Author(s)
Westlake, RichardKeywords
BANK FAILURESAUDITORS
FINANCIAL LEVERAGE
CHIEF EXECUTIVE
CREDIT RATING
TREASURY BONDS
NATIONAL BANK
BANK MANAGEMENT
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP
BANKING INDUSTRY
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
STAKEHOLDERS
CONSUMER
SAVERS
DEPOSITS
CREDITWORTHINESS
COMPANY
STAKEHOLDER
FACE VALUE
INVESTMENT BANKS
GOOD GOVERNANCE
FRAUD
SHAREHOLDERS
CONSUMER PROTECTION
DEPOSIT
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY
INCOME
GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
TRANSPARENCY
MARKET DISCIPLINE
AUDIT COMMITTEE
RATE OF RETURN
BUSINESS CYCLE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
RISK MANAGEMENT
INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR
BANK FAILURE
FINANCIAL LITERACY
SOCIETY
LAWS
VALUATION
LENDERS
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
AUDITING
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING
BENEFICIARY
SPONSORS
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES
DUTY OF CARE
SOLVENCY
GROSS NEGLIGENCE
EQUITY RATIO
FAVORABLE TERMS
BANKING SECTOR
COLLECTIVE INTERESTS
RETURN ON INVESTMENT
LEADERSHIP
DEPOSITORS
EARNINGS
CONTRIBUTION
INTEGRITY
PRIVATIZATION
CREDIT CARD
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
FAMILY MEMBERS
EMERGING MARKETS
EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE
SOCIETIES
CAPITAL MARKETS
BORROWER
INTEREST COST
COLLUSION
SHAREHOLDER
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
SECURITIES
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
TAXATION
MANAGERS
BOARD MEETINGS
CREDIT RISK
BOARD MEMBER
IMPAIRED ASSETS
BANKING SYSTEM
CONFIDENCE
SCANDAL
TAKEOVER
INDIVIDUALS
THEFT
LIABILITY
BUSINESS PEOPLE
DEBTORS
PROBABILITY
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
FINANCIAL SECTOR
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
NONPERFORMING LOANS
BOARD MEMBERS
RATING AGENCIES
BANKS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REPAYMENT
TRADITIONAL LOAN
SUBSIDIARY
FEDERAL REGULATORS
FINANCIAL CRISIS
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS
BANK LOANS
DEVELOPMENT BANK
VALUABLE
RESPONSIBILITIES
CEO
SENIOR
ACCESS TO BANK LOANS
MINISTERS
RISK OF DEFAULT
APPETITE FOR RISK
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
CRIMINAL
BANKING SUPERVISION
FULL DISCLOSURE
STOCK EXCHANGE
RECEIPT
BALANCE SHEETS
COLLECTIVE
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
BUSINESS TRANSACTION
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
INTERNAL CONTROLS
BALANCE SHEET
WORTH
BEST PRACTICE
WORKING CAPITAL
RISK MEASUREMENT
LARGE BANKS
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS
DIVERSIFICATION
MAJOR BANKING
PAYMENT SYSTEMS
BOARD MEETING
RELATED COMPANY
SINGLE SHAREHOLDER
ACCOUNTABILITY
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
LOAN CONCENTRATIONS
SECURITIES DEALERS
FINANCIAL ASPECTS
FINANCIAL MARKETS
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CREDITORS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION
TRAINING MATERIALS
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
AUDITOR
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INDEPENDENT AUDIT
LOAN
Full record
Show full item recordOnline Access
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19044Abstract
The need for sound governance of banks worldwide has never been stronger. After the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, spectacular bank failures, whether caused by greed, incompetence, or indifference, are still occurring. This guide is intended mainly for three groups of readers: (i) new directors with experience in banking; (ii) directors who understand governance, but have no experience in banking; and (iii) new directors who have no experience of either banking or being a director. It is mainly an introduction for the directors of non-complex banks, whose main business is to take deposits and provide loans, and is not designed for the directors of large, complex banks or investment banks operating in global capital markets and dealing with complex corporate structures. We hope, however, that even relatively experienced directors of banks, and those who work with them, may find the book a useful refresher. Main topics discussed in the Guidance are: 1) where banks fit in the corporate governance framework; 2) the unique role of banks governing risk; 3) Board structures and directors' duties; and 4) effective Board decision making. Since the late Jonathan Charkham CBE wrote the first edition of this Guidance book in 2003, the world has changed dramatically. During the crisis, many household-name banks merged or disappeared. Now there is stronger supervision of banks and greater expectations of Boards, so directors need to be knowledgeable about and engaged with their bank to provide direction and hold bank management to account.Date
2014-07-29Identifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/19044http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19044
Copyright/License
CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGORelated items
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
-
Financial Sector Assessment Program Update : Assessment of Philippines Deposit Insurance CorporationInternational Monetary Fund; World Bank (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2011-02)The global economic and financial sector
 crisis of 2008-09 became a stark reminder to countries
 around the world of the need for an effective process for
 maintaining the confidence of depositors and resolving
 troubled financial institutions with the least amount of
 adverse impact on the financial sector and the community
 served by the institutions. The role of deposit insurance
 was highlighted during this difficult time. Nations without
 a formal system found the need to reassure their citizens by
 announcing formal government guaranties. Nations with
 established systems were not immune from the public's
 concern and as a result many increased the allowable
 coverage. The Philippines, although somewhat immune from the
 global crisis, none the less felt the impact of the crisis
 and responded, as did other countries, by taking steps to
 address the possible impact of the crisis by bolstering
 depositor confidence. The Philippines stands out among its
 Asian neighbors at being in the forefront of deposit
 insurance. Long before deposit insurance became popular at
 the peak of the Asian financial crisis of the late
 1990's, the Philippines already had an established
 formal deposit insurance system. The Philippine Deposit
 Insurance Corporation (PDIC) is a government
 instrumentality. It was established in June 1963 with the
 passage of Republic Act (RA) 3591. The role of PDIC at that
 time was to help build the banking sector by encouraging
 citizens to save and to deposit those savings in the formal
 banking system. It was to do this by assuring depositors of
 the safety of their deposits by providing a government
 sponsored insurance of up to a P 10,000 per depositor in the
 event of a bank failure. The underlying motivation was to
 promote a safe and sound banking system and to foster public
 confidence in it.
-
Financial Sector Assessment Program : Malaysia - Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance SystemsWorld Bank; International Monetary Fund (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013-10-02)This assessment of compliance with the Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (Core Principles) was conducted as a part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) performed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank at the request of the Malaysian government. This assessment was conducted by Claire McGuire, Senior Financial Sector Specialist with the World Bank, during a mission to Malaysia from March 27 to April 13, 2012. The assessment was based on a review of relevant laws, regulations and regulatory and supervisory practices related to the conventional banking sector and the operations of PIDM. There has been no experience with bank failures in Malaysia since Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia (PIDM's) establishment in 2005. As a result the assessment looked at the relevant provisions of the legal framework without consideration of how the laws had been applied in practice or interpreted by the courts. Several weaknesses in the legal framework have been noted in this assessment.
-
Bank Risk and Deposit InsuranceLaeven, Luc (2002-01)Arguing that a relatively high cost of
 deposit insurance indicates that a bank takes excessive
 risks, this article estimates the cost of deposit insurance
 for a large sample of banks in 14 economies to assess the
 relationship between the risk-taking behavior of banks and
 their corporate governance structure. The results suggest
 that banks with concentrated ownership tend to take the
 greatest risks, and those with dispersed ownership engage in
 a relatively low level of risk taking. Moreover, as a proxy
 for bank risk, the cost of deposit insurance has some power
 in predicting bank distress