Keywords
DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCERULE OF LAW
STATE AUTHORITY
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY
DEMOCRACIES
INVESTMENT CLIMATE
POLITICAL PARTIES
ELECTION
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS
AMBITION
PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE
CITIZENS
CHECKS AND BALANCES
DEMOCRATIZATION
PER CAPITA INCOME
POLITICAL MOBILIZATION
SOCIAL CHANGE
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
DEMOCRACY
POLITICAL POWER
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
POPULAR PARTICIPATION
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
SPECIALIZATION
TRANSPARENCY
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS
ACCOUNTING
DISCRETION
ASSETS
ECONOMIC POLICIES
POLITICAL DEMOCRACY
MONOPOLY
ECONOMIC REFORMS
ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
CORRUPT BUREAUCRACY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PUBLIC INFORMATION
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
DECENTRALIZATION
PUBLIC SECTOR
LAWS
POLITICAL SCIENCE
RULING PARTY
STATE INSTITUTIONS
BEST PRACTICE
PUBLIC SERVICES
DECISION-MAKERS
WEALTH OF NATIONS
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
SOCIAL CAPITAL
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
ECONOMIC GROWTH
NATIONS
CIVIL WAR
STATE FUNCTIONS
POLITICAL PROCESS
FREE PRESS
SOCIAL LEARNING
PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
CORRUPT
INCOME
BUILDING STATE CAPACITY
JUDICIARY
AUTHORITY
CIVIL SOCIETY
PUBLIC INTEREST
MAJORITY RULE
COMMUNISM
GOVERNANCE REFORMS
REVOLUTIONS
COMMUNIST
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
STATE INTERVENTION
VOTING
POLITICAL SENSITIVITY
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
BUREAUCRACY
MARKET ECONOMY
INVESTIGATION
CONFIDENCE
CORRUPTION
LABOR UNIONS
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
MONARCHY
PUBLIC RESOURCES
DIVISION OF LABOR
POLITICAL LEADERS
AUTOCRACY
ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
PUBLIC INVESTMENTS
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
REVOLUTION
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
FRAUD
PATRONAGE
VIOLENCE
ADJUDICATION
POLITICAL SYSTEM
POLITICIANS
CITIZEN
POPULISM
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
BY ELECTION
ECONOMICS
GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
POLITICAL ELITES
DECISION-MAKING
FINANCIAL CRISIS
GOVERNANCE DIMENSIONS
POLICE
POLITICS OF GROWTH
INCUMBENT
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
REPUBLIC
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
DICTATORSHIP
CORRUPTION CHARGES
GANGS
PUBLIC SPENDING
SOVEREIGNTY
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
AUTHORITARIAN RULE
GOVERNANCE REFORM
GOVERNORS
INDEPENDENT MEDIA
PRESIDENCY
SOCIAL POLICIES
POLITICAL REFORMS
INCREMENTALISM
GDP
SOCIAL GROUPS
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS
SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS
MARKET ECONOMIES
MILITARY REGIMES
ABUSES
CONSENSUS
FREE MEDIA
JUSTICE
ACCOUNTABILITY
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
CITIZENSHIP
POWER POLITICS
CONSTITUENCY
POLITICAL CHANGE
PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
LIBERALISM
HUMAN RIGHTS
STATE FAILURE
COLLAPSE
TRADE POLICY
PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY
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http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19915Abstract
A frontier challenge for development strategy is to move beyond prescribing optimal economic policies, and instead -- taking a broad view of the interactions between economic, political and social constraints and dynamics -- to identify entry points capable of breaking a low-growth logjam, and initiating a virtuous spiral of cumulative change. The paper lays out four distinctive sequences via which the different dimensions might interact and evolve over time, and provides country-specific illustrations of each. Each sequence is defined by the principal focus of its initial step: 1) State capacity building provides a platform for accelerated growth via improved public sector performance and enhanced credibility for investors; strengthened political institutions and civil society come onto the agenda only over the longer term; 2) Transformational governance has as its entry point the reshaping of a country's political institutions. Accelerated growth could follow, insofar as institutional changes enhance accountability, and reduce the potential for arbitrary discretionary action -- and thereby shift expectations in a positive direction; 3) For 'just enough governance', the initial focus is on growth itself, with the aim of addressing specific capacity and institutional constraints as and when they become binding -- not seeking to anticipate and address in advance all possible institutional constraints; 4) Bottom-up development engages civil society as an entry point for seeking stronger state capacity, lower corruption, better public services, improvements in political institutions more broadly -- and a subsequent unlocking of constraints on growth. The sequences should not be viewed as a technocratic toolkit from which a putative reformer is free to choose. Recognizing that choice is constrained by history, the paper concludes by suggesting an approach for exploring what might the scope for identifying practical ways forward in specific country settings.Date
2014-09-02Identifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/19915http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19915
Copyright/License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/Related items
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