Keywords
CREDIT BUREAUPORTFOLIO OF MORTGAGES
INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES
LIABILITY
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
LENDING REQUIREMENTS
DIVIDENDS
GOVERNMENT BONDS
LOAN PORTFOLIOS
LENDERS
UNDERLYING MORTGAGES
CAPITAL MARKET FUNDING
LIABILITY SIDE
CRITICAL MASS
PRIVATE EQUITY
LIQUIDITY CRISIS
PORTFOLIOS
CAPITAL RATIOS
PENSION FUNDS
MORTGAGE INTEREST
TAX
GOVERNMENT DEBT MARKET
FOREIGN EXCHANGE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
INTEREST RATE RISK
LIQUIDITY RISK
DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND
LIQUIDITY
LONG TERM LIABILITIES
BOND MARKETS
FOREIGN CURRENCY
FINANCIAL SERVICES
BANKING INSTITUTION
BOND ISSUES
SECURITIES
EQUITY HOLDER
COLLATERALIZATION
SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS
HOME LOAN
BANKRUPTCY
TRANSACTIONS COSTS
TAX FRAMEWORK
MARKETABLE BONDS
MARKET PRACTICES
TAX TREATMENTS
CREDIT RATING
INSOLVENCY
CONFIDENTIALITY
PRIMARY LENDERS
MORTGAGE BANKS
ACCOUNTING
RISK WEIGHTING
INSURANCE COMPANIES
ARBITRAGE
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
BANKRUPTCY LAW
AFFORDABLE HOUSING
RISK MANAGEMENT
FINANCIAL INFORMATION
DEBT ISSUANCE
FIXED RATES
LOAN PORTFOLIO
MARKET VALUE
PRIMARY MARKET
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
HOME LOANS
BONDS
MATURITY
LENDER
LOCAL BOND MARKET
CHECKS
COMMUNITY INVESTMENT
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK
REPOSSESSION
BOND INVESTORS
MORTGAGE MARKET
HOLDING
SAVINGS
TRANSACTION
MORTGAGE LENDING
ASSET LIABILITY MANAGEMENT
HOUSING FINANCE
OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
AUDITS
TERM DEPOSITS
TRANSFER OWNERSHIP
MORTGAGES
HOUSING LOAN
DISCOUNT RATE
COMMERCIAL BANKS
MARKET INFORMATION
BOND MARKET
MATURITY TRANSFORMATION
CAPITAL MARKETS
HOME OWNERSHIP
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
BENCHMARK BONDS
COVER POOL
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK
PENSION
LIQUIDITY RISKS
MORTGAGE LOANS
LENDER OF LAST RESORT
DEPOSIT
ISSUANCES
MARKET FAILURE
PORTFOLIO OF LOANS
SECONDARY MORTGAGE
INCOME GROUPS
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
INCOME TAX
YIELD CURVE
REAL ESTATE
FLOATING RATE
BOND ISSUANCES
SECURITY INTEREST
INTEREST RATES
HOUSING LOANS
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
MORTGAGE MARKETS
RISK PROFILE
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
FINANCIAL MARKET
RETURN
COST OF FUND
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS
CREDIT ENHANCEMENT
GOVERNMENT DEBT
MARKET DISTORTIONS
BULLET REPAYMENT
FIXED INCOME MARKET
LIQUIDITY FACILITIES
UNSECURED BONDS
FIXED RATE
CREDITS
CREDIT BUREAUS
INVESTMENT INCOME
JUDICIARY
GENERAL BANKRUPTCY LAW
CASE OF BANKRUPTCY
BANKING SYSTEM
BANK LOAN
CREDIT UNIONS
TRANSPARENCY
MORTGAGE PORTFOLIO
FINANCE PRODUCTS
ACTIVE MARKET
EMERGING MARKETS
MORTGAGE PORTFOLIOS
CAPITAL ADEQUACY
PORTFOLIO
ISSUANCE OF BONDS
DEPOSITS
LIQUIDITY FACILITY
COLLATERALS
SETTLEMENT
GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE
DUE DILIGENCE
CAPITAL MARKET
FIXED INCOME
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
SHAREHOLDERS
CENTRAL BANK
SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS
MATURITY MISMATCH
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE
COLLATERAL
MATURE MARKETS
PROMISSORY NOTES
SECURITIES REGULATION
DEPENDENT
GOVERNMENT BACKING
MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES
UNDERLYING MORTGAGE
MARKET DISTORTION
BOND
MARKET DEVELOPMENT
INTEREST RATE
SMALL LENDERS
FINANCIAL RISKS
VALUATION
CREDIT RISK
BANK SYSTEM
INSURANCE
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS
LONG TERM ASSETS
LOCAL CURRENCY
GENERAL BANKRUPTCY
CENTRAL BANKS
BALANCE SHEET
DEBT OBLIGATIONS
SAVINGS BANKS
PROFIT MARGIN
BASIS POINTS
MORTGAGE
COMMERCIAL BANKING
LOAN MATURITIES
BRANCH NETWORK
DISBURSEMENT
SHAREHOLDER
EXPOSURE
PUBLIC DEBT
LIQUIDITY SUPPORT
INVESTOR CONFIDENCE
TURNOVER
GENERAL DEBT
POTENTIAL BORROWERS
BOND ISSUANCE
COST OF FUNDS
DOWN PAYMENTS
MARKET SHARE
PREPAYMENTS
GOOD GOVERNANCE
PREPAYMENT
LOAN
SYSTEMIC RISK
REGULATOR
INFLATION
FINANCIAL CRISIS
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKETS
LIEN
UNDERLYING ASSETS
MANDATE
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
NATIONAL BANK
CAPITALIZATION
DEFERRED PAYMENT
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http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18372Abstract
This note brings together some of the policy lessons learnt in the creation of mortgage liquidity facilities around the world. It looks at the main benefits which can be derived from the creation of a mortgage liquidity facility and the conditions under which they can operate most effectively. The note details some of the pre-conditions necessary for the creation of a liquidity facility. There is summary of some of the key techniques used in obtaining security over the mortgage collateral. Lastly two important aspects which are crucial to building confidence in mortgage liquidity facilities are how they are regulated and their corporate governance. The note brings in relevant examples from liquidity facilities which have been set up as far back as 1987 (Malaysia), from developed countries (France) and from facilities still under discussion (West Africa). Overall the note points to the valuable developmental role that mortgage liquidity facilities can play in nascent mortgage markets as an intermediary between capital markets in the primary mortgage markets. This is especially the case in markets where the mortgage lending infra-structure and environment have not developed sufficiently to allow for other more sophisticated alternatives such as securitization or covered bonds.Date
2014-05-15Identifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/18372http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18372
Copyright/License
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