Keywords
GOVERNANCEQUESTIONNAIRES
INFORMATION
EVALUATION
ENTRIES
CONFIDENCE
ACT OF CORRUPTION
RULE OF LAW
LAW
DATA COLLECTION
CORRUPT
JUSTICE
VALIDITY
INTERVIEWS
CRIME
SCIENCE
PUBLISHING
CONCEPTS
GOVERNMENTS
COMPUTERS
INDICATORS
SMOKING PREVALENCE
EFFECTS
ACCOUNTING
MALFEASANCE
AGREEMENTS
CASE
SURVEYS
SIMULATION
ESTIMATING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
ETHICS
ANTI-CORRUPTION
BRIBERY
TECHNIQUES
ORGANIZATION
SAMPLING
BRIBE
BRIBES
SMOKING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL
CHEATING
ORGANIZATIONS
SIMULATIONS
PROBABILITY
DATA
ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES
RESEARCH WORKING PAPERS
CRIMINALS
POLICY
METHODS
GOVERNMENT
PROBABILITIES
CRIME VICTIMIZATION
OFFENSE
RELIABILITY
SIZE
RESEARCHERS
RESEARCH
LIBRARY
ARRANGEMENT
PROSECUTION
TRANSPARENCY
TIME
INVESTIGATION
FICTIONS
SERVICES
PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION
KNOWLEDGE
CORRUPTION
COMPUTER
ORDERINGS
CORRUPT ACT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
OBSERVATION
DESCRIPTION
BANK
CONCEPT
NOTATION
CORRUPTION SURVEYS
MEASURES
MARIJUANA
SURVEY DATA
SAMPLES
ESTIMATES
MODELING
STANDARD
CASES
WEB
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH
ORDERING
CLASSIFICATION
METHODOLOGY
RESEARCHER
POLITICIANS
TRIALS
TESTS
STRATEGIES
SERVICE
ADMINISTRATION
ANTICORRUPTION
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
CRIMINAL
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http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22008Abstract
This paper develops a structural approach for modeling how respondents answer survey questions and uses it to estimate the proportion of respondents who are reticent in answering corruption questions, as well as the extent to which reticent behavior biases down conventional estimates of corruption. The context is a common two-step survey question, first inquiring whether a government official visited a business, and then asking about bribery if a visit was acknowledged. Reticence is a concern for both steps, since denying a visit sidesteps the bribe question. This paper considers two alternative models of how reticence affects responses to two-step questions, with differing assumptions on how reticence affects the first question about visits. Maximum-likelihood estimates are obtained for seven countries using data on interactions with tax officials. Different models work best in different countries, but cross-country comparisons are still valid because both models use the same structural parameters. On average, 40 percent of corruption questions are answered reticently, with much variation across countries. A statistic reflecting how much standard measures underestimate the proportion of all respondents who had a bribe interaction is developed. The downward bias in standard measures is highly statistically significant in all countries, varying from 12 percent in Nigeria to 90 percent in Turkey. The source of bias varies widely across countries, between denying a visit and denying a bribe after admitting a visit.Date
2015-06-02Type
Working PaperIdentifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/22008http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22008
Copyright/License
CC BY 3.0 IGOCollections
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