The U.S. Constitution’s Emoluments Clauses: How History, Behavioral Psychology, and the Framers’ Understanding of Corruption All Require an End to President Trump’s Conflicts of Interest
Keywords
EmolumentsConflicts of Interest
President Trump
Standing
Ethics
Law
K
Law in general. Comparative and uniform law. Jurisprudence
K1-7720
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The two Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. Constitution forbid federal officials from accepting “any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatsoever” from foreign or domestic governments. President Donald Trump’s business interests generate numerous opportunities to use public office for his personal benefit. This article examines the history of the Emoluments Clauses and the Framers’ conception of corruption. The conflicts of interest alleged in pending emoluments lawsuits against President Trump would not be allowable in the private sector, and various plaintiffs argue that the Emoluments Clauses apply to all public officials, including the President. The President’s lawyers have claimed he is exempt from the application of these clauses and have raised numerous procedural objections, such as challenging who might have” standing” to bring a lawsuit to compel his compliance with the clauses. Out of three cases filed in 2017, one has been dismissed, while two judges have recognized that the plaintiffs have standing. In each lawsuit, the President’s lawyers insist on a conception of corruption that is quid pro quo, where only bargained for exchanges count as corruption. While the Emoluments Clauses require public officials to get Congressional permission before receiving such benefits, the President’s position is that Congress must first demand an accounting of any personal benefits, rather than the burden being on the President to ask permission. Thus far, two courts have rejected that approach, and as of this writing, further appeals can be expected.Date
2018-12-01Type
ArticleIdentifier
oai:doaj.org/article:0366a9de94504db094e5adad774b28c12049-4092
10.2478/bjals-2018-0010
https://doaj.org/article/0366a9de94504db094e5adad774b28c1