Author(s)
World BankKeywords
INFRASTRUCTUREOPTIONS
INCOME HOUSEHOLDS
ENERGY
VALUE
CARBON SINKS
ATMOSPHERE
LESS
MARKETS
ECOSYSTEM
OIL
CLEANER
FOSSIL FUEL
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
FUELS
GAS
COMPENSATION SCHEMES
SOLID FUELS
PUBLIC TRANSPORT IMPROVEMENTS
POWER
ELECTRIFICATION
HYBRID CARS
FOSSIL
BALANCE
HIGHER ENERGY PRICES
FORESTS
CARBON TAX
FUEL
TRANSPORT IMPROVEMENTS
INVESTMENT
CLIMATE POLICIES
GRANTS
CO2
SAFETY
COAL MINING
ZERO EMISSIONS
FUEL SUBSIDIES
CARBON TECHNOLOGIES
ENERGY TAXES
CAR
EMISSION REDUCTIONS
LAND
PILOT PROJECTS
CARBON DIOXIDE
COSTS
BENEFITS
CLIMATE CHANGE
LOW-CARBON
CARBON EMISSIONS
INSURANCE
WEALTH
TRANSPARENCY
CARBON PRICES
CARBON
SUBSIDIES
TAX
PUBLIC TRANSPORT
MONEY
ENVIRONMENT
CLIMATE
POLLUTION
PRICES
CARBON PRICE
SUBSIDY
INVESTMENTS
COAL
PRICE
FISCAL POLICIES
FINANCE
CLIMATE STABILIZATION
TRANSPORT
POLICIES
CLIMATE POLICY
EMISSION
INCOME
POLICY
TAXES
NEGATIVE IMPACTS
ENERGY PRICES
EMISSIONS
APPROACH
CARS
TRADITIONAL FUELS
Full record
Show full item recordOnline Access
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21889Abstract
Stabilizing climate change entails bringing net emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) to zero. CO2 stays in the atmosphere for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. As long as one emit more than captured or offset through carbon sinks (such as forests), concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere will keep rising, and the climate will keep warming. Countries can follow three principles in their efforts to create a zero-carbon future: (a) planning ahead for a future with zero emissions, (b) getting carbon prices and policies right, and (c) smoothing the transition and protecting the poor. In this context, the report presents managing the political economy of reform without getting captured by vested interests; and ensuring poor people benefit from the reform.Date
2015-05-11Type
BriefIdentifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/21889http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21889
Copyright/License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/Collections
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