Responding to the Challenge of Fragility and Security in West Africa
Keywords
REVENUESENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
WELFARE EFFECTS
VALUE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
INCENTIVES
FISCAL POLICY
PROJECTS
EFFICIENCY
AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITY
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
ACCOUNTABILITY
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
ENTITLEMENTS
TRUST FUNDS
LAND USE
PRIVATIZATION
DEFORESTATION
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ROYALTY
PROFITS
MIGRATION
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
SOCIAL CONFLICT
PIT
FISCAL REVENUE
INTEREST
POLITICAL ECONOMIES
LOCAL TAXES
POLLUTION
EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES
METALS
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
OIL
PRICES
AUTHORITARIANISM
REVENUE SHARING
RESOURCES
VALUES
TRANSACTION COSTS
DECENTRALIZATION
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
RESOURCE CURSE
GOVERNMENT
LEGISLATION
SERVICES
FISCAL FEDERALISM
NATIONAL LEVEL
ENVIRONMENT
CENTRALIZATION
INSURGENCY
REVENUE
INDUSTRY
CORRUPTION
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
SOIL DEGRADATION
TRADE
ACCOUNTING
PRESENT VALUE
FISCAL
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
CITIZENS
ADMINISTRATION
NATURAL RESOURCES
TRANSFERS
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION
EFFECTIVE USE
ECOLOGY
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PROPERTY
LABOR
STREAMS
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
EXPLOITATION
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
POLITICAL ECONOMY
DEPOSITS
PRODUCTIVITY
WATER POLLUTION
MINES
FISHING
FINANCE
ECONOMIES
ECONOMIC GROWTH
REGULATORY MECHANISMS
FISHERIES
TRANSPARENCY
POLICY MAKERS
LAWS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
TAX SYSTEM
MARKETS
GOVERNMENTS
DEVOLUTION
ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNMENT REVENUE
DECISION-MAKING
RISK
REGIONS
PUBLIC FINANCES
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
TAXES
RIVER BASINS
STATE
GOVERNANCE
FISH
COUNCILS
CREDIT
INFRASTRUCTURE
BANKS
SOCIOECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION
GOVERNMENT REVENUES
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
STATE AUTHORITIES
STRATEGIES
EXPECTATIONS
DISCRIMINATION
ETHNIC GROUPS
TAX RATES
RESPONSIBILITY
LOCAL COUNCILS
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
DECISION MAKING
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES
EXPENDITURES
FOREIGN INVESTORS
TIMBER
ENVIRONMENTS
OPTIONS
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
LAND
EMPLOYMENT
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
BANK
EXTERNALITIES
REGULATORY REGIMES
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Full record
Show full item recordOnline Access
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22511Abstract
The inability to unlock natural resource wealth for the benefit of developing countries’ local populations, a phenomenon popularly known as the ‘resource curse’ or the ‘paradox of plenty’, has spawned extensive debate among researchers and policy makers in recent years. There is now a well-established body of literature exploring the links between natural resources and conflict, with some sources estimating that over the past 60 years, 40 percent of civil wars have been associated with natural resources. Following this introduction, Section two provides an overview of interstate tensions in West Africa in order to improve understanding of the drivers of fragility that trigger conflict between countries around extractive industry investment. Here, the discussion is grounded in examples in which interstate tensions have been apparent, including the case of the Mano River Union, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, a region with a history of conflict, and where the exploitation of commercial deposits of high-value resources may continue to have a potentially destabilizing effect. Section three focuses on the decentralization of natural resource revenues, a process that proponents believe can help manage grievances and defuse intrastate tension in areas directly affected by resource extraction, but one that is also not without challenges. Drawing upon the case of Ghana’s Mineral Development Fund, the section explores the potential for conflict (and conflict triggers) to arise when the redistribution of extractive industry revenues to subnational regions takes place. In doing so, it becomes apparent that the capture and misuse of revenues from the fund is as much a political issue as it is a policy or technical one. This sets the stage for section four, which focuses in greater detail on extractive industry-related conflict within catchment communities, and how contestation is most often a result of unequal power relationships. Section five, the conclusion, summarizes and reflects upon some of the challenges and struggles over resource management associated with West Africa’s recent resource boom, and draws out some of the cross-cutting themes. Here, suitable entry points for future lines of inquiry and engagement are identified.Date
2015Type
ReportIdentifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/22511http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22511
Copyright/License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/Related items
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
-
Local Governance in Developing CountriesShah, Anwar (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012-06-05)This book develops a comparative institutional framework for responsive, responsible, and accountable governance in developing countries. It provides a synthesis of analytical literature on local governance. It traces the historical evolution of local governance and presents a stylized view of alternative models of local governance practiced in various countries. It also presents case studies for 10 countries by leading national and international scholars. The country case studies present an in-depth view of local government organization and finance in each country.
-
Autonomy with Equity and Accountability : Toward a More Transparent, Objective, Predictable and Simpler (TOPS) System of Central Financing of Provincial-Local Expenditures in IndonesiaShah, Anwar (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014-08-29)During the past decade, Indonesia has
 transformed itself from centralized governance to
 decentralized local governance. Local governments were given
 extensive expenditure responsibilities while keeping the tax
 system centralized. To finance decentralized
 provincial-local expenditures, Indonesia implemented a new
 system of intergovernmental finance. This paper provides a
 review of the equity and efficiency implications of the
 current system of central-provincial-local transfers. It
 finds that the system of intergovernmental finance
 represents one of the most complex systems ever implemented
 by any government in the world. The system is primarily
 focused on a gap-filling approach to provincial-local
 finance to ensure revenue adequacy and local autonomy but
 without accountability to local residents for service
 delivery performance. This is done through a great degree of
 academic rigor using highly complex procedures. The
 complexity leads to a lack of transparency, inequity and
 uncertainty in allocation as well as creating incentives for
 jurisdictional fragmentation and reducing own-tax effort.
 Simpler alternatives are available that have the potential
 to address equity objectives while also enhancing efficiency
 and citizen-based accountability. Such alternatives would
 represent a move away from complex gap filling and special
 allocation approaches to simple, output based transfers to
 finance operating expenditures. These would be complemented
 by capital grants to deal with infrastructure deficiencies,
 and fiscal capacity equalization as a residual program with
 an explicit standard to ensure that all local jurisdictions
 have adequate means to deliver reasonably comparable levels
 of public services at reasonably comparable levels of tax
 burdens across the country. The paper argues that such an
 alternative system of intergoveernmental finance would
 preserve autonomy, while enhancing equity, simplicity,
 objectivity, transparency and accountability.
-
City Finances of Ulaanbaatar, MongoliaWorld Bank (Washington, DC, 2013-04-22)Ulaanbaatar's (UB) population has
 swollen from half a million in 2001 to approximately 1.2
 million in 2011, accounting for over 40 percent of the
 country's population. This trend is likely to continue
 as economic growth is increasingly concentrated in UB. With
 its growing population and concerns in rising inequality,
 the city is facing increasing pressure to maintain and
 expand service provision (especially infrastructure). The
 local tax on wages is expected to continue to provide
 substantial revenues to the UB government, which will assist
 the growing demand for services. Additionally, a new
 'capital city tax' is expected to come into effect
 in 2013. The decision of the central government (CG) to
 pursue further decentralization gives greater leadership to
 the UB government and its districts. It also provides local
 broader decision-making authority as well as opportunity for
 citizen's participation and for the improvement of
 governance and transparency. Therefore, a key challenge for
 UB and its districts is ensuring that the local fiscal
 system is sound and ready to handle a greater volume of
 revenues to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth. The
 city also needs to develop a robust and transparent fiscal
 management system if it is to make an effective use of new
 revenue sources. The main objective of this study is to
 understand the inner workings of the municipal finance
 system in Ulaanbaatar and its districts.