Keywords
CORRUPTIONSHAREHOLDERS
DEBT
JURISDICTION
RETURN
DUTY OF CARE
WITHDRAWAL
FLOW OF INFORMATION
GOOD FAITH
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
CORPORATE ASSETS
SUPPLIER
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
PERSONAL LIABILITY
GOING CONCERN
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
COMPANY'S CREDITORS
CASH FLOW
INSOLVENT
SUBMISSION OF CLAIMS
FINANCIAL INFORMATION
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CORPORATE BODY
TURNOVER
FINANCIAL HEALTH
SECURITIES
BOARD MEMBER
STOCK PURCHASES
FINANCIAL DISTRESS
INSOLVENCY
CREDITOR
LEGAL RIGHTS
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES
EMERGING MARKETS
STAKEHOLDERS
CHARTER
CORPORATE ENTERPRISE
CORPORATE STRATEGY
ACCURATE INFORMATION
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
MISMANAGEMENT
PUBLIC COMPANIES
FINANCE CORPORATION
SOLVENCY
GOVERNANCE ISSUES
FRAUD
LEGAL COUNSEL
LIABILITY EXPOSURE
DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
COMPANY
COUNSEL
CORPORATION
TRANSPARENCY
MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS
INSURANCE
VALUATIONS
DIRECTOR LIABILITY
NEGLIGENT CONDUCT
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
MAJOR CREDITORS
WAGES
SHAREHOLDER
FAMILY BUSINESSES
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
COMPANY IN BANKRUPTCY
DUTY OF LOYALTY
JURISDICTIONS
PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS
CREDITOR CLAIMS
CREDITOR BODY
EQUITY VALUE
BANKRUPTCY
OPERATION OF LAW
BOARD MEETING
INVESTIGATION
DERIVATIVE
GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
DISTRESSED COMPANIES
CORPORATE CONSTITUENCIES
JUDGMENT
FINANCIAL ADVISORS
TRANSACTION
REGULATORY OBLIGATIONS
WILLFUL FAILURE
FINANCIAL REPORTING
PROPRIETARY
CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
PREMIUM PAYMENTS
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
ENFORCEABILITY
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
POTENTIAL LIABILITY
SPINOFF
CREDITOR INTERESTS
DIVIDENDS
STAKEHOLDER
FINANCIAL STATEMENT
STOCKHOLDERS
SUBSIDIARY
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
BOARD MEMBERS
CREDITORS
PREFERENTIAL PAYMENTS
DISTRESSED COMPANY
FINANCIAL SITUATION
LEGAL RIGHTS OF CREDITORS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
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http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21701Abstract
Investors see value in nominating members to the boards of companies they have invested in. Through board members, they can help improve the company's operations, define corporate strategy, adjust inefficiencies, improve governance, and ultimately increase the expected return on their investment. The authors examine the shift in the relative position of stakeholders when a company enters the penumbra of insolvency. In good times, directors rightly think of the shareholders as the parties to whom their duties to the company (and legal responsibilities) most directly extend. But once the enterprise s very survival as a going concern comes into question, the profile and legal rights of creditors and other stakeholders take on greater importance. The board must be able to demonstrate that it is doing everything it can to maximize the enterprise value of the company, and hence the likelihood that the company will meet its obligations to parties with claims (on the cash flow and assets of the company) that come before the residual interest of shareholders. This paper lists other actions (including, importantly, documentation of all material decisions) that each director should take to reduce the chances and consequences of subsequent litigation. The authors rightly emphasize the importance of securing reliable information and good-quality outside advice. For the board of a company in distress to be effective and to demonstrate that it has satisfied the duty of care, it is necessary to review the existing flow of information between management and the board and to make any changes needed to ensure that people and processes are in place for the board to receive timely and accurate information.Date
2015-04-08Type
BriefIdentifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/21701http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21701
Copyright/License
CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGOCollections
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