATORY PROCESSES
REGULATORY SYSTEMS
REGULATORY TOOLS
RISK OF EXPROPRIATION
RULES
SHAREHOLDER
STATE AGENCIES
STATE ENTERPRISE
STATE FINANCE
STATE REGULATORY
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES
TRANSACTION COSTS
TRANSPARENCY
TURNOVER
UTILITIES
UTILITIES POLICY
UTILITY REGULATION
UTILITY REGULATORS
VETO
VOTING
Metadatos
Mostrar el registro completo del ítemOnline Access
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/10645Abstract
This article points out that regulatory
 governance-how regulators manage concession contracts, or
 other public-private contractual arrangements and sector
 laws-can affect the private sector's perception of
 regulatory risk and thus the availability of private capital
 for infrastructure projects. Four key elements of the
 regulatory governance structure can reduce the risk of
 regulatory failure: political and financial autonomy,
 decision-making structures that reduce regulatory
 discretion, access to effective enforcement and other
 regulatory tools, and efficient rules of accountability.
 This note presents an analytical framework based on those
 four elements and applies it in assessing regulatory
 governance in Brazil.Date
2012-08-13Type
Publications & Research :: BriefIdentifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/10645http://hdl.handle.net/10986/10645
Copyright/License
CC BY 3.0 IGOÍtems relacionados
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