What it Takes to Lower Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Industries : An Assessment and Benchmarking of Brazilian Regulators
ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM
FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
RISK OF EXPROPRIATION
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AbstractThis article points out that regulatory
governance-how regulators manage concession contracts, or
other public-private contractual arrangements and sector
laws-can affect the private sector's perception of
regulatory risk and thus the availability of private capital
for infrastructure projects. Four key elements of the
regulatory governance structure can reduce the risk of
regulatory failure: political and financial autonomy,
decision-making structures that reduce regulatory
discretion, access to effective enforcement and other
regulatory tools, and efficient rules of accountability.
This note presents an analytical framework based on those
four elements and applies it in assessing regulatory
governance in Brazil.
TypePublications & Research :: Brief
Copyright/LicenseCC BY 3.0 IGO
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