Keywords
ACCESS TO CREDITFINANCE
INVESTORS
FINANCIAL ACCESS
EQUITY
CREDIT BANK
DURABLE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM
EMPLOYEES
CORPORATE FINANCE
FIXED ASSET
MICRO ENTERPRISES
EXTERNAL FUNDS
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
FIXED ASSETS
EXCHANGE
EXTERNAL FINANCING
CORPORATE DEBT
CHECKS
TRADE CREDIT
LENDER
COUNTRY RISK
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
BIASES
INSTRUMENT
MICRO-ENTERPRISES
BORROWER
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
CONTRACT RIGHTS
BANKRUPTCY
INVESTOR
INVESTOR PROTECTIONS
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
TRANSACTIONS
PROPERTY
STOCK MARKETS
BANKRUPTCY LAWS
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
SECURITIES
PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
LIABILITIES
ENDOWMENT
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
LOCAL STOCK MARKET
PEOPLE
FINANCIAL REGULATIONS
DEPOSIT
INFORMAL FINANCE
CAPITAL FINANCE
BANKING SYSTEMS
MARKET
SHARE
CREDIT ALLOCATION
ACCESSIBILITY
INVESTMENTS
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
FINANCING
GOOD
EQUITY MARKET
PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
LEGAL SYSTEM
MARKET DEVELOPMENT
REINVESTMENT RATES
DEBT
INFLATION
BANK
DEVELOPMENT OF BANKING
EQUAL TREATMENT
PRIVATE PARTIES
INTERESTS
PROPERTY RIGHT
REINVESTMENT
HUMAN CAPITAL
CORRUPTION
BANKS
LENDERS
INVESTMENT FUNDS
CREDIT
EARNINGS
CREDITOR RIGHTS
INFLATION RATE
CREDIBILITY
BORROWERS
MARKETS
EXTERNAL FINANCE
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
INSTRUMENTS
GOODS
STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT
EXPROPRIATION
PROPERTY RIGHTS
CORPORATE INSIDERS
FINANCIAL CAPACITY
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
INCOME LEVELS
WORKING CAPITAL
ENTERPRISES
EXPROPRIATION RISK
INTEREST
CAPITAL
PAYMENT
SHAREHOLDERS
DEFAULTS
COLLATERAL
BIAS
BANK CREDIT
CREDITOR
DEBT MATURITY
LEGAL PROTECTION
FINANCIAL MARKETS
LENDING
STOCK MARKET
ACCESS TO FINANCE
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INVESTOR PROTECTION
FINANCIAL SERVICE
ENTERPRISE
JOB CREATION
FINANCIAL ASSETS
PRIVATE PROPERTY
SALES GROWTH
INVESTMENT
BRIBES
PRIVATE CREDIT
SMALL BUSINESS
STOCK
FINANCIAL DEPTH
SHARES
RULE OF LAW
FORMAL FINANCE
ACCESS TO EXTERNAL FINANCE
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
INTERNAL FUNDS
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
LOAN
SHAREHOLDER
BANK FINANCING
SAVINGS
MICROENTERPRISES
CONTRACTS
DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS
ACCESS TO INVESTMENT
GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
FINANCING OBSTACLES
ECONOMIC GROWTH
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER
CONTRACT
MICRO DATA
CREDITORS
RETURNS
EQUITY MARKETS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
DEBTOR
CENTRAL BANKS
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
TRANSPARENCY
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Show full item recordOnline Access
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22160Abstract
The empirical literature on institutions and development has been challenged on grounds of reverse causality, measurement error in institutional indicators, and heterogeneity. This paper uses firm-level data across countries to confront these challenges. Instead of analyzing ultimate outcomes, such as income levels where institutional quality is likely endogenous, the focus is on firm-level external finance. Moreover, institutions are “unbundled” to explore how various types of institutions affect external finance differently. The paper documents that micro firms have significantly less access to external finance than small and medium firms. General financial development and contracting institutions that facilitate transactions between private parties exert little effect, on average, on firms’ access to external finance. In contrast, property rights institutions that constrain political and economic elites exhibit stronger positive association with access to external finance. The analysis finds evidence of attenuation bias associated with error in measuring institutions. For leveling the playing field between elite and non-elite firms (as proxied by firm size) in their access to external finance, property rights institutions also figure more prominently—with an important exception for the information environment, a component of contracting institutions. The results indicate that a specific channel through which development is affected more by property rights institutions rather than contracting institutions is external financing for firms.Date
2015-06Type
Working PaperIdentifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/22160http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22160
Copyright/License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/Collections
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