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## Pakistan - Afghan Relations

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# Pakistan - Afghan Relations: Historic Mirror

Mohib Ullah Durani\*

Ashraf Khan\*\*

## Abstract

*Pakistan and Afghanistan are immediate neighbors having 2240 km common border formally known as Durand Line. Despite shared geography, ethnicity and faith, relations with Afghanistan have never been smooth. Rather, they have been a painful. With the Indian threat looming from the East, Afghanistan's hostile attitude has added further in the fragile security environment challenging the very existence of Pakistan. Ian Stephon termed such a security scenario enveloping simultaneously from the East and the West as a 'pincer movement' aiming to crush still born Pakistan.<sup>1</sup> A secure and friendly North-Western border has always been Pakistan's desire and security requirement vis-à-vis India which, could never get materialized because of Afghanistan's hostile attitude. With the sole exception of the four years of Taliban rule (1997-2001) over Afghanistan, successive governments in Kabul have displayed varying degrees of disaffection towards Islamabad.<sup>2</sup> Issues of Pakhtoonistan and Durand line, are at the heart of such hostile/ unfriendly attitude and antagonistic relations, resulted from Afghanistan's ambitions over certain areas in the North West of Pakistan that, for a brief period, remained part of territories conquered by Ahmad Shah Abdali from 1747 to 1773.<sup>3</sup> This article relates to Durand Line. Our aim is to trace out its history & examine its future prospects.*

**Keywords:** Pakistan, Afghanistan, Pak-Afghan Relations, Durand line

## Introduction

Change in Afghanistan has always affected the region in general and Pakistan in particular. Stability across both sides of the borders is mandatory for peace and security in the region. The research study is

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\* Mohib Ullah Durani, MPhil Research Scholar, Dept. of IR & Political Science, Qurtuba University of Science & IT, Peshawar Campus.

\*\* Muhammad Ashraf, M.Phil Research Scholar, in Department of IR & Political Science, Qurtuba University of Science & IT, Peshawar Campus.

focused to evaluate the conduct of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy with a view to identifying its strengths and weaknesses, irritants and force multipliers so as to make suggestions for improvement. The underlying aim of this research study is to revisit these relations and give them a new direction for peace and prosperity in the region. This article tries to analyze different phases of Pak-Afghan relations in chronological order with a view to identifying challenges hindering rapprochement process and continue to enflame the geo-strategic and geo-political environment amongst two neighborly countries. After the irritants causing worsening of relations are identified then the research offers some measures to address these irritants and suggest a strategy to bring both of the neighbors at friendly terms. The article is divided in to two parts. Part one explores the period from 1947 till American occupation of Afghanistan and part two discusses the inter-state relations in post 9/11 era. The subsequent discussion in this article is arranged as follows:

Part -1: Pakistan Afghanistan Relations: 1947- 2001

Part-II: Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations since 9/11

Part-III: Analyze major challenges / Irritants effecting maintenance of good neighborly relations between the two states.

### **Part-I: Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations:**

#### *Historic Perspective*

Pakistan came in to being on Islamic ideology revolving around the concept of Muslim Ummah and destined to be a symbol of universal Islamic solidarity across the globe. According to the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan, 'A cardinal feature of this ideology (of Pakistan) is to make Muslim brotherhood a living reality. It is therefore, part of the mission which Pakistan has set before itself to do every thing in its power to promote closer fellowship and cooperation between

Muslim countries'.<sup>4</sup> It was with this background that Pakistan, since its inception, pursued every step that could bring Muslim world closer at one platform. Its one of the fundamental principle has been to establish brotherly relations with the Muslim countries. Pakistan succeeded in cherishing very cordial relations with every Muslim country barring Afghanistan. In case of Afghanistan geographical location has acted more negatively than the binding role the Muslim faith was expected to play. In case of Pak-Afghan relations Lord Curzon's (former Viceroy of India) saying seems to be worth mentioning here, '*frontiers are indeed the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war and peace, of life or death to nations*' seems proving to be correct.<sup>5</sup>

It is regrettable fact of the history that from the time of Pakistan's birth, Afghanistan has maintained an attitude of hostile neighbor and Pakistan has to live with it because neighbors can not be changed. At the heart of Afghanistan's indifferent attitude towards Pakistan were the issues of Durand Line and Pakhtoonistan. Both of the issues were based on Afghanistan's ambitions of regaining control of NWFP and other areas which, for a brief period, were part of Ahmad Shah Abdali's conquered territories. During 1940s, when it became apparent that Britain is likely to free India, the Government of Afghanistan asked Britain that in the event of the demission of British authority the whole Pathan country as far as the Indus should revert to Afghan sovereignty or the people of NWFP be given choice of independent Pathan state.<sup>6</sup> Since then Afghanistan is playing self-styled champion's role for the establishment of, 'Pakhtoonistan'. The rationale sounded of the Pakhtoonistan was that since India was partitioned between Hindus and Muslims therefore, by parity of reasoning; there should be a further partition to provide the Pakhtoons with their own

home land also. The proponent of the claim forget that Pakistan's inception was not based on the ethnic reason but, rests on religious, cultural, historic and economic consideration. Referendum results held for the future of NWFP, 289244 votes in favour and 2874 against<sup>7</sup>, clearly demonstrate the desire of the inhabitants of the area in absolute term. People of the Tribal Agencies, without exception, stated that they were part of Pakistan and wished to preserve same relations with Pakistan as they had with the British. Afghanistan was the only country around the world that opposed Pakistan's entry in United Nation in September 1947.<sup>8</sup>

For the purpose of better understanding of the issue and coherency of the events Pak- Afghan relations are described into three phases. This phase wise distribution of the events would help in acquiring in-depth sight of the happenings that shaped the bilateral relation to its present course.

### **Phase-I: The Ill Fated Start of the Bilateral Journey (1947-1963)**

The phase marks the ill fated beginning of the bilateral relations, commencing from the establishment of Pakistan in 1947 and continues till 1963. The phase describes how the seeds of conflict and discord were sown and promoted between the two brotherly neighbors by the vested interests. Describing Pak Afghanistan relations President Ayub Khan identified two misconceptions amongst Afghans that influenced future course of inter state relations in negative directions<sup>9</sup>:

Pakistan, having no reasonable infrastructure pre-requisite of any state, would be unable to survive as an independent and sovereign state therefore; it would be wise enough on the part of Afghans to public their claims on Pakistan's territory especially alleged under Durand Line before it was disintegrated. The second misconception was based on the

self assumed fear amongst Afghan rulers that Pakistan's survival and successful march to democratic system of governance would undermine the position of the rulers in Afghanistan.

Pakistan, since its inception, is struggling for its survival as an independent and sovereign country against heavy odds. It has inherited a hostile neighbor, ten times larger in size and weight, determined to undo the partition of the subcontinent and re-emerge as united India from Ammu River to Bay of Bengal. Therefore, Pakistan has no other option but to maintain a foreign policy of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world and especially with its neighbors. Furthermore, Pakistan's strong attachment to its Islamic ideology has prompted it to espouse very intimate, cordial and brotherly relations as corner stone of its foreign policy. Pakistan, that already had threatening East could not imagine to afford another hostile nation on its West. It was only with the friendly relations with Afghanistan that could help Pakistan to escape the nightmare of being sandwiched between two hostile neighbors simultaneously from East and the West. But Kabul's refusal to recognize the Durand Line as a legitimate international boundary and its demand regarding Pakhtoonistan was extremely irritating beginning. Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan's admission into the UN, conditioning its recognition upon the provision that the right of self-determination be given to the people of Pakistan's NWFP. Actually the demand for Pakhtoonistan was made in December 1947, when Indian army was poised for a quick advance into Kashmir, on Pakistan's border. Since then raids from Afghanistan into Pakistani territories have taken place from time to time.

Afghanistan was the only country that voted against Pakistan's admission to the UN on the ill-conceived cry of Pakhtoonistan and ill

motivated blame of Pakistan's mal-treatment of Pathans. These complaints were perceived to be motivated in part by the ruling Afghan elite's desire to deflect criticism from their own country's economic backwardness, and in part by Indian machinations. Afghanistan's press and radio unleashed the propaganda war mainly to pressurize Pakistan to accede to their demand of Pakhtoonistan. Pakistan, though disappointed from Afghanistan's role, demonstrated open Heartedness by expressing its will to cultivate friendly relations with her. Mr. I.I. Chundrigar was dispatched as ambassador to Afghanistan followed by a delegation led by Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar to represent Pakistan in Afghanistan's Jashin e Azadi celebrations.<sup>10</sup> However, to create conducive conditions, win allegiance of the tribes and set grounds for mutual trust, Pakistan reversed long-standing British policy of stationing troops in the Pathan tribal areas by withdrawing its troops stationed in tribal areas.<sup>11</sup> Pakistan's gesture of trust and respect of the tribal traditions was reciprocated by the Loya Jirgah of Pakistan's tribal agencies by declaring their allegiance to Pakistan against India.<sup>12</sup>

Reconciliatory efforts including; Afghanistan's withdrawal of its negative UN Vote and exchange of ambassadors in 1948 from both sides could not pay much in bringing both of the countries closer. Rather, Afghanistan's Loya Jirgah's proclamation, in June 1949, fueled the flames further when announced that it did not recognize Durand Line and declared all Durand line related agreements void. In 1950, the tension reached to its climax when Afghan king Zahir Shah made an anti Pakistan speech at a celebration in Kabul. The Afghanistan's flag was hoisted and anti Pakistan leaflets were dropped by the Afghan Air Force.<sup>13</sup> The Afghan government did not halt on proclamation rather took a step further by setting up a Pakhtoon parliament inside Pakistan's

tribal areas.<sup>14</sup> Irregular forces from Afghanistan crossed Pakistan border to fabricate Paktoon uprising in Pakistani tribal areas in 1950-51 were even handedly dealt by Pakistan's security forces. Afghanistan denied its covert involvement in the cross border infiltration. Pakistan rejected Afghanistan's claim of neutrality in the cross border infiltration and both nations withdrew their ambassadors for few months till those were repositioned.<sup>15</sup> The assassination of Pakistani Prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan by an Afghan national in 1951 further deteriorated the already fragile relations.

Given the strained relations with Pakistan, Kabul overtly joined India to oppose any possibility of U.S. arms aid to Pakistan. Afghanistan's ambassador Mohammad Kabir Ludin protested to Secretary Dulles on January 4, 1954, that US military assistance to Pakistan might create a "Power vacuum" in Afghanistan that a foreign ideology could exploit.<sup>16</sup> Afghanistan's request for US arms support was rejected by the Washington in December 1954 primarily with the possible Soviet reaction rather than with the Pakistani response.<sup>17</sup> The rise to power of Sardar Daud, the cousin of Afghan monarch who was an ardent supporter of Paktoonistan movement and Pakistan's joining of SEATO and CENTO for defense purposes were two more irritants.

In 1955, Pakistan restructured its administrative units on *one unit* basis by incorporating all the areas in Western part of the country as West Pakistan province and eastern areas as East Pakistan province. Afghanistan government vehemently opposed the decision of integrating the Pathan dominated Northwest Province and instigated mass rallies and protests inside Afghanistan and across. Afghan Pakistani embassy in Kabul was sacked, consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad were attacked and Pakistan flag was molested.<sup>18</sup> Pakistan's people retaliated by

attacking on the Afghan consulate in Peshawar and Pakistan government embargoed Afghan goods. Fearing Soviet Union may exploit the opportunity by filling vacuum in Afghanistan; Washington's diplomacy prevailed in subsiding tempers and resumption of normal relations between Kabul and Karachi. In September 1955, Pakistan's flag was again raised at its embassy and consulates, and the Afghan emblem flew once again over its consulates in Pakistan.<sup>19</sup> November 1955 added a new external dimension to top the Pak-Afghan relations when Moscow severely reacted against Pakistan's joining of CEATO and CENTO in South Asia and elsewhere. Communist leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin paid a highly publicized visit to India and Afghanistan. In India Communist leaders endorsed New Delhi's position on Kashmir and in Afghanistan announced Moscow's backing for the Afghans on Pakhtoonistan, pledged \$100 million in economic aid and offered military assistance.<sup>20</sup> The visit marked entry of a new player in Indo-Afghanistan nexus against Pakistan, and Afghanistan, for all intents and purposes, became an economic satellite of the USSR.

On seeing possibility of Afghanistan going in to the lap of Soviet Union, America and other world powers including Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia tried to normalize the relations between the two neighbors and urged Pakistan not to sever its diplomatic relations with Afghanistan.<sup>21</sup> To reconcile and develop prospects for friendly relations, Pakistan's president Iskandar Mirza visited Afghanistan in August 1956 and Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy Prime Minister of Pakistan toured Afghanistan in 1957. These visits were reciprocated by Afghan ruler King Zahir Shah in 1958 and Prime Minister Sardar Daud Khan in 1959. These visits helped in cultivating attitude of reconciliation on both sides. Sikandar Mirza and Daud agreed to relegate political issue to the lower

priority and conceded to explore U.S suggestions, which envisaged establishing a transit zone in Karachi, providing special rolling stock for the Afghan trade, building short railway spurs into Afghanistan from the existing railheads at the border towns of Chaman and Landi Kotal, and improving roads and warehouse facilities inside Afghanistan. Development of these facilities was to cost about \$30 million that was to be borne by the United States.<sup>22</sup>

Seeing the competitive spirit amongst the leaders of the cold war, Prime Minister Daud tried to harvest from both sides of the fence. However, in President Ayub's view Daud believes the Soviets would win the Cold War and therefore sought Moscow's friendship. Inflow of Communist aid became so significant that the Russians had virtually taken over Afghanistan.<sup>23</sup> Soviets were developing the road infrastructure in Afghanistan in a way that could be strategically of their own use in later time frame. America did not agree to Pakistan's idea of adopting tough line against Afghanistan that had mortgaged its future to Soviets, as it was likely to push Afghans further into the Soviet camp.<sup>24</sup> American use of Peshawar air port for U-2 flights prompted Soviets to penetrate further in to Afghanistan and threatening Pakistan for the serious consequences for being accomplices in U-2 flights.<sup>25</sup>

Since the happening of U-2 incident USSR supported every Afghan move to isolate or damage Pakistan in any aspect. Indian connivance and Soviet's support to Afghanistan against Pakistan marked another series of cross border raids into Pakistan by Afghan tribesmen in the fall of 1961. These incursions led to the termination of Pak-Afghan relations and closure of Afghanistan's consulates and trade offices in Peshawar and Quetta that were turned to be centers of subversion. In retaliation, Kabul broke off diplomatic relations, closed the border and

suspended transit trade with Pakistan.<sup>26</sup> The new stand off effectively cut land-locked Afghanistan off from most of the world, leaving it dependent on transportation links with the Soviet Union, extremely limited access through Iran and with India through air. The break with Pakistan had accelerated the adverse trends on Afghanistan's economy and political system. America, stressing its concerns on growing Soviet influence in Kabul, maneuvered to manage the crises by offering U.S. good offices to both of the countries. In a bid to reduce Afghan dependence on the Soviets, America offered to finance the extension of railway lines from Pakistan into Afghanistan and urged the temporary reopening of Afghan trade offices. Pakistan agreed to a cross-border rail link near Quetta but denied the one near Peshawar. The reluctant Pakistan, finally succumbing under American pressure in September 1962 agreed "rather reluctantly" to consider allowing the Afghan "tentacles" across the border and a meeting between Pakistani and Afghan foreign ministers in New York.<sup>27</sup> However, the credit of successful mediation goes to Iran that managed to reconcile both countries on Tehran Accord 1963.

### **Phase-2: Detent in Pak- Afghanistan Relations (1963-73)**

Following Iran's successful mediation which resulted in the 1963 Tehran Accord, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to restore diplomatic relations, re-open their closed borders and resume trade and commercial ties. Both sides further agreed to 'approach all mutual problems in accordance with international law, and to continue to create an atmosphere of good understanding, friendship, and mutual trust.'<sup>28</sup> Resumption of bilateral relations and reopening of trade route in end September provided a sigh of relief to the depressed economic environment of Afghanistan. The onus of responsibility for severing the Pak-Afghan relations was put on the Prime Minister Daud who resigned in March 1963.

Daud's resignation as Prime Minister, the main exponent of Paktoonistan, and mediation of Shah of Iran led to the normalization of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the two states restored full diplomatic relations by mid 1963. These developments diluted Kabul's focus on the Paktoonistan issue and made the Afghan rulers to take a more relaxed view of Pakistan. The relations were improved to such an extent that during the 1965 India -Pakistan war, Afghanistan sided with Pakistan which enabled Islamabad to fully concentrate on its war with India and worry less about the security of its western border. King Zahir Shah, in his state visit of 1968, was given a very warm welcome by Pakistan.<sup>29</sup> King Zahir Shah's visit was reciprocated by Muzafar Ali Khan, Pakistan's Finance Minister, to explore the possibilities of increasing trade and fields of economic cooperation.<sup>30</sup> Islamabad decision to disband one unit led to further warmth in Pak-Afghan relations including increase in economic cooperation and mutual understanding.<sup>31</sup> Afghanistan maintained strict neutrality during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan and refrained from taking advantage of Pakistan's preoccupation in war.<sup>32</sup>

### **Phase-3: Reversal of Rapprochement (1973-1978)**

The normalization process that commenced in 1963 with the resignation of Sardar Daud as Prime Minister of Afghanistan started gaining currency with every passing year. The bilateral relations were about to be matured enough to resolve the historical legacy of mistrust when these were interrupted by a sudden change in the Kabul's corridors of power. In July 1973, Sardar Daud, an ardent champion of Paktoonistan issue, deposed King Zahir Shah while he was on visit to Europe<sup>33</sup> with the help of leftist forces and in connivance with the Soviets. These left forces were mainly from the Parcham wing (under Babrak Karmal) of the

Communist People's Democratic Party (PDP). Daud abolished the monarchy and inaugurated a republic under his own presidency.<sup>34</sup> Pro-Soviet elements in civil and army that supported Sardar Daud in his coup d'état took their right granted in interfering state policies that was perceived as an alarming development in Islamabad. During his last tenure as Prime Minister, Afghan -Pak relations remained murky and could not improve till his resignation in 1963. Now once again he was in power hence the process of Pakistan-Afghanistan rapprochement got struck in the middle and was to be reversed soon. The resumption of power by Mohammed Daoud in which pro-Soviet, leftist officers of the Afghan armed forces played an important role, was perceived in Islamabad as a negative development. Seeing his old record of supporting separatist tendencies in Pakistan it was feared that the Daoud comeback would once again arouse separatist movements amongst Pakhtoon and Balochi living across Durand Line. And it did happen in Balochistan when Afghanistan provided sanctuaries to the Marree and Bugti insurgents in mid 70s. To give a gesture of solidarity with Baloch insurgents in 1974-75 Daud's announced mobilization of his forces to Pak-Afghan border under the guise of war game that resulted in Pakistan's reciprocal deployment of troops along its western border.

Baloch insurgency was not new one but extension of their old demand of autonomy that was raised in their previous insurgencies of 1948, 1953, 1956-68. And similarly Pakhtoon uprising was also a new phenomenon rather resurfaced pulses of old Pakhtoonistan movement. However, it was inept handling of Pakistan government that portrayed Baloch and Pakhtoon demands of political autonomy with secessionist colors and perceived it a deliberate attempt by Kabul to disintegrate Pakistan. These perceptions in Islamabad were reinforced by the

sanctuary and financial assistance given to Baloch separatists in Afghanistan. Considering Daud a serious threat to Pakistan integration, Pakistan government decided to support anti Daud forces in destabilizing and bringing down Daud regime. Resultantly, Pakistan welcomed Afghan Islamists with anti communist and anti Doud feelings.<sup>35</sup> These dissidents were provided training and other supports for their incursions and uprisings inside Afghanistan. Figures like Gulbaddin Hekmat Yar, Ahmad Shah Masood, and Burhan-ud-din Rabbani escaped to Pakistan and continued controlling their armed resistance against Communists backed Daud regime from Peshawar.<sup>36</sup> These forces succeeded in gaining momentum with in few years and attained a status of armed opposition to be reckoned with. Reportedly, around 5,000 Afghan dissidents were trained by Pakistan in its secret military camps.<sup>37</sup>

On the other side Iran also did not like Daud's support for Baloch nationalism as it was felt a dangerous move that could ignite Iran's dormant Baluch population as well. Experiencing rise in Soviet influence in Afghanistan's internal affairs Daud observed that anti Pakistan policies were doing Afghanistan more harm than good.<sup>38</sup> Daud, succumbed by Pakistan retaliation, decided for reconciliation with Islamabad and invited Pakistan's Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto for Kabul's visit. Bhutto was given an unprecedented warm welcome in Kabul in June 1976 and Daud was given red carpet reception in his reciprocal visit to Islamabad in August same year. These reconciliatory visits helped in reviving trust, defusing tension, resolve of peaceful coexistence, and finding pacific settlement of disputes. Dr Babar Shah opines in his article 'Pakistan's Afghanistan policy: An Evaluation' that Bhutto agreed to release the National Awami Party (NAP) leaders accused of supporting the Pukhtoonistan demand, while Daud agreed to

recognize the Durand Line as the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan.<sup>39</sup> Daud while distancing him from the communist forces sought aid from Iran and persecuted both wings of the PDP in 1977.<sup>40</sup> However, the process of rapprochement was once again derailed as the window of opportunity got closed with the overthrow of Bhutto government in Pakistan in July 1977, and elimination of Daud by communist forces in April 1978.<sup>41</sup> Kabul was taken over by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) designating Noor Mohammed Taraki as President, Hafiz Ullah Amin as Prime Minister, and Babrak Karmal as deputy Prime Minister. The country was renamed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). Soon the communist reforms enraged land owners and the clergy –resulting in wide spread protests and rioting all along the country side. The currents and undercurrents of Iranian Islamic Revolution also added Islamic color and temptations to the forces resisting communist regime in Afghanistan.

The positioning of communist regime in Kabul presented a serious threat to Pakistan's security and integrity as it was perceived from Kabul-Delhi-Moscow nexus with all its ramifications. Pakistan had no other option but either to surrender or to go for all out support to the forces resisting against the communist regime of President Noor Mohammed Taraki. Besides, supporting and organizing resistance forces against the Communist regime of Kabul, Pakistan had to host over 150,000 Afghan refugees into Pakistan immediately after the Saur Revolution of April 1978.<sup>42</sup> In December 1978 PDPA signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. On September 16th 1979, Hafizullah Amin staged another coup against own government, killing Taraki, and took over as President of Afghanistan. Moscow having found

Amin less subservient invaded Kabul during the last days of 1979 executed Amin and installed Karmal as a new president.<sup>43</sup>

#### **Phase-4: War of Independence against Soviet's Occupation (1979-1992)**

The December, 27<sup>th</sup> 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which killed Hafizullah Amin and installed Babrak Karmal as the country's president, created a frightening situation for Pakistan as it brought the Red Army dangerously close to the Khyber Pass, the traditional gateway of invasions of South Asia from the north. The invasion was seen in Islamabad as a calculated move more than a help to a floundering puppet. Moscow's takeover of Afghanistan deeply offended Zia's sense of Islamic brotherhood.<sup>44</sup> The invasion coincided with the post revolutionary disarray in Iran, Baloch insurgency in Balochistan and continued uncertainty in Pakistan. Russian forces were positioned within an hour flying time of the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and Baloch area. Furthermore, the proponents of warm water theory feared that Pakistan was the terminal stop for the Soviet troops.<sup>45</sup> Hence the Soviet military move into Afghanistan was posing a direct strategic threat to the security of Pakistan, Iran and the Persian Gulf alike. Pakistan was faced with a challenge; how to tactically face and engage an ideologically hostile super power standing right on its doorstep. Pakistan had three options to deal with the situation in Afghanistan: accept it as the fait accompli, or provide full support to freedom fighters resisting against the invasion, or mobilize international community to put political pressure on Soviet Union along with covert support to the resistance forces. According to Mr. *Abdul Sattar*, ex- Foreign Secretary and Foreign Minister of Pakistan:

*“The Soviet military intervention provoked a deep sense of alarm in Pakistan. Suddenly the buffer disappeared and if the Soviet rulers consolidated their control in Afghanistan they could use it as springboard to reach the warm waters of the Arabian Sea. Pakistan could not afford to acquiesce in the Soviet intervention. But neither could it afford a confrontation with a super power. Islamabad therefore decided on the middle course, avoiding confrontation but raising a low pitched voice of concern and protest.”<sup>46</sup>*

America, whose sense of regional insecurity was already injured with the downfall of Shah of Iran, perceiving Soviet invasion as a geo-strategic threat not only to Pakistan but also to the Persian Gulf area and American interests. Considering the likely repercussions America decided to bolster its regional security network in an attempt to contain the communist expansion. President Carter, on May 4, 1980, declared:

*‘We will provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat from the north.’<sup>47</sup>*

Pakistan, owing to sheer compulsions of its own security concerns allowed US to make use of its territory for unfolding of proxy war against communist expansion. But, Carter’s offer of \$400 million, in military and economic assistance to be spread over in two years, was rejected being incommensurate with the size of the corresponding threat.<sup>48</sup> However, lack of agreement on military and economic aid did not effect widening intelligence cooperation between CIA and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).<sup>49</sup> Soon, in early 1981, the new incumbent Administration led by Ronald Reagan realized the urgency of the situation and enhanced their economic and military assistance to \$ 3.2 billion-five years proposal.<sup>50</sup> The lion’s share of American aid channeled

through Pakistan was funneled to seven groups of Sunni Muslims based in Peshawar. The American's supply of arms, ammunition and equipment to the Mujahideen, was funneled through Pakistan's ISI.<sup>51</sup> The covert aid for raising, training, equipping and managing Mujahideen in to the battle field went as high as \$400 million by 1984 from \$60 million annually in 1981.<sup>52</sup> The leading recipient of this aid was Hezb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar that proved to be the trust worthy and deserving resistance force.<sup>53</sup> It was Pakistan's skill-full use of intelligence and resources against Soviet forces that made Afghanistan a 'bleeding wound'<sup>54</sup> for Moscow. Finally, Gorbachev during his November 1986 visit to India called for political solution of Afghanistan that could guarantee its sovereignty and nonaligned status. This realization in Moscow gave a way to diplomacy and Islamabad initiated negotiation on the time frame of the intended withdrawal of the Soviet forces. On one side diplomatic channels were busy in drafting final version of the Geneva Accord and on the other side clandestine bomb blasts and bombings of Pakistan cities were underway to derail the forthcoming withdrawal process. Blowing up of Ojiri Camp munitions depot on 10<sup>th</sup> April 1988 was one of such sabotages. Finally, the Peace Accord between Pakistan and Afghanistan was signed in Geneva on April 14, 1988, with the two superpowers as its co-guarantors. The salient of the accord were:

- All Soviets troops to leave Afghanistan within nine months, and half of them to be removed in the first three months.
- The Accord called for a ban on cross border activities.
- Both of the super powers were to ensure one-year moratorium on arms deliveries.

- However, both of the superpowers has the right to arm their 'allies' should there be a violation of the one-year moratorium on arms deliveries.

The Accord did not cater for any post withdrawal interim government in Afghanistan thereby leaving the country in state of civil war. The Soviet invaders departed on schedule and their withdrawal was followed by eight years of civil war that devastated the remains of Kabul and surrounding. The withdrawing Soviets left behind necessary war munitions and equipment that enhanced staying power of Dr. Najeeb Ullah Government in Kabul. On the other side Americans stopped flow of arms, ammunition and equipment to the Mujahedden thereby virtually depriving them of any capacity to fight. The disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991 triggered the collapse of Najeeb Ullah in April 1992 and setting up of Sibghatullah Mojadedi's broad-based Interim Government. The power sharing arrangements under Peshawar accord brokered by Pakistan failed when Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, President and Ahmad Shah Masood, the defense minister, conspired to keep Gul Badin HikmatYar designated Prime Minister out of power. This new power game gave birth to another civil war on ethnic lines. Instead of honoring the terms of Peshawar Accord Rabbani perpetuated his power illegally by getting himself reelected as President in June 1994.

Rabbani's extension of his presidential power of the transitional government that was expiring on 15<sup>th</sup> December 1994 was betrayal to Peshawar Accord. The in-fighting amongst the different Mujahedden between 1992 and 1994 brought about colossal loss of men and material that included over 45000 dead and nearly same numbers were maimed.<sup>55</sup> The social anarchy, chaotic conditions and rampant mismanagement all around Afghanistan was depicting the country as a failed state like

Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi.<sup>56</sup> Pakistan accused Rabbani on his betrayal of Peshawar Accord and nurturing links with India to damage Pakistan's interests. The unprecedented love for Pakistan demonstrated during and after the Soviet occupation vanished and Pakistani citizens in Kabul were being termed as enemy agents. The situation went so worst that Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was closed down in July 1994 and Pak-Afghan border was soon closed. Suddenly a new force called Taliban emerged over the ashes left behind by the war lords in southern Afghanistan.<sup>57</sup> Rabani betrayal created friction between Islamabad and Rabani regime and emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan provided Islamabad an alternative choice to replace Rabani.

#### **Phase-5: Emergence of Taliban & Pakistan's Support for Revitalizing Peace & Stability in Kabul:**

Pakistan that was eagerly looking for revitalization peace and stability in war torn Afghanistan found a window of opportunity to realize its long awaited dream of having peace and stability in Afghanistan –a mandatory condition for voluntarily return of over 3 million Afghan refugees to their homes. Disillusioned with the prolonged in-fighting and criminal activities of the Afghan Mujahideen leadership, the Tehreek-i-Islami-i-Taliban Afghanistan emerged in and around Kandhar in September 1994 and began as a new movement to pursue following points<sup>58</sup>:

- To disarm all war lords/ militias either by persuasion or through coercion.
- Restoration of peace and social order by enforcing Islamic laws in the areas under their control.
- Retain control of all areas liberated by the Taliban.

- Defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan.

The Taliban phenomenon soon became a puzzling reality, gathered momentum and grew into a dominating force that was to be reckoned with. Pakistan, that was worried on the possibility of the over flow of Afghan civil war into its territory. Since, most of the Taliban's were amongst those who, during their stay in refugee camps during Soviet's occupation, were educated in Pakistan therefore; they had soft and sympathetic feelings for Pakistan. Taliban's seizure of Toba Achakzai arms and ammunitions depot (Spin Boldak) in October 1994 was a classic example of tactical surprise and swiftness of operation that help them to own over 80,000 Kalashnikovs and hundreds of thousands of ammunition rounds.<sup>59</sup> Taliban's timely military intervention helped Pakistan's NLC convoy (loaded with goods) destined for Central Asia to get rescued from the captivity of warlords. Having brushed aside resistance between Chaman and Kandhar Taliban easily overpowered the disunited old guards defending Kandhar on 5<sup>th</sup> November 1994. Fall of Kandhar to Taliban resulted in to high level defections in government forces and local militias joining Taliban.

Having consolidated their authority in and around Kandhar, Taliban spread north towards Kabul and West towards Herat. Soon the movement picked up momentum and by February 1995 they were in occupation of nine provinces.<sup>60</sup> Capture of Charasyab in February 1995, overrunning of Herat in September 1995, Jalal Abad on 11 September 1996 and Kabul on 26<sup>th</sup> September 1996 flushed the movement with success and fame.<sup>61</sup> India provided lot of financial, material and diplomatic support to Rabani and Ahmad Shah Masood in order to enhance their ability and capacity to withstand Taliban pressure.

Frontier Post reported that Indian cargo planes landed at Bagram air base on 15<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup>, 21<sup>st</sup>, and 27<sup>th</sup> June 1995.<sup>62</sup> There were also reports of Indian pilots flying planes belonging to Rabani forces.<sup>63</sup> With occasional reverses at certain parts of the Afghanistan Taliban were finally able to control 27 out of 32 provinces by the 3<sup>rd</sup> week of May 1997. India, following the old dictum that your enemy's enemy is your friend went all out to support Rabani and Ahmad Shah Masood who had developed serious differences with Pakistan on Taliban issue. India also succeeded in falsely feeding Iran that Pakistan on the behest of USA is supporting Taliban with the sole aim of isolating / containing Iran. Taliban became a common enemy where Iranian and Indian interests converged. Whereas, India's main aim in Afghanistan was to prevent Pakistan in solidifying a common block of Muslim countries that would give strategic depth to Pakistan at the time when confronted with India.<sup>64</sup> New Delhi was also fearful from the Taliban's likely support to Kashmiri freedom fighters therefore India wanted to help Rabani and Masood in denying Taliban control of Afghanistan.

Taliban's rapid move, winning loyalties of opposing commanders by doling out money and their success in bringing out peace and stability in the areas under their control have diluted the resolve of the Heratis, and the forces defending Jalal Abad, and Kabul to put up stiff resistance against them. Sultan Amir, Pakistan's Consul General in Herat recalls, 'they (Taliban) brought peace, they eradicated poppies, gave free education, medical treatment and speedy justice, they were the most respected people in Afghanistan'<sup>65</sup> The story of Taliban rise and takeover of Afghanistan is summed up by Mr. Abdul Sattar:

"The Taliban whirlwind, brewed in the chaos and tyranny of warlordism, started from Kandahar, swept across the southern

Afghanistan in 1995, gathering strength as the idealistic seminaries were joined by the former Mujahideen, fed up with factional internecine warfare. The populace welcomed the more disciplined and better behaved Taliban. The popular base of reputed Mujahideen leaders was undermined. Continuing their march, the Taliban on the dawn of September 27, 1996, drove into Kabul”.<sup>66</sup>

Pakistan was looking for a peaceful and stable Afghanistan with a cooperative government in Kabul that could facilitate return of over 3 million Afghan refugees on one hand and provide safe access to Central Asian markets on the other. Keeping in view the fast moving progress of Taliban movement Pakistan felt that it could successfully move towards its goals through the Taliban administration in Kabul. It was first time for Pakistan that Afghanistan had a government that was Pakistan friendly and had no link with India.<sup>67</sup> Pakistan extended full diplomatic and economic support to the Taliban Government. To reconstruct Chaman-Kandhar-Herat- Kushka highway Pakistan provided financial and technical support to the Taliban as well.<sup>68</sup> Pakistan’s politico - economic assistance to the Taliban was partially on a desire to promote its national interests. Taliban’s success in controlling the war lord and bringing peace in their controlled areas influenced Pakistan to bet future of Afghanistan upon them. Pakistan’s leaning towards Taliban was motivated by number of geo-economic and geo-strategic considerations such as:

- Rabani Government’s hostile and unthankful attitude coupled with growing involvement of India was the dominant factors that compelled Pakistan to drift towards Taliban. Furthermore Taliban were predominantly Pakhtoon and supporting them

meant preferring Pakhtoones over Rabbani and Masood who have bitten the hand that had fed them in hard days.

- Taliban would be able to secure trade route to the land locked Muslim Central Asia –a goal that Islamabad was looking for.
- Their religious outlook and Islamic belief would help in providing anti secular/ anti Indian force that would deny India Afghanistan territory to use against Pakistan.
- Taliban controlled Afghanistan would lend strategic depth to Pakistan against its arch rival India.
- Taliban controlled Afghanistan would also facilitate Kashmiri Mujahideen in their training and struggle for freedom from Indian yoke.
- Taliban government means punishing/ revenging from Rabani who was instrumental in the sacking of Pakistan's Embassy in Kabul.
- Taliban proved to be a coherent force capable of controlling war lords, bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan and calling an end to the ongoing civil war that has the chances of overflowing to Pakistan's territories.

To cement its relations with Taliban regime Pakistan accorded them diplomatic recognition in 25<sup>th</sup> May 1997 as they entered Mazar e Sharif.<sup>69</sup> The Taliban government was meeting all the recognition requirements as per international law. Taliban government was in effective control of most of the Afghanistan territory including capital and included representatives of all the ethnic groups. Pakistan's recognition of Taliban government persuaded Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to follow the suit immediately after, which

they did. However, official recognition of Taliban widened the gap between Pakistan and Iran on the particular issue. The Pak-Iran ties were further deteriorated when Taliban asked Iranian to close their Embassy and leave Kabul with in 48 hours. All the Central Asian countries except Turkmenistan were opposed to the Pakistan's marrying up with Taliban. American response to the Taliban government was though cautious but encouraging. Robin Raphael (then Assistance Secretary of state) called Taliban an indigenous movement, and hoped that their extremist policies can be moderated by engaging them. However, gradually US policy towards Taliban started changing because of Taliban's oppressive behavior towards women and presence of Osama and Taliban's open support for him. On May 5th, 1999 the US Senate passed a resolution calling on President Bush not to recognize any government that discriminated against women.

In 1998, Pakistan government generously provided over \$ 6 million in direct support to the Taliban in addition to the trade facilities.<sup>70</sup> U.S intelligence assessment at the time contended that Pakistan was funneling the Taliban forces with munitions, fuel, and food. Taliban's brutal style of enforcing Islamic practices and cruel treatment to women sent alarms in the region and were soon alienated. Simultaneously, Pakistan also persuaded Taliban to make a broad-based coalition government by sharing power with major ethnic groups in Kabul. Taliban having control of their 90% Afghanistan's territory refused to sit with Northern Alliance as coalition partner. Pakistan's insistence on broad based government backed by continued diplomatic pressure Taliban turned to Saudi millionaire Usama Bin Laden for economic support. Taliban allowed Usama to live comfortably in Afghanistan and

in return he provided personnel, money and hundreds of Arab fighters to participate' in the Taliban military campaigns in the north.<sup>71</sup>

Pakistan was caught between the American pressure on the one hand and the Taliban's absolute refusal on bin Laden's expulsion on the other. Meanwhile Taliban's killing of Iranian diplomats in Herat annoyed Iran pointing fingers on Pakistan. In order to stem erosion of its friendly relations with Iran and play down the American criticism of its support for the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, Islamabad began to distance itself from the Taliban. In September 1998 Iran closed its border with the Taliban held areas and on 9<sup>th</sup> December 1998 UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 1214 calling on Taliban to:

- Cease fire with the Northern Alliance
- Stop shielding terrorists and closing narcotics trade
- And enter in to peace talks with the opposition factions
- motion of censure for killing the Iranian diplomats and the slaughter in Mazar-i-Sharif

Though Pakistan support to Taliban was based on its national priorities and objectives but at the same time Pakistan also tried to bring Taliban and the opposition closer. Pakistan viewed a broad based, multi-ethnic government in Kabul as the recipe for long term peace and stability in the country. With the UN persuasion and Pakistan's intervention Taliban agreed to meet anti Taliban Alliance at Ashkabad from 10 to 14 March 1999 on the agenda of peace, cease fire and arrangements for broad based government in Afghanistan. The talk ended in fiasco without giving any credible out put to proceed further. On 15<sup>th</sup> October 1999, the UN adopted Resolution No. 1267 that demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden, failing which

UN imposed economic sanctions on 14<sup>th</sup> November 1999.<sup>72</sup> Taliban's relations with the Al-Qaeda network were of mutual benefits. In return of providing safe sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban gained money, troops and arms to fight the Northern Alliance

Pakistan's stand with regard to Taliban's recognition and having a multi-ethnic broad based government in Kabul remained unchanged even in Musharaf Government. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, while denying any change in Afghan Policy, reiterated that Pakistan would continue to pursue the idea of a broad based government in Afghanistan that represents all major ethnic groups.<sup>73</sup> In June 2000, Pakistan's Foreign Minister while in Tehran for ECO Ministerial conference very loudly declared that Pakistan supports every peace initiative whether that is Iran led OIC efforts or by the UN, and Pakistan will accept any peace formula that is accepted by the Afghans.<sup>74</sup> Pakistan's consistent engagements and pursuance to Taliban started paving the way for improvement on the issues of international concerns. It was the outcome of such constructive engagements that during his visit to Pakistan Afghan Interior Minister not only resolved differences over Afghan Transit Trade amicably but also agreed to hand over proclaimed offenders involved in sectarian violence in Pakistan.<sup>75</sup> Soon a meeting between the Taliban leadership and the US under Secretary Thomas Pickering was arranged by Pakistan which helped both parties to understand each others view point and agreed to continue talks.<sup>76</sup> Resultantly, to honour their commitment Taliban closed down three training camps including Rashkor and Kargha, cracked down on narcotics factories, and placed restrictions on Osama's related Arab fighters.<sup>77</sup> Such a positive response by the Taliban helped build mutual trust not only with Pakistan but also with the US and other neighbours.

But the situation changed with the 9/11 that brought American symbols of economic and military might under brutal attack and Osama Bin Laden, living in Afghanistan, was declared as master mind behind the act. Pakistan condemned this vile act and denounced terrorism in all its manifestations.<sup>78</sup> United States warned the Taliban, the ruling authority in Afghanistan, to hand over Osama or face the consequences. Taliban refused to handover their guest who fought to liberate their homeland from the Russians. Hence, the U.S. decided to attack Afghanistan, destroy Osama and its training camps, and disintegrate the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and, giving unparalleled and unprecedented accumulation of power to the Northern Alliance –mainly a non-Pakhtoon entity.

### **Part-II: Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations Since 9/11**

The horrific acts of September 11, 2001 changed the world and Pakistan found itself between the devil and the deep sea. It marks a new phase of the Pakistan foreign policy in general and Pakistan's Afghanistan policy in particular. Pakistan was given a stark choice by America; 'either to be with us or against us'.<sup>79</sup> Pakistan stood at a crossroad as President of United States George W. Bush made it clear that he would not make any distinction between the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks and those who harbor them:

*"We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime"*

Pakistan was to either stand with America in its war against Al Qaida and Taliban or suffer U.S. retaliation if continue with its pro Taliban stand. Pakistan opted to side the international coalition and provide intelligence, flight corridor and bases for logistic support and recovery to the U.S. led military attack over Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.<sup>80</sup> Pakistan, to avert likely war, did its best to mediate between U.S and the Taliban. George Tenet, former head of C I A, in his book amply records Pakistan's efforts of bringing Taliban to the table and averting war. He claims that Pakistan helped in arranging meetings between Robert Grenier, (CIA boss in Islamabad) and Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani, Taliban leader to sort out any peaceful solution.<sup>81</sup> Reportedly, Pakistan spy master Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed (DG ISI) with a high level delegation also visited Taliban leader Mullah Omar in Kandahar on 17<sup>th</sup> September 2001, and persuaded him to extradite bin Laden so as to avert drastic consequences from US attack.<sup>82</sup> The attack was effective in destroying the training camps, however, the large numbers of the Taliban and Al Qaeda dispersed and disappeared in to the hinterland and some fled in to the neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. Within 8-10 weeks the Taliban were over powered, routed, major cities including the capital fell on November 13<sup>th</sup>, 2001.

Being a gate way to Central Asia, the geo- strategic location of Afghanistan provides a shortest and most cost effective route for channeling vast energy resources of Central Asia to the outside world. The fall of Taliban in Afghanistan paved the way for foreign actors to intervene in Afghanistan to secure their strategic interests. After the disintegration of Taliban and surrender of Kabul, UN arranged meeting of selected Tribal chiefs in Bonn (Germany) to decide upon Afghan interim government under Hamid Karazi with six months mandate

commencing from 22 December 2001. Pakistan supported the interim set up and Hamid Karzai paid an official visit to Pakistan in February 2002 that renewed bilateral relations on friendly terms. Pakistan offered all sort of moral, political and economic support to strengthen new government in Kabul under the presidency of Mr Karazai. President Musharraf's visit to Afghanistan in April 2002 and announcement of 100 million dollars aid for reconstruction of Afghanistan should be seen in this context. Pakistan also provided full support for the peaceful conduct of presidential and parliamentary polls in October 2004 and September 2005 and sealed its border to guard against any incursions across the border to disrupt election process. President Musharraf was the first head of state to visit Afghanistan after the successful completion of presidential election.

Soon the warmth of relations between the two neighbors started deteriorating because of the intrigues of the cabinet members belonging to Northern Alliance. The trust deficit widened further with each passing day and president Karzai, once considered to be pro-Pakistan, started blaming Pakistan for supporting cross border terrorism. Baring the person of Hamid Karazi, the Bonn Conference wrongly neglected dominant tribes while giving political role in future set up of Afghanistan. This mistake turned in to catastrophe as it helped blossom the Afghan insurgency. The other Bonn conspiracy turned in to blunder was keeping Pakistan out of the process and from under taking any kind of reconstruction work. On the contrary Afghanistan's distant neighbour like India was provided opportunity to further its strategic interests against Pakistan. Since then, India has found a vast platform in Afghanistan to conduct its covert activities in Balochistan through

Balochi dissidents and FATA through TTP in order to destabilize Pakistan.

Establishment of over a dozen Indian Consulates all along Pak-Afghan border has become security concern for Pakistan. These Consulates are doing less humanitarian work and more running the spy/sabotage network to destabilize Pakistan. Anti-Pakistan activities that include channeling of arms, ammunition, and money in to Balochistan and FATA by these consulates have been pointed out by Pakistan at number of forums/ occasions. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Mr Yousuf Raza Gilani has reportedly provided requisite proofs of Indian involvement in Balochistan affairs to his Indian counter part Egyptian resort of Sharmel Sheikh Summit on July 16<sup>th</sup> 2009. The proofs also included names and photographs of Indian officials meeting with Baloch dissident Brahamdagh Bugti and other terrorists in Afghanistan and during their visits to India.

### **Challenges in Pak- Afghanistan Relations**

Ensuing discussion in view, Pakistan and Afghanistan relations have never been, smooth rather a painful experience of course. Pakistan's resolve to promote closer fellowship and cooperation between Muslim countries especially with Afghanistan could not materialize in its true letter and spirit. Pakistan succeeded in cherishing very cordial relations with every Muslim country baring Afghanistan. With the sole exception of the four years of Taliban rule (1997-2001), successive governments in Kabul have displayed varying degrees of antagonism towards Islamabad. The most disturbing period with bitter experiences was the two spells of Sardar Daud, from 1947 to 1963 and from 1973 to 1978. He proved to be the champion of Paktoonistan issue and Durand Line controversy. His period of rule carries repeated incidences of border clashes, insurgents

surge, sabotages, border closure, trade embargoes, burning of national flags and embassies, and severing of diplomatic relations etc. All these acts of antagonism and Pakhtoonistan issue were architect of Indo-Afghan connivance so as to keep Pakistan wanting peace and stability in its hinter land. More over on every occasion of trade embargo or border closure India and Soviet Union presented themselves as alternatives to Pakistan. When Sardar Daud realized that stability across both sides of the borders is mandatory for peace and security in the region then it was too late.

An in-depth look in to the making and breaking of the roller coaster type bilateral relations points towards mainly two interrelated historical problems; the Durand Line issue and Pakhtoonistan movement and remaining all irritants were effects of these two. Excluding a long list of minor nature of irritants from this write up, few of the worth mentioning challenges / findings identified during the research analyses are:

- Durand Line Issue
- Pakhtoonistan Issue
- Interference into each others internal affairs
- Foreign hand and particularly Indian Factors

*Durand Line Issue:* Durand Line is a historic fact of British legacy that kept hounding the Pak-Afghan relations for the last sixty two years or so. It is a *de jure* boundary line between Pakistan & Afghanistan, drawn as a result of a fully negotiated agreement on 12<sup>th</sup> November 1893 between British Government of India and the Afghanistan, and signed by Sir Mortimor Durand (British Foreign Secretary) and Afghanistan's Amir Abul Rehman Khan.<sup>83</sup> The agreement was subsequently reaffirmed by

the later Afghan rulers in their different agreements and treaties. Amir Abul Rehman's own autobiography states that the boundary line was agreed upon from Chitral and Baroghil Pass up to Peshawar, and thence up to Koh-i- Malik Siyah( the tri junction of Persia, Afghanistan and Balochistan) in this way that:

*“Wakhan Kafiristan, Asmar, Mohmand of Lalpura, and one portion of Waziristan(Birmal) came under my rule, and I renounced my claims from the railway station of New Chaman, Chaghi, the rest of Waziri, Biland Khel, Kurrum, Afridi, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Dir, Chilas and Chitral.”*

The legal acceptability of the line was doubted by the people and various governments of Afghanistan from time to time that fueled mistrust and suspicions against each other. Research finds that the issue is simple, clear and easy to understand/ interpret but roots to the continuity of the issue lie in lack of proper information and misunderstanding of related documents. The factual position of the issue is:

- The agreements/ treaty documents signed, ratified and endorsed by successive Afghan regimes negate the claim that the agreement was coerced or imposed by the British.
- It also refutes the baseless claim that the validity of agreement has expired after 100 years in 1993.
- Research also finds that the view of the Line being an arbitrary and not physical is also dubious. The line follows the tribal boundaries and well recognized features. The only tribes which were partly divided were the Mohmand and Waziri.
- Rights and obligations for the newly emerged state like Pakistan under International Law also support Pakistan's stand that the

agreement is enforceable in post-British period as well. The law clearly states that treaties of extinct states concerning boundary lines remain valid and all rights and obligations arising from such treaties of the extinct state devolve on the successor nation which inherits treaty rights. Pakistan is the successor nation on the north western part of the Indian subcontinent.

- After partition of the sub continent, British Governments of different times with stand to their pre-partition position on Durand Line as a willingly negotiated and internationally accepted border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The permanency and legality of the Durand Line was also validated by the Lord Home, British foreign secretary, in the British parliament on November 3, 1953. And lately British Prime Ministers; Mr Anthony Eden and Mr Harold Macmillan confirmed this position in separate statements made by them in the British parliament on March 1, 1956, and May 20, 1960, respectively.<sup>84</sup>

Foregoing rationale in view and a cursory glance of history points that a large number of states have their borders drawn and redrawn on different account. Now reversal or realignment of their borders on the basis of historic setting of the past would jeopardize the socio- politico system of the world leaving chaos, confusion and anarchy. This even may result in to call an end of Afghanistan itself as Afghanistan has 200 years life of its own but remain a subsidiary of India and Pakistan for more than 1000 years or so. Hence, if we choose to regard declaring borders illegitimate on historical grounds then it will become a right to each state to reject the status of its international border thereby collapsing the current international regime for governing borders.

Whereas, the Durand Line is the only boundary that was demarked through bilateral understanding and yet the only border that Afghanistan is not willing to recognize. Under international law and the international legal regime, Afghanistan's objections to the Durand Line are unlikely to hold grounds.

*Pakhtoonistan Issue:* Pakistan's Afghan policy has always been predominantly influenced by its ideology and earnest desire for closer ties with all countries of the Muslim world. Afghanistan was not an exception to it, rather it occupied more important place in Pakistan's foreign policy due to its location, commonality of its ethnically Pakhtoon population and socio-cultural history. On the contrary, Afghanistan never accepted Pakistan with all its territorial manifestations as it claimed Pakhtoon areas of NWFP and Balochistan as an integral part of state of Afghanistan that were forcefully annexed by British India. The central theme of Afghanistan's argument made in favour was that the Pakhtoons living across the Durand Line are one nation and the Durand line arbitrarily splits the nation into two. Afghanistan failed to realize that the Durand line was not an arbitrarily drawn but a physically drawn and accepted border since 1893. The border follows physical geo-political features of tribal boundaries. Syed Abdul Qadoos in his research studies finds that the line separated those tribes which go to markets in Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Tank and Quetta from those with economic links with Khorasan, having Kabul, Ghazni, Kandhar as their market towns'.<sup>85</sup> The only tribes which were partly divided were the Mohmand and Waziri. Furthermore, the interesting phenomenon of the Pakhtoonistan issue was that it was applicable only on the union of Pakhtoon with Afghanistan and not Afghanistan based Pakhtoon with NWFP. The Afghan concept of Pakhtoonistan consisted of only those

Pakhtoon who live in Pakistan. When ever the idea of holding a plebiscite for a united Pakhtoon land was put forward the Afghan government always reacted angrily and rejected the idea.

Instead of helping new born Pakistan to secure and maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity against the heavy odds of unjust partition Afghanistan challenged Pakistan's right to rule over its Pakhtoon areas as a successor state of the British India. Rather, its government at that point of time, did it's all out effort to push for creation of another independent state in Pakhtoon dominated areas West of Indus River or alongside the Durand Line. Afghanistan not only supported the Pakhtoon uprisings but also instigated, housed, equipped, and armed Baloch insurgents to destabilize Pakistan from within. Pakistan initially reacted with diplomatic and political protests followed by the repeated incidences of closing border, severing of diplomatic relations, and disconnected Afghan trade transit through Pakistan. Trade blockade badly affected Afghanistan's economy and her socio-economic development. Whereas, on the other hand Pakistan taking cognizance of the Afghanistan's land locked state allowed Afghan goods to pass through Pakistani territory and allocated a number of railways carriages to transport Afghan goods. The issue remained at forefront during the Sardar Daud eras; from 1947 to 1963 and 1973 to 1978. The issue went in to dormancy with Sardar Daoud's stepping out of power in 1963 and later with his assassination in 1978. Though Communist regime from 1978 to 1995 and Northern Alliance government since 2002 has kept the issue alive though at low profile, for their vested interests. Fears of Pashtunistan led Pakistan to support Jihadist surrogates in the Afghan resistance during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s and, later, to build up the Taliban. Ironically, during its rule in Kabul the Taliban refused to

endorse the Durand Line despite pressure from Islamabad. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has also resisted, calling it "a line of hatred that raised a wall between the two brothers."

*Encouraging Insurgents for Across Border Activities & Indian Factor:* It has already been discussed above that Afghan government not only supported the Paktoon uprisings but also instigated, housed, equipped, and armed Baloch insurgents to succumb Pakistan before Afghanistan's demands of Durand Line and Paktoonistan issue. Sardar Daud era as Defence minister and Prime Minister, from 1947 to 1963 is replicated with number of incidences of Afghanistan's involvement in internal disturbance in Pakistan. Faqir of Appi's arm resistance in Waziristan and Balochie's uprising in Kalat in 1948-49 are extreme examples in this regard. To desist Kalat state merger with Pakistan, Prince Karim, brother of Khan of Kalat, launched the first armed insurgency against Pakistan on 16<sup>th</sup> April 1948 with its base in Afghanistan.<sup>86</sup> Prince Karim Khan was later apprehended by Pakistan's security forces and was sentenced to prison. Afghanistan's moral, and material support to Prince Karim Khan in his armed resistance against Pakistan's control over Kalat was to embroil Pakistan's security forces in Balochistan so as to weaken its counter insurgency effort against Faqir of Appi in NWFP. Afghanistan's involvement in Pakistan's internal affairs remained active through out without short lulls of dormancy. Involvement of Indo-Afghan and even Russians hand was obvious behind the Balochies insurgencies of 1958, 1960s and 1970s. Fears of communists renewed support for Paktoonistan and Baloch insurgents led Pakistan to support Afghan jihadist surrogates in their resistance against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s and, later. Pakistan's support to the Afghan Mujahideen against Communist invasion, later against Najeeb Ullah and later to the Taliban

movement was to create a Pakistan friendly government in Kabul. On the other hand, India's and Russia's support for the Northern Alliance arose from its desire to establish an anti-Taliban, anti-Pakistan government in Afghanistan. Taliban's gains led to Russia supplying arms while India began "airlifting non-military supplies" to the Northern Alliance troops via Iran. In early 2001, the United States also joined the triad of India, Russia and Iran as their fourth partner in aiding Northern Alliance in their bid to change Taliban regime.

The blame game of involving each others internal affairs is on the turf again. Afghanistan is accusing unobstructed flow of militants infiltrating from Pakistani side of the border to Afghanistan. Afghanistan has no regard of Pakistan's troops deployment along the border to prevent any infiltration across and its successful operations in Swat, South Waziristan and else where. Without giving recognition to Pakistan's substantive effort against the militants, Afghanistan's rhetoric 'to do more' is spoiling the trust and confidence. Afghanistan has also failed to satisfy Pakistan on its counter accusations that many Indian consulates in Afghanistan appear to be indulging in undesirable activities against Pakistan. Compared to Pakistani efforts, the Afghan efforts are not only negligible but extremely limited.

## End Notes:

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- <sup>2</sup> Dr. Rifath Hussain, "Pakistan's Relation with Afghanistan: Continuity and Change". Available at: [http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2002\\_files/no\\_4/articale/3a.html](http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2002_files/no_4/articale/3a.html)
- <sup>3</sup> S.M.Burke and Lawrence Ziring, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, (Karachi: Oxford Press, 1990) 68-69
- <sup>4</sup> Ikram Rabani, *Pakistan Affairs*, 14<sup>th</sup> ed, (Lahore: Carvan Book House, 2009) 292
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid;
- <sup>6</sup> Olaf Caroe, *The Pathan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004) 436
- <sup>7</sup> S.M.Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, opcit. P.70
- <sup>8</sup> Hameed A.K.Rai, , *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1981) 35
- <sup>9</sup> Muhammad Ayub Khan, , *Friends not Master London*, (Oxford University Press, 1967)174-175
- <sup>10</sup> Ikram Rabani, , *Pakistan Affairs*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed, (Lahore, Carvan book house, 2006) 343
- <sup>11</sup> Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001) 42
- <sup>12</sup> Fazal Habib Curmally, "The Great Game and the Durand Line", *The Defence Journal*, Karachi, Vol.13, No.2, September-October 2009, p.63
- <sup>13</sup> Mujtaba Rizvi, *The frontiers of Pakistan*, (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1971) 156-57
- <sup>14</sup> Curmally, "The Great Game and the Durand Line", opcit. 2009, p. 64
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid
- <sup>16</sup> Kux, ,*The United States and Pakistan*, opcit, 2001, p. 60
- <sup>17</sup> ibid. p. 70
- <sup>18</sup> Salahuddin Ahmad, , *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, (Karachi, Comprehensive Books Service, 1996) 88
- <sup>19</sup> Kux, ,*The United States and Pakistan*, opcit, 2001, p.77
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid. p.78
- <sup>21</sup> Ikram Rabani, , *Pakistan Affairs*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed, (Lahore, Caravan book house, 2006) 344
- <sup>22</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*, op. cit, 2001, p.77
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid. p.109
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid, p.124
- <sup>25</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*, opcit, 2001, pp. 112-113
- <sup>26</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*, opcit, 2001, p.124
- <sup>27</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*, opcit, 2001, p.124
- <sup>28</sup> Rifaat Hussain "Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan: continuity and change". Available at: [http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2002\\_files/no\\_4/article/3a.htm](http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2002_files/no_4/article/3a.htm) (12-9-2009)

- <sup>29</sup> Rifaat Hussain "Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan: continuity and change. Op. cit
- <sup>30</sup> Mujtaba Razvi, , *The Frontiers of Pakistan: A Study of Frontier Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, (Karachi, Dacca: National Publishing House, 1971) 159
- <sup>31</sup> Razvi, , *The Frontiers of Pakistan*, op. cit , 1971 p. 163
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid;
- <sup>33</sup> Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics, 1045-2000*, (Delhi, Paerson Education, 2001) 570-71
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid;
- <sup>35</sup> Kamal Matinuddin, , *Power Struggle in Hindokush (1978-91)*, (Lahore: Wajid alis, 1991)18.
- <sup>36</sup> Khawar Hussain, *Pakistan's Afghanistan Policy*, Monterey California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005) 22-23
- <sup>37</sup> Marvin Weinbaum, , *Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction*, (Lahore: Pak Book Corporation, 1994)5
- <sup>38</sup> Babar Shah, "Pakistan's Afghanistan policy: An Evaluation", *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad*, Vol. 2, No. 3. 2000. Available at: [http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2000\\_files/no\\_2\\_3/article/6a.htm](http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2000_files/no_2_3/article/6a.htm)
- <sup>39</sup> Dr. Babar Shah, "Pakistan's Afghanistan policy: An Evaluation' op. cit
- <sup>40</sup> Calvocoressi, *World Politics*, op. cit. 2001, p.571
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid;
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