Mongolia : The Political Economy of the Resource Paradox, Synthesis Note
Author(s)
World BankKeywords
MONETARY POLICIESCONFLICTS OF INTEREST
TAX REGIME
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
BUDGETING
CASH TRANSFERS
BEST PRACTICE
CABINET
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINT
PATRONAGE
PUBLIC MONIES
PRIVATE SECTOR
COALITION GOVERNMENTS
COMMODITY PRICES
EXCHANGE RATE
INVESTMENT CLIMATE
DISCRETION
DISBURSEMENT
SOCIAL TRANSFERS
MEDIA
PROCUREMENT LAW
CORRUPTION
GOVERNMENT REVENUES
BOOM-BUST CYCLE
NATURAL RESOURCES
POLICY MAKING
POPULISM
ELECTIONS
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
ACCOUNTING
CAPACITY-BUILDING
FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION
BUDGET PLANNING
PUBLIC OPINION
NATIONAL SECURITY
RETURNS
STOCK EXCHANGE
INSTRUMENT
INITIATIVE
RESOURCE CURSE
NON-PERFORMING LOANS
FISCAL RULES
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
DOMESTIC CREDIT
LEADERSHIP
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
VOTING
TAX
EXECUTIVE BUDGET
PARLIAMENTARIANS
FOREIGN RESERVES
FISCAL RESOURCES
PUBLIC CONSULTATION
STATE BUDGET
LACK OF TRANSPARENCY
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
LEGISLATION
FOREIGN POLICY
BUDGET EXECUTION
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
FINANCIAL CRISIS
DISTRICTS
FISCAL DEFICIT
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
INVESTMENT CONTRACTS
CONSTITUENCY
POLICY OPTIONS
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
CADASTRE
NATIONAL INTERESTS
INVESTMENT SPENDING
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
CONSTITUENTS
LOSS OF CONFIDENCE
CONFIDENCE
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
MACROECONOMIC POLICIES
ECONOMIC GROWTH
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
TRANSPARENCY
POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
POVERTY REDUCTION
MP
RETURN
SOCIALISM
BUDGET CONSTRAINT
MEDIUM-TERM OBJECTIVES
APPROPRIATE CHECKS
LOCAL CURRENCY
GOVERNMENT CONTROLS
CIVIL SERVICE
LAWS
FUND MANAGEMENT
POLITICAL ECONOMY
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
SERVICE DELIVERY
BRIBES
EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROPOSAL
MARKET ECONOMY
RESOURCE FLOWS
EXECUTION
BENEFICIARIES
BANKING SECTOR
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
ACCOUNTABILITY
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
EXTERNAL SHOCKS
FISCAL BALANCE
PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
DECISION-MAKING
COALITIONS
POLICY FORMULATION
INVESTMENT PROJECTS
PUBLIC SECTOR
DEPOSITS
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION
GOOD GOVERNANCE
POLITICIANS
DECREES
GOVERNMENT EQUITY
SHAREHOLDERS
GOVERNMENT REVENUE
ANNUAL BUDGET
PUBLIC INVESTMENTS
ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS
PUBLIC SECTOR SPECIALIST
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
FOREIGN INTERESTS
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
NATIONALISM
PUBLIC RESOURCES
ASSETS
STATE PARTICIPATION
FOREIGN INVESTORS
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
PROVINCIAL LEVEL
ALLOCATION
DEMOCRACY
STATE OWNERSHIP
PARLIAMENTARY VOTES
PUBLIC SPENDING
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
MACRO-STABILITY
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
FISCAL FRAMEWORK
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
POLITICIAN
REFORM AGENDA
INVESTMENT POLICIES
BUDGET PROCESS
DEPOSIT
FOREIGN COMPETITION
INFORMATION SYSTEM
CASH TRANSFER
PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAM
SOCIAL PROGRAMS
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
ANTI-CORRUPTION
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PENSIONS
POLITICAL PARTIES
PUBLIC POLICY
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
POLICY MAKERS
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY
INSTITUTIONALIZATION
PARLIAMENT
CHECKS
CIVIL SOCIETY
CORRUPTION LAW
SOVEREIGNTY
INFLATION
POLICY DECISIONS
PUBLIC REVENUES
VETO
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN
NATIONAL INTEREST
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
PUBLIC INTEREST
ROYALTY
POLITICAL PLURALISM
REVENUE SHARING
LEVY
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http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12715Abstract
This report discusses Mongolia's increasing dependence on mining revenues and the associated vulnerability to boom and bust economic cycles, and calls for special attention to governance in mining resource management. It seeks to identify can be learned from the experiences of other mineral dependent countries that have succeeded in converting their mineral endowment into broadly shared growth, as well as from those that have not. A challenge for the Bank is to be able to formulate good reform solutions which fit the country's' implementation capacity, and are flexible enough to respond to changing country dynamics. The Bank could modify its support better correspond to Mongolia's realities, such as taking into account concerns that by entering into an investment agreement, the government will lose the ability to influence or veto decisions that negatively impact national security. The report looks at the Public Investment Program, focusing on the principles of development oriented investments, and what this would imply across sectors, by taking into account the policymaker's concern that public procurement of public investment projects must disburse quickly, so that procurement efficiency is improved.Date
2013-03-14Identifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/12715http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12715
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