Venture Capital Financing with Staged Investment, Agency Conflicts and Asymmetric Beliefs

Author(s)
Giat, Yahel
Contributor(s)
Industrial and Systems Engineering
Keywords
New business enterprises Risk management
Managerial incentives
Moral hazard
Bargaining power
Entrepreneurship
Negotiation Mathematical models
Unobservable effort
Venture capital Mathematical models
Principal-agent

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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/96470
Online Access
http://hdl.handle.net/1853/7548
Abstract
Committee Chair: Hackman, Steve; Committee Co-Chair: Subramanian, Ajay; Committee Member: Deng, Shijie; Committee Member: Platzman, Loren; Committee Member: Tovey, Craig
Date
2006-01-18
Type
Dissertation
Identifier
oai:smartech.gatech.edu:1853/7548
http://hdl.handle.net/1853/7548
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