Author(s)
Dixit, AvinashKeywords
GOVERNMENT POLICIESSCANDAL
LICENSE
INTERNATIONAL POLICY
SECURITIES
BRIBES
ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS
ADJUDICATION
ACCOUNTING
INSTITUTION
COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS
MALFEASANCE
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
PENALTY
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
COMPLAINTS
WEB PAGE
BANKS
OFFENSE
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
BRIBERY
CRIME
MATERIAL
BRIBE
DOMAIN
RESULT
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
POLICE
SANCTIONS
MEDIA
EXTORTION
LAW ENFORCEMENT
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION
VICTIMS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
TAXONOMY
FEASIBILITY
MAFIA
GLOBALIZATION
PUNISHMENT
INTEGRITY
LICENSE FEE
CONTACT INFORMATION
ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES
BUSINESS COMMUNITY
PRISONERS
INNOVATIONS
CAPACITY BUILDING
CONFIDENCE
SUPPLIERS
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
LEGAL SYSTEM
PAYOFF
ANTICORRUPTION
BUSINESS ASSOCIATION
FIGURES
SANCTION
BUSINESSES
GOVERNANCE REFORM
BUSINESS LEADERSHIP
JOURNALISTS
CONVICTION
PENALTIES
WEB
REMEDIES
SCANDALS
POLITICIANS
TRANSPARENCY
AUCTION
SOCIAL SCIENCE
OPEN ACCESS
INNOVATION
COMPLAINT
CORRUPT
RECONSTRUCTION
WHISTLE-BLOWING
MARKETING
CORRUPTION
LEADERSHIP
LICENSES
RESULTS
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ANTI-CORRUPTION
PAYOFFS
Full record
Show full item recordOnline Access
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19371Abstract
This paper considers the possibility of collective action by the business community to counter corruption in the award of government licenses and contracts. The analogy is with contract enforcement institutions studied by economic historians and contract law scholars. The institution in this context comprises a no-bribery norm, a community system to detect violations, and a multilateral ostracism penalty upon conviction in a community tribunal. The requirements such an institution must meet if it is to be effective are analyzed. It is shown that an institution of sufficient quality -- combining probability of correct detection and severity of punishment -- can eliminate bribery. If the private institution is not sufficiently good, then in conjunction with the state's formal apparatus it reduces the level of bribes demanded, but increases the probability of winning the license or contract through bribery. An improvement in the government's formal anti-corruption mechanism, holding the private institution constant, reduces both the level of bribes and the probability of success through bribery. The two institutions together are shown to achieve substantially better outcomes than either can on its own.Date
2014-06Identifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/19371http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19371
Copyright/License
CC BY 3.0 IGOCollections
Related items
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
-
Fighting Corruption in East Asia : Solutions from the Private SectorBerenbeim, Ronald E.; Arvis, Jean-Francois (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003-08)The critical need for private sector involvement in the fight against corruption is now an accepted fact, particularly in East Asia, where there is a buoyant private sector and where corruption has often been equated with cronyism. Cutting off corruption's supply side is a vital step in limiting the economic damage inflicted by corrupt practices. Despite the importance of private sector efforts in this regard, little attention has been paid to company anticorruption programs and to trying to learn from company experience. This book, which is based on research cosponsored by the World Bank and the Conference Board, provides detailed documentation of the efforts of Western and Asian companies to develop good standards of business conduct in their East Asian operations. It provides evidence that a common set of principles for resisting corruption can be established notwithstanding the rich cultural diversity and ownership structure of firms based in that region.
-
Deterring Corruption and Improving Governance in Road Construction and MaintenanceWorld Bank (Washington, DC, 2014-03-28)This sourcebook is part of a broader program on governance and corruption in the transport sector. The Sourcebook is meant as a resource to sector practitioners to assess the extent and risks of corruption in the sector and to improve governance in ways that reduce corruption. As this is an emerging field, the sourcebook is not intended to be a manual, nor a set of directives but rather to organize and illustrate approaches and tools which sector practitioners may find useful. This sourcebook is in seven sections. Section two provides an overview of governance and corruption, and the framework used to evaluate governance and corruption risks in transport. Section three describes a 'generic' transport sector structure and several tools for evaluating governance at the sector level. The next four sections describe how to detect corruption, and improve governance in: sector policy and planning (section four); capital works (section five); government engineering and construction units (section six); and public-private partnerships (section seven).
-
Philippines : Combating Corruption in the PhilippinesWorld Bank (Washington, DC, 2000-05-03)This report collects and presents available information about corruption issues facing the Philippines, ongoing anticorruption efforts in and outside the government, and suggested elements for a national anticorruption strategy, drawing on global experience. The report proposes a nine-point approach to fighting corruption in the Philippines. 1) Reducing opportunities for corruption by policy reforms and deregulations; 2) reforming campaign finance; 3) increasing public oversight; 4) reforming budget processes; 5) improving meritocracy in the civil service; 6) targeting selected departments and agencies; 7) enhancing sanctions against corruption; 8) developing partnerships with the private sector; and 9) supporting judicial reform. These initiatives, which are already underway as isolated elements, must be unified under one concerted program, a strong leadership and management structure, and a strong partnership with the private sector, civil society, donors, the congress, and judiciary.