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ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS

Kenya and ICC prosecution

Spiralling effect on peacebuilding

For many years since Kenya's independence in 1963 the country was nostalgically referred to as an Island of Peace in the seas of violence rocking neighbouring countries. Even though the country had sporadic internal conflicts such as cattle rustling and other criminal activities, these had never risen to the magnitude of the events of 2007/2008; the infamous post elections violence. Conflict was limited to some regions and was never considered a national tragedy. Indeed, it was inconceivable in the minds of many that a near civil war would ever break out in Kenya.

Open conflicts in the country were first witnessed in the wake of the multiparty politics in 1992. During this period, political ambition found a wild card to use namely the ethnic diversity and differences in which the political class would mobilize support along ethnic lines fuelling animosity between different ethnic communities. As a matter of fact, political parties that were founded at the time clearly had one agenda; to organize a specific tribe or group of tribes towards galvanizing movement for achievement of political ends. This notion took so deep roots over time that ethnic conflict became synonymous to elections every electoral period.

Following the defeat of Kenya African National Union (KANU) in 2003 by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) there was renewed hope and optimism as the people envisioned the beginning of a new era. Subsequently, Kenya was in 2003 voted as the most optimistic nation on earth. This optimism was however short-lived as the political functionaries engaged in battles of supremacy in government with rival sides clamouring for a fair share of power citing a dishonoured memorandum of understanding between the coalition partners. The preceding events continued until the elections in 2007 and led to the animosity that was responsible for the violence witnessed thereafter.

The post elections violence 2007/8

The violence that broke out in various parts of the country after disputed presidential elections left over 1,300 persons dead and over 350,000 others internally displaced. This was besides unvalued loss of wealth and property in different parts of the country which greatly damaged the socio-economic fabric of communities across Kenya.

The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Elections Violence (CIPEV) established to look into various issues surrounding the violence released its report on October 15, 2008. The content of this report was perhaps the genesis of International Criminal Court interest in the Kenyan case.

The ICC persecutions

After several failed attempts at establishment of a local tribunal to try the perpetrators of the violence, the Panel of Eminent African Personalities under the Chairmanship of Dr. Kofi Annan submitted the CIPEV report and a sealed envelope containing names of individuals that were identified as having played key roles in planning, organizing, facilitating or funding the violence, to the ICC. As a result, in April 2011 the famous Ocampo six were summoned to the Hague to have the charges read to them before confirmation of their cases scheduled for September 2011. It was now apparent that the ICC was going to take over the matter following Kenya's failure to show commitment in establishing a local tribunal.

Citizen confidence and support of the ICC process has been rising according to recent surveys. Between June 2010 and January 2011 the citizen's faith in the ICC rose by 12percent. At the point of drafting this paper a Synovate opinion poll indicated that 57percent Kenyans supported the trial of the six in The Hague while only 24 percent supported the establishment of a local tribunal to try the suspects. This indicates that majority Kenyans are interested in the dispensation of justice through international means having lost confidence in the local judicial systems. Granted that the judicial reforms have been beaming a ray of hope to Kenya's future, it cannot be gain said that the transfer of the Hague prosecutions to Kenya would still ensure that justice is done and seen to have been done simply because, the reforms are still at an infant stage. The weight of political anti-reform forces, mainly from among those that stand to lose political power and privilege, cannot be underestimated.

Impact and implications of the impending prosecutions

The impending ICC prosecutions have had a spiraling effect on the Kenyan politics, peace and conflict situations. There have been spirited efforts to save the named persons from prosecution obviously pointing at a realization that some of these people had political ambitions which would be derailed should the prosecutions be left to proceed. This would particularly be so upon confirmation of the cases in September 2011. The fact that these prosecutions target key government officers and coalition partners' functionaries, it is with no doubt that Kenya's political configuration is bound to change radically. There have been efforts to withdraw from the Rome statute or at least get a deferral of the cases to after the 2012 elections which attempts have so far been frustrated. This scenario has had a number of implications.

Loss of confidence in political leaders

There is sustained disillusionment of the people of Kenya on the responsiveness of the leaders to the cause of justice for the victims of the Post Elections Violence. This loss of confidence in political leaders has extended to the African Union levels as the regional body is on record as being hostile to the ICC as demonstrated by the open support given to the Kenya government's call for withdrawal from ICC and frustration of efforts to apprehend President Al Bashir of Sudan. AUs hostility towards the ICC seems to have been fuelled by the Kenya government's move in the recent past. It should be remembered that following indictment of the President El Bashir of Sudan, the AU almost in unison resolved with the exception of very few members not to cooperate with the ICC, so that none of the member states would comply with the Rome statute provisions to effect arrest of the indicted President. Kenya seemed to set pace in this agreement as El Bashir was invited to the promulgation ceremony of Kenya's new constitution in September 2010 and never arrested.

Growing rift between citizens and leaders

It is evident that disconnections between the political class and the citizenry are widening. The general feeling among Kenyans is that political leaders are determined to perpetuate impunity which has had in the past, extremely adverse effects on the dispensation of justice. The likely scenario is that the clique within government that is in support of the ICC process will join up with the citizens in targeting those anti-ICC. Already political positioning and alignments are emerging even though it is clear that there is a bit of confusion on the best options available to the politicians. There is a demonstration of distrust and caution against building of such coalitions. The revolutionary events in North Africa and the Arabic world in general cannot be ignored with respect to inspiration of the people against leaders who seem to uphold impunity. The ground can be said to be fertile for conflict. Political analysts have equated the actions of government as a test of Kenyans' patience and that it is just a matter of time before a similar revolution as in North African arises.

So far, the government has spent in excess of Kshs 30 million ($US 375,000) in shuttle diplomacy to woo African Union into supporting the cause of withdrawal from the Rome Statute or push for deferment of the cases. The net effect of this knowledge is that government is not sensitive to the plight of IDPs who have been in camps for years now for lack of funds, political goodwill or appropriate plans to resettle them on the part of the government. This has contributed to a number of protests by the IDPs demanding appropriate attention by the government.

The ethnic angle

Prior to the unveiling of the Ocampo six, there were ethnic tensions in some parts of the country as some politicians sought to play the ethnic card claiming that ICC was only targeting certain communities. In the past, politicians have used ethnicity to mobilize support and win sympathy from their loyalists in their communities. Indeed, just before the ICC named the six individuals, a politician was quoted saying in a public forum… *"...if I am summoned by the ICC, my people will be left fighting..." those who believe in me know that I did no wrong..."* This was a clear indication that politicians were prepared to fan ethnic tensions should they be summoned or warrants of arrest issued against them. The general mood in the country presently is that the current crop of leaders which is busy building alliances ahead of 2012 is insensitive, inept and is happy to continue unwritten policies and politics of ethnicity and exclusion. The fear among people across the country is that such alliances are setting the stage for a repeat of 2007/2008 post elections violence.

There is also a growing perception in some parts of the country that the Luo community rejoiced at the naming of the Ocampo six seeing that none from among them was named. In this connection there has been street talk about Mr. Odinga, Kenya's Prime Minister likely to be advantaged in the run up to 2012 Presidential elections as the competition get's less stiff should his main opponents, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, get barred from running by the virtue of the criminal charges at the Hague if the same are confirmed in September 2011. This scenario poses threat to national cohesion and paves way for ethnic conflicts during the electioneering period in 2012.

The IDP question

Shortly after the signing of the National Accord, the government made some effort to resettle the over 350,000 IDPs. However, the programme was poorly managed and was marred with corruption as some of the funds earmarked for the exercise were misappropriated. As a result, the endeavor could not be completed leaving over 1500 families still not resettled. Upon government's unequivocal declaration that it would support the named ICC suspects with legal fees and other necessities, there was an outcry from among the IDPs in the camps. There were demonstrations and calls for government to rethink its position on the plight of the IDPs.

What was emerging was that the government's pre-occupation with need to save the Ocampo six ignored the cause for IDPs still in camps four years since the violence. Civil society organizations joined in condemning the government's move terming it a perpetuation of impunity. From a peace building perspective, the government move was ill informed and untimely and may live to haunt efforts at national cohesion and integration. It sent signals to the electorate to the effect that they were less important compared to individuals' political pursuit. This has contributed to the widening of the gap between the leaders and the citizen with the latter's confidence in the former eroding rapidly. The desperation of IDPs cannot be downplayed as a potential trigger of conflict in some parts of the country as the electoral period approaches.

Political realignments

Most politicians in Kenya now have their eyes focused on elections of 2012 and in their characteristic approach, coalitions are beginning to emerge. These adopt ethnic dimensions as leaders from different ethnic backgrounds seek to mobilize for support. It implies that ethnicity is still a key factor that will be used by some in pursuit of their political goals. The impending prosecutions are a threat to such coalitions because some of the individuals named are presidential hopefuls for 2012. In spite of the impending ICC action, politicians have gone ahead to group themselves strategically for 2012 in alliances and coalitions that would provide a vehicle to political supremacy in 2012.

Role of the media

While the role of media in educating and informing the people is appreciated, yet the interest that the naming of the Ocampo six and the entire ICC process has generated from among the media houses raises concern with regard to building of national cohesion. The CIPEV report identified media as one of the contributors to the PEV 2007/8 by among other things broadcasting one sided stories and lack of impartiality. Indeed one of the six ICC suspects is a media personality whose naming was based on a program he runs at a vernacular FM station whose content is considered inciting the members of the Kalenjin community. It can be anticipated that once the cases are confirmed in September, there is a likelihood of heightened media activity on the subject with significant effects on peace and stability.

Effects on implementation of the new constitution

The government's preoccupation with the ICC issue in the first half of the year took away concentration from managing implementation of the new constitution. Currently the implementation of the new constitution is behind schedule by about 6 months, yet, it is the outcome of this process that will influence the shape and structure of the much needed reforms in the country. Should the implementation of the new constitution be incomplete by 2012, there will be confusion with regard to expected county governments, electoral period/dates, and devolution of power among others. Such a scenario would dampen the spirits of hopeful Kenyans providing a platform for unmanageable conflict or violence.

Conclusion

While many Kenyans have very high hopes in the ICC the implications of the entire process on the peace and stability of Kenya must be weighed. Necessary preventive measures need to be put in place to cushion the people against adverse political effect irrespective of the direction the ICC process takes. Evidently, the gap between the people and the leaders is wide which the ICC process would only serve to widen it. The continued government activity on trying to save the Ocampo six will only escalate citizen disillusion with the government and political class and possibly, speed up a people's revolt against the ruling cadre. Unlike what politicians have

always wanted Kenyans to believe, the impending ICC prosecutions are not likely to cause ethnic violence, but instead the lack of it may spark off countrywide anti-government uprising.

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Emerging trends in Somalia: an analysis of 'regional administrations'

Somalia is experiencing a two-decade long civil war with no lasting solution on the horizon. The country is divided into three zones: 'Somaliland,' 'Puntland' and South-central. In the south, together with Alshabaab and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ), the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is in charge while in the north two 'regional' administrations exist with relative stability and development. This article is looking at the current situation of the existing regional administrations in lawless Somalia as part of the emerging trends. The article will briefly trace the historical background of some of these regions; examine the issues and perspectives and possibly provide a number of policy recommendations.

Although 'Somaliland' and 'Puntland' started their administrations at an early stage in lawless Somalia there are a number of issues that contributed to the emergence – and mushrooming – of regional administrations in Somalia's two-decade long civil strife; hence the balkanization of the country and therefore prolonging the Somali crisis: these include Ethiopia's 'building blocks' policy in the early 1990s, the current US-led 'dual track' approach towards Somalia introduced from late 2010, the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), and Mogadishu politics and the subsequent clan political dispensations.

Background

Somalia fell into anarchy in early 1991 when the Ethiopian-backed armed groups of the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the Somali National Movement (SNM) fought a bitter civil war against the military regime leading to its demise first in the northwest ('Somaliland') and later on in Mogadishu. There have been a number of peace attempts tried first in Djibouti and later on in various other places worldwide. This led to the formation of a number of regional entities throughout the country but at different stages.

The Republic of 'Somaliland'

For example, soon after the war broke out, the SNM took effective control of northwest regions and declared independence in May 1991. Calling itself, and with its capital in Hargeysa, the Republic of 'Somaliland,' this region, unlike much of South-central Somalia, has enjoyed relative stability. But, other than political moves by countries like Ethiopia who maintain a trade/consular office in Hargeysa, its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence remain unrecognized by the international community including the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU). The region has, nonetheless, undertaken to build a functional constitutional democracy which gave it a kind of a special status in terms of the international community's dealings with it.

So far, it has held a number of elections: from municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections that, to some observers, are better than many in the Horn of Africa sub-region. It has development plans and a functioning parliament, house of elders and a functioning central government. Other than some rhetorically-put statements from its leaders – from time to time – that it would engage an elected Somali government in Mogadishu, they have been persistently pursuing recognition which they are yet to get.

In terms of the Somali clan calculations, 'Somaliland' draws its clan support from the northern Dir clan, mainly the Issaq, the Gadabursi, and the Issa and the Dhulbahante of the Darod clan. There are also a number of other minority sub-clans including the Musa-dheryo.

'Puntland' State of Somalia

Puntland, officially known as the 'Puntland' State of Somalia is a region in northeastern Somalia with its capital in Garoowe in the Nugaal region. The name 'Puntland' is derived from the ancient 'land of Punt' which is historically the name known for Somalia in pre-colonial times. With that pride fully intact in their thinking, and out of a homegrown constitutional conference held in Garoowe in 1998 for over three months, following the outbreak of the civil war in 1991, the people of 'Puntland' declared autonomy from Mogadishu (Somalia's capital) which has itself had no functional central government since 1991. In fact, authorities in the 'Puntland' region maintained this position since its emergence as a regional entity in 1998.

'Puntland' claims to have a third of the country's population in its territory. But, unlike 'Somaliland,' it does not seek independence and/or secession from the rest of Somalia but self-autonomy and the right to be part of a federated Somalia in the near future. This northeastern region of Somalia also borders between 'Somaliland' and the rest of the country, i.e. South-central Somalia including the Galmudug region.

It is worth to note here that 'Somaliland' and 'Puntland' have had some territorial disputes over Sool, Sanaag and the district of Buhoodle in Togdheer region in the central north: a wide plateau area which is between the two regions. There have been some clashes throughout their existence especially from 1998 onwards and the issue is far from resolution.

But, unlike the issue of 'Somaliland' which is a major problem awaiting for future Somali leaders to sort out, 'Puntland' and other regional entities that fulfil the requirements of the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), have a place in the political dealings of Somalia including a bigger say in developments at the national level for example on how government business is run, how resources are shared and who gets what seats in the political structures of the Mogadishu-based Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). This is in line with Article 1 of the TFC of the Somali Republic which stipulates that 'Puntland' is part of the federal state of Somalia.

In terms of the Somali clan calculations, 'Puntland' draws its clan support from the Harti sub-clan of the Darod, mainly the Majeerteen, the Dhulbahante and the Warsangeli. There are also a number of other smaller sub-clans from the Daarood.

'Galmudug' State of Somalia

'Galmudug' State of Somalia, formed in 2006, is another regional state in the central region of Somalia. Based in the southern part of Gaalkacyo district, of pre-1991 Mudug region in Somalia, 'Galmudug' borders with 'Puntland' and is the gateway corridor to southern Somalia. In fact, Gaalkacyo town is divided between 'Puntland' and 'Galmudug.'

The 'Galmudug' regional administration closely works with the forces of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) who are currently fighting Alshabaab in central Somalia and with the TFG in Mogadishu. Despite this close working relationship with the Pro-TFG Islamist ASWJ group and the TFG itself, the TFC does not recognize

'Galmudug' as part of the regional administrations which should be recognized by the TFG in its political dispensation since 'Galmudug' does not represent two or more regions.

In terms of the Somali clan calculations, 'Galmudug' draws its clan support from the Habargidir Sacad sub sub-clan of the Hawiye. Other Hawiye sub-clans with representation in the region include the Abgaal, the Murursade, the Duduble, the Dir, the Sheekhaal and the minority Madhibaan sub sub-clan.

Other 'regional administrations'

Although only more confusing, other than the Southwest State of Somalia in the Bay/Bakool region in early the 2000s which did not materialize, there are a number of other attempts to put up as many regional entities as possible. These include Azania and the Jubbaland Initiative, both for the Jubba Valley regions of Gedo, Middle and Lower Jubba regions in southern Somalia; Ximin & Xeeb, Central State and Dooxada Shabeelle for Galguduud, Hiiraan and Middle Shabeelle regions of Somalia; Raas Casayr for northern Somalia; among other entities with the list growing day by day.

Issues and perspectives

There are a number of debates, issues and perspectives on the emergence of regional administrations in Somalia. The first debate is whether the previous Ethiopian 'building blocks' policy is as the same as the current US-led dual track approach to resolve the Somali crisis. One other interesting debate is the fact that the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) encourages federalism; hence the formation of regional administrations. Finally, the effects of Mogadishu politics and the subsequent clan political dispensations throughout the country is also another key debate.

Ethiopia's building blocks policy

Ethiopia, with support from the OAU, introduced the building blocks approach to resolve the Somali crisis in the early 1990s. Coupled with the international community's 'peace dividend' policy which signalled more support for the more relative peaceful and developed areas than chaotic southern parts of the country, the Ethiopian initiative did not sail through. Instead, the people of Baay and Bakool did set up a regional administration led by a Supreme council of elders but it later on flopped with the takeover of the late Gen. Farah Aideed of Baay and Bakool regions militarily.

Throughout the country, this policy, which has been in use for close to two decades now, did not, however, lead Somalia into peace. Instead, it only led to the balkanization of the country and the empowerment of extremist groups; be they religious or clanists hiding behind regional administrations.

The US-led dual track approach

The dual track policy towards Somalia introduced by the United States in September 2010 has already had disturbing consequences on the ongoing peace-building and state formation efforts in Somalia. Ambassador Johnnie Carson, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, called it the Obama administration's long awaited US foreign policy toward Somalia. According to Ambassador Carson, the essence of the 'dual track' policy is that the US would deal with the TFG and with all other state actors simultaneously in order to advance peace and development in Somalia.[1]

Carefully analyzed, the dual track approach is no different than putting old honey in new bottles. It is like the old and failed Bush policy towards Somalia which has been somehow crafted to spice up the thinking of a number of Somali leaders. Practically speaking, this US-led dual track approach inadvertently strengthens clan, sub-clan and sub sub-clan divisions, it undermines inclusiveness and the required participatory trends in the country's political life and most important of all, it creates the necessary conducive environment for the balkanization of Somalia which has been the central arguments of Ethiopia as part of its resolve to the Somali crisis.

The position of the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC)

Some analysts believe that the fact that the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) recognizes regional administrations is itself encouraging their formation. But, although Article 1 of the TFC recognizes regional entities as part and parcel of a federated Somalia in the future, for now, it only recognizes them only when regional entities are formed by two or more regions. In this case, it is only 'Puntland' that the TFC and the TFIs in general recognize as a regional state of Somalia. It can be interpreted that this also has to do with the 'how' question in terms of sharing national cake in Mogadishu.

The effects of Mogadishu politics

The effects of Mogadishu politics and the subsequent clan political dispensations among other issues are also to blame. While nationalists focus more on developments in Mogadishu, regionalists are busy developing local-level governance institutions which should not only focus the provision of basic social services but also represent the people of those regions in the sharing of the national cake in the capital: Mogadishu. Some analysts argue that regions like Azania has been formed by a disgruntled former TFG defense minister with support from Kenya in order to have it serve as a security buffer zone for Kenya against Alshabaab in the Jubba Corridor.

Although this also did affect the relations between Kenya and Ethiopia, it did not go well with the TFG either. One other level of argument is the fact that the initiative does not enjoy the blessing of the local clans on the ground: mainly Gedo, Middle and Lower Jubba regions.

The fact that there is weak leadership in the TFIs in Mogadishu who have been unable to marshal a vision of national unity and state building to run the country contributed to the loss of confidence in the TFIs by a majority of Somalis; hence the formation of regional entities as solace instead.

Conclusions

Regional administrations formed in the 1990s served clear objectives especially as was the case in 'Somaliland' or 'Puntland.' Despite their respective secessionist and autonomous tendencies, they did bring relative stability and development to their regions unlike mush of South-central Somalia. The formation of regional administrations throughout Somalia – a majority of them having no clearer agendas but to use them as clan enclaves to compete with other over the sharing of the national cake – has become a continuous trend.

However, the early 1990s 'building blocks' policy, the US-led 'dual track' approach, and the international community's 'peace dividend' policy are not the only to blame for this balkanization of Somalia into clan fiefdoms instead of regional entities answerable to some kind of an orderly central unit somewhere in the country. The biggest culprit, however, is the TFIs' incapability and lack of visionary leadership which allowed for all this to happen.

In conclusion, regional entities and the processes they take in their emergence will only lead to the further balkanization of Somalia. In addition to the widespread perception that it is someone else's plan B, it is clear that it will only prolong the resolution of the Somali crisis unless there is visionary leadership by those in the capital and the international/regional actors form policies informed, by the way Somalis want to resolve their crisis.

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1 See for example Africa: Obama Will Promote 'Strong Democratic Agenda'- Carson, US Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson: 15 March 2011.

What ails Muslims? Islam and Political Islam in the Horn

The maxim *"Islam din wadawla"* (Islam is religion and state) often describe a distinguishing mark of Islam-the suggestion being that Islam is a religion with a political mission at its core. Both those who repeat the mantra with approving fervor and those who worry about it assert its essential truth and suggest that all Muslims must make it a part of their world view. Some go so far as to claim that this axiom calls for a particular form of state structure or political behavior. And yet, of course, the statement is nothing more than a political slogan-an artifact of its time, its meaning contingent on the setting in which it is used, like any other rallying call. This quality does not make the slogan any less meaningful for the Muslims who subscribe to it; what it does is highlight the fact that this saying reflects a pre-occupation with state power in the modern world.

The political behavior of Islamist and sometimes that of all Muslims is often treated as an exotic peculiarity that defies normal analysis and can only be explained as an extension of their faith. Suffice to say, countries in the Horn of Africa have experienced a remarkable rise of Islamic political forces that have become the most prominent feature of its political scene. This rise has caused many problems that require extensive debate. The starting point to understand the situation should be defining political Islam and how it is different from historical Islam found in Islamic society. Attempts to define political Islam and its place in Islam have led some to view it as a response to western modernity or an attempt to revive the spirit of Islam and make it relevant to new realities. Others see it as a response to a threat to the identity of Muslim societies after the shock of connecting with the West. Still others believe it is a reaction to the crisis of creating modern states in the Muslim world and its subsequent failure, and some even view it as apostasy or political manipulation of religion.

All these definitions have become particularly useful in Somalia after the fall of the Siad Barre regime in the 1990's left the door wide open for the emergence of various religious forces termed generally as political Islam. In the recent past, groups that advocates for political Islam include al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam. They claim to be primarily concerned with reviving the issue of Islam among societies and populations who define themselves as Muslims and have a long and stable Islamic history. The religious identity of these societies, which were perhaps settled centuries earlier, is re-examined by political Islam, and becomes questionable or even doubted. This skepticism is sometimes indirect, in the form of a call to create or recreate an Islamic society or Islamic state, without reference to its current identity, as if it is no longer Islamic. At other times this is done directly by criticizing the propriety of the Islam in society and its proponents usually directly asks. Are we Muslims?

In asking such a question, al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam suggests a pause in the history of Islam that views the history of Islamic societies as Muslims even if they lacked some of the religions visions and practices. Although Islam only requires the utterances of the shahada (there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Prophet), and after these words no one has the right to question another's Islamic belief, let alone an entire society's unless it is for a personal reason that affects his direct interest. Yet, in its pause, al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam question the religious identity of society according to its own definition. For these groups, Muslim societies and states are not what is commonly defined in history as those where the people or majority are Muslims, but ones that adopt Islamic policies, usually interpreted by them as applying and guided by sharia principles (law). This means political Islam groups do not consider Islamic societies and states as Islamic because their populations are Muslims but because they adopt Islamic policies.

In the Horn, Al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam present themselves as fighting units against foreign occupation. Yet, in real sense their raison d'être is to censure the common belief that Muslims consensus over what is proper makes it proper. They

view this notion as incorrect (based on the rule: what a Muslim sees as good in God's eyes; or the axiom; my nation does not agree on what is injudicious). Instead, propriety is defined by sharia which in political Islam is not open to interpretation or an accumulation of historical experiences that can be revised. It is a closed text of rulings and absolute definitions, the majority of which is set in stone and cannot be altered.

Al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam are radical and violent political Islam groups who interpret Sharia not as what Muslim societies have historically tried to understand or how they have lived, but are a pre-determined vision based solely on their outlook. Any other definition or classification is debatable, even if it is advocated by religious institutions or sharia scholars.

The result of such view is demonstrated by the rigid extremist and mostly violent positions of political Islam currents on issues that were modified by and subjected to historical political interpretation. What has been happening is Somalia over the last two decades is that political Islam groups, al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam have been questioning the very identity of society and the state as unresolved and their Islam is questionable and doubted, or even, suspect. In their understanding the call to Islam is launched in the same manner it was when Islam first appeared. But in the present form Islam returns not as a reminder, warning or confirmation of religion, but as a tool to Islamize society and state and bring the people back to the religious fold after they neglected it or even abandoned it altogether.

By and large al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam have brought back to the Horn, the da'awa (call, propagation), not to non-Muslim but to Muslim societies. Deep down they view its targets as if they were never Muslims. Accordingly, there is talk of the need for da'awa, joining the da'awa, organizing the da'awa, the interest of da'awa, as if the 'call' is occurring in a society that knows nothing about Islam. It is in this light that the fighting in Somalia between different Muslim groups is ironic because the efforts for da'awa by most political Islam groups target Muslim and no one else, mostly those who are of different perspectives within Islam, such as the Sufis.

The emergence of a myriad of fighting groups in Somalia suggest that political Islam does not relegate the decision of jihad (religious struggle) to the ruler but gives it to the individual. Jihad is viewed by political Islam as an obligation and perhaps a goal in itself, not a means. But more importantly it is the individual right of every Muslim without interference or direction from the ruler. Hence if a Muslim is attacked or Muslim land is occupied, jihad becomes an obligation for the entire nation and is no longer the prerogative of the rulers. Accordingly, the people must take up jihad without waiting for the approval or decision of the ruler. This explains the growth in the Horn, Somalia in particular of international and globalized jihad manifestations but based on a reason (such as in defense against aggression on Muslim lands, or one's person).

Another feature of political Islam in the countries of the Horn is its combining of religion and politics without any distinction between the two. This appears unlike the historical practice in Islamic societies of operating religion and politics to some extent. The historical separation is unlike the modern secular understanding of separating state and religion, where the latter is confined to a specific plane that it cannot exceed. It is a separation based on the differences in the nature and tools of what is religious and what is political which maintains the comprehensiveness and absolutism of religion separate from politics with its segmentation, variations and implementation.

Religion and power

The exercise of power is bound by time and place, and it depends on the competence of political actors. These conditions determine the political impact of Islamist ideals. In some cases, the venality of political actors can trigger disillusionment and a reappraisal of Islamic obligations leading some to turn their backs on an Islamic political program.

Groups like al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam enter politics fully aware that the game of politics is to grapple with the practicalities of power. This requires making sense of why people act as they do and when they do; why they respond to certain calls to action-nationalist, Islamist, whatever- and why they think their political activities are appropriate, ethically as well as practically, to the ends they imagine worthy of achievement.

Islamist political motifs that originally emerged in the 1990's and gained power thanks to the US led UN mission in Somalia came not simply from the disillusionment with secular power but products of distinctively local Somali politics. Al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam certainly identify themselves as Muslim, but they also represent what it means to be political actors in contemporary Somalia, having to do with clan politics and responses to threats of a foreign intervention.

The resources of Islamist groups may be very different now than when these groups emerged; demography and power structures have changed and continue to be influenced by forces previously unknown e.g. diaspora in Somalia. But the expression of their political imagination, no matter how self consciously attached to distinctively Islamic markers, is similar to their predecessors. Thus, their attention to defining community and collective loyalties; the importance they attribute to territorial control and administration; their building of coalitions; their ideas of representation, their use of violence; their acculturations, with money of patrimonial networks; their competing for political leadership-all are familiar features of political behavior. Self conscious Islamist movement and parties no less than the secular nationalist ones, to which they bear a strong family resemblances, are pre-occupied with what works and how.

Location, location, location

Grounding Islamist organizations and their sympathizers is a local political reality shaped by the histories, predicament and pre-occupation of the people they seek to mobilize is a central theme in understanding their emergence and growth in the Horn.

Looking at the behavior of political Islam in the Horn of Africa projects a convincing failure of the two "grand narratives" that have dominated common understanding of political Islam over the past decades or so. The first is the narrative of the "war on terror" which implied that military forces would clear the way for the establishment of democracies and democratic practices in Muslim communities. The second is both the target and mirror image of the first; this is the ideology propagated by violent and extremist groups; they hold that jihad directed against the "far-away enemy" is the best way of establishing Islamic rule in Muslim majority states and elsewhere.

Both these narratives are delusions, have equally improbable goals and have inflicted horrific damage, damage that has often provoked local resistance and left western power and groups like al-Qaida, al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam bogged down in the intransigent politics of place, facing criticism, fragmenting alliances and isolation.

Quite apart from the ethical revulsions, these two narratives have provoked among Muslims and non-Muslims alike, another problem; their remoteness from Muslims' actual and diverse experiences. Both narratives so reify religion as to turn political behavior into the mere reflection of an individual's attachment to a timeless set of prescriptions called "Islam" as if there were removed from the contexts in which Muslim principles and identities drive political actors. They also suggest that Muslim politics can or must be understood in relation to their faith. Yet the truth is more complicated, contested, and contingent than these two narratives allow.

Neither can explain why at a given time and place a given Muslim group or Muslims chooses the prescription it does from Islam's vast and rich tradition to guide its political behavior. And neither can account to why other groups of Muslims act on very different understanding of Islam or why still others see their engagement with power as having only the most tenuous connection, if any, to their religious beliefs.

What does explain these differences in the Horn and elsewhere is political context, especially the diversity of Muslim politics particularly in the Horn, where series of violent incidents and symbolic confrontations over the past decades have prompted talks of a fundamental incompatibility of values and a "clash of civilizations." A cursory glance at political reality makes clear that most of the conflicts involving Muslims in the countries of the Horn owed more to the policies pursued by the governments than to the Islamist identities or even Islamist proclivities of the protagonist such policies created a fertile ground of radical Islamist political sentiments among Muslims. Whether these differences in policy provide the key explanation for the variety of political views amongst Muslims is still up for debate. Part of the debate is that which is critical of the generalization.

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Rethinking the security discourse in South Sudan

As South Sudan becomes the world's newest country, it also takes on some of the burdens that come with being a sovereign state, security being one of them. But as the country works out its security and defence policy, it must also begin to think of the changing security complexes both within and outside its borders. These include threats outside traditionally perceived security quondams which might not be as obvious as armed conflict, but whose effects might have a greater impact on the people of South Sudan.

As such, it is possible that one of the most immediate security pitfalls for the new nation may lie not in the obvious but in the more mundane like perhaps the environment. Of course this is not to say that South Sudan should overlook the threat of armed insurrections, far from it. In fact, these threats remain real, as does the threat of border conflicts with neighbouring countries, particularly the north.

This paper will therefore argue that unlike any other country at its independence, South Sudan has to expand the scope with which it approaches its security beyond the traditional remits. Whereas this might be a challenge particularly after more than two decades of dealing with the North as the only threat during the civil war, it is a challenge that the Republic of South Sudan must take on if it is to secure its new found statehood. Indeed in expanding its security spectrum, South Sudan will be adopting new security paradigms in line with the changing regional and international security complexes. These are for the most part reflected in: *"The UN secretary-general's report on the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004), "Toward a new security consensus"*[1]. Although authored in 2004, this report is still relevant today as is evident in the changing nature of conflicts and their causes. However, the reports highlight is perhaps its emphasis on the changing nature of global security beyond the dreadfulness of vicious war among and within states.

With this in mind, it is thus not surprising that today; more and more conflicts are motivated mainly by competition for basic natural resources like water[2] . In Sudan, this is particularly the case as reflected in a 2007 Post-Conflict report on Sudan's environment by 'The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP)'. The report which was commissioned by the Government of South Sudan concluded that 'past and present conflicts in Sudan are linked to the serious environmental degradation that has occurred in the country over the last several decades'. Therefore, as a

country at the frontier of the Sahara, environmental degradation is a more urgent and pressing issue for South Sudan than perhaps other countries in the Horn. Indeed, the same UN report *'estimates that the northern desert boundary in Sudan has shifted southward 50 to 200km since the 1930s, turning large amounts of previously arable land into desert'*[3]. This is not only alarming but is further evidence of the fragile nature of South Sudan's environment which supports a volatile conflict prone Agro-pastoralist population wholly dependant on the land and its resources.

However, despite arguments linking environmental degradation and security, there are those who argue that aligning the environment to national security is flawed. This school of thought although in contradiction to the UN's *"Toward a new security consensus"* argument, should not be overlooked. On the whole, the argument is perhaps best represented by Daniel Deudney's essay 'The case against linking environmental degradation and national security'[4] which argues that:

"(1) Linking environmental degradation to national security is analytically flawed because such degradation does not connect to protecting the state from violence from other states; (2) environmental degradation is unlikely to cause war between states; and (3) appealing to national security to increase attention on environmental problems subordinates environmental interests and values to "national security mindsets" [Deudney 1990 p. 469]

Although Deudney's submissions might sound extreme today[5], it is worth remembering that they were written in 1990 and that global security has come along way since then. That the importance placed on the environment as a matter of national security is for the most part subjective and that in the global south, environmental degradation is more likely to cause war between states than in the developed world. In the case of South Sudan, This is already a reality with existing cross border conflicts over water and pasture particularly where there are shared trans-national pastoralist communities. As such the new nation faces not only the challenge of identifying its security concerns but also the bigger challenge of identifying which of these concerns it should prioritise.

South Sudan's security priorities

Identifying and prioritising security threats is perhaps a government's greatest challenge, least of all an inexperienced government in a new country. Although it can be argued that the government in the new country, under the ruling party the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) should have no problems prioritising its security concerns particularly, as a party that emanated from a rebel movement. It is also the case that perceptions of security from a liberation army's point of view and from a states point of view may differ.

As a new country South Sudan now has to not only identify but also spell out its security priorities both internally and externally especially as it will exist in an already volatile and fragile region prone to conflict. As such the Government of Southern Sudan has come up with its national security policy in 'The SPLA Defence White Paper 2008'. The defence white paper, the first in South Sudan provides a comprehensive look at the country's security environment whilst providing a policy framework to address the challenges it poses.

Whilst the 'defence white paper' aims to: *"Define the Government of Southern Sudan's policy on defence; inform the Sudanese people, the partners of the Government of Southern Sudan, the neighbouring states and the international community about the defence intent of the SPLA"*,[6] it also actualises the challenges facing the new state. In so doing, the white paper also articulates not only the defence priorities for the new country which are identified as 'defending the territories designated as Southern Sudan and creating an enabling environment for human security and sustainable development in South Sudan' but also the challenges. On the whole though, South Sudan's security priorities will depend ultimately not on the defence white paper but on how the political landscape in post independent South Sudan unfolds.

At present, security flash points in South Sudan seem to revolve around conflicts with the North, particularly around the yet to be demarcated border and distribution of oil wealth. It is therefore plausible that with Southern independence and the subsequent elimination of Khartoum as the common enemy, other conflicts in the South are likely to flare-up. This is already visible in the increasing number of inter-ethnic clashes particularly in the Upper Nile regions[7] and also in the Greater Equatoria[8], where disgruntled SPLA generals have launched rebellions. The threat of internal rebellions in South Sudan therefore remains real, especially driven by what the defence white paper describes as 'internal divisions within Southern Sudan'.

However despite the rebellions, the other pressing security challenge for the Government of South Sudan lies perhaps not in the rebelling generals but in a militarised civilian population awash with small arms. In the case of South Sudan, the civilian population has contributed and continues to contribute to insecurity not only locally but across Sudan's borders. This usually manifests itself, in inter-ethnic conflicts amongst the agro-pastoralist communities. Although, these conflicts may seem local, they do have the potential to escalate into Trans-national conflicts given the shared trans-national ethnicities between Sudan and its neighbours in the Horn especially Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. As such, whatever South Sudan's Security priorities may be, it will have to pay considerable attention to not only its neighbours but the wider region as well.

South Sudan and regional security

The South Sudan referendum on independence and the impending independence on the 9th of July marks a turning point not just for the new country, but also the region. As the latest addition to the Horn of Africa region, South Sudan is expected not only to become a key player in the region, but also to change the regional security dynamics.

After decades of interacting with South Sudan as a 'wounded' neighbour in crisis, its immediate neighbours Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and The Central African Republic now have to contend with a sovereign South Sudan, with national interests and its own national security and defence strategy. This is likely to have a profound impact on how Sudan's immediate neighbours approach their own security. On the whole though, it is unlikely that South Sudan will be seeking to alter its existing relationships with its neighbours particularly to the South. At present, South Sudan is heavily dependant on these neighbours (it imports about 60 to 70 percent of all its raw foods from East Africa[9]) and is therefore unlikely to upset the current regional balance.

However, this is likely to change as South Sudan becomes more self-sufficient and hence more assertive in pursing its own national interest, in accordance to its own defence and security priorities. This is something that its neighbours need to take into consideration, as is the question, how is an assertive South Sudan likely to impact on the region? Of course, the answer to this question is in part subjective and wholly dependant on who is answering it, where in the region they sit and ultimately how they view the latest addition to the neighbourhood. This is also true of the regional bodies and in particular, the East African Community (EAC) and The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

For the East African Community where South Sudan is awaiting to take up full membership after its July 9th independence, the new member could prove to be a double edged sword capable of altering alliances within the community. For Kenya and Uganda, South Sudan is a new and vital trading partner and the two founding members of the EAC are likely to shift their attention north as South Sudan increasingly looks south to East Africa.

This is likely to have an impact on how the community members interact. The trading links between Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan are likely to further strengthen already existing social, political and cultural links. As it is, Uganda and Kenya's political outlook is already drawn north as the two countries are classified as part of

the Horn of Africa whilst the third founding member of the EAC, Tanzania is part of the Southern Africa regional grouping SADC. Although this is not a point of concern at present, South Sudan membership to the EAC could see an isolation of Tanzania, a founding member of the EAC as the community's outlook shifts north. Arguably, this could put the East African union at risk of fragmenting as was the case in 1977.

An independent South Sudan will also be forcing a rethink of alliances at the other regional body; The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The security of the IGAD countries whose members include Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea and Uganda is linked through shared ethno-political histories. Nonetheless, there is also a history of mistrust amongst the member states particularly between Ethiopia and Eritrea[10]. This mistrust has been a threat to regional stability especially with the two standing accused of sponsoring cross border proxy wars against each other[11]. As such, the split of The Sudan raises new challenges for the region. Will North Sudan remain part of IGAD or will it leave the regional grouping? Will South Sudan join the regional body that midwived the peace process that's brought it independence? What will this mean for the shared regional security concerns, be it the human security, the rise of radical Islam in the region or transnational ethnic conflicts?

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NEWS

Interfaith action on climate justice and sustainable peace

In preparation for international negotiations meeting on Climate Change UNFCCC (COP17) to be held in Durban, South Africa from 29th November to 9th December 2011, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) in partnership with Programme for Christian Muslim Relations in Africa (PROCMURA), and later joined by the South African Faith Communities' Environment Institute (SAFCEI) organized a Pan-African Interfaith Conference on Climate Justice and Sustainable Peace in Africa, which took place from 6th to 9th June 2011 in Nairobi, Kenya. The AACC has engaged its constituency in the Climate Change process since 2008.

AACC and PROCMURA are encouraged by the positive responses given by the representatives of Faith and Ecumenical partners. UNEP took seriously this initiative and hosted the conference in the UNO offices in Gigiri, Nairobi Kenya. The Conference benefited from the support of the Government of Kenya.

The Conference agreed on a plan of action to engage all Faith organizations who will in turn mobilize all believers in the continent for practical involvement in bringing about climate justice and sustainable peace. While affirming the past efforts on climate change by Global and African leaders, the Conference called upon these leaders to break the deadlock in the negotiations and come out with concrete and equitable actions. The AACC will send high level emissaries to share the concerns, convictions and commitments of the Faith leaders, calling on negotiators to take decisive measures to reverse the current trend of climate change.

Political violence in Uganda

Uganda experienced unprecedented political violence before and after the swearing in of the President. The demonstrations led to the death of 8 persons and approximately 250 injured in a contest between supporters of the main opposition leader and the incumbent. It is alleged that 580 persons who participated in the political protest had been arrested. The protests were triggered by the rise in food and fuel prices and later converged opposition to the violent arrest of opposition leader. The leader who initiated a peaceful 'walk-to-work' protests was accused of inciting the civil disobedience and civil society uprising. The protests intended to be non-violent to highlight the rising cost of living.

The political unrest in Uganda are occurring when democratic revolutions are taking place in North Africa and Middle East. Human Rights organizations as well as other Non-governmental organizations appealed to the government to take in the consideration the concerns of the citizens by critically reflecting and acting rationally on the issues as opposed to suppressing them with violence and intimidation.

Violence in Sudan threatens independent South Sudan

Violence against civilians is on the increase in Southern Sudan. The disputed region of South Kordofan has in the recent past experience humanitarian disaster as a result of violence. The violence is being orchestrated by the government that is determined to crush militia groups in the region. The clash is between Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and its militia an encounter that caused the retreat of Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA). The violence was meted out to civilians believed to harbour the militias as a result estimated 300,000 have been rounded and cut off from receiving humanitarian aid. Additionally communal safe havens such as schools and churches are being targeted for destruction leaving the citizens with no safety zones. The violence between government forces and rebel groups threatens the stability of the newly independent South Sudan State that is set to be inaugurated on 9th July 2011. Religious leaders who ardently raised awareness of the conflict situation in Sudan continue to advocate for the actors to embrace peace in order to facilitate resumption of relief services. They also urged the governments to commit and act to end the violence that will ensure an environment that allows the people access humanitarian relief.

Kampala accord and road map for elections in Somalia

A UN lead initiative converged in Kampala, Uganda reached an agreement to extend the terms of the Somalia's president and Parliament by one year after a five month long political impasse in Mogadishu. The deal also postponed the election till next year. The agreement commonly referred to as the Kampala Accord was signed by the President of Somalia Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and the Speaker of Parliament Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden. The accord - mediated by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni on June 9 was meant to break the political deadlock between President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Speaker of Parliament Sharif

Hassan Sheikh Aden and establish a road map for national elections as well as a new constitution. The agreement also stipulates that the current Prime Minister resigns and a new one appointed within the next 30 days. It is predicted that the one year extension is set to create further divisions and disputes.

The support for the agreement has led to questions over the leadership capacity of the President. After the agreement protestors in Mogadishu took to the streets opposed to the call for the Prime Minister's resignation under the Kampala accord. Somali's citizens in and out of Somalia castigated the initiative comparing it with past failed peace strategies which were largely externally driven without regard to internal complexities and realities. The President has since appointed a new Prime Minister

Kenya – implementing the constitution

Kenya continues to make progress in implementation of the issues agreed upon in the Agenda 4. These reform issues are agreed upon in the agreement after the 2007 post election violence. Among the landmark progress after the promulgation of the constitution in November 2010 is the appointment and swearing in of a new Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and Director of Prosecution all that fall within reform agenda in the judiciary. The process of appointment was in accordance with the new constitution that deviates from previous appointments that were the prerogative of the President.

RESOURCES

Special New Routes issue - commemorating Dag Hammarskjöld

Like few others, Dag Hammarskjöld contributed to the relevance of the United Nations while being in office as second Secretary-General 1953-1961. In commemoration of his legacy as a role model for the international civil service the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) jointly with the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (DHF) have published a special issue of its magazine New Routes, no. 2.2011, on the theme Dag Hammarskjöld and the United Nations: Vision and legacy – 50 years later.

Guest edited by the DHF's Executive Director Henning Melber, it presents a wide panorama of contributions translating the values and norms that Hammarskjöld lived and died for into their current relevance within the United Nations. Renowned authors associated with the United Nations, leading scholars and civil society activists reflect on the lasting marks Hammarskjöld left beyond the time of his death. They discuss past and present challenges and how to meet them through the United Nations. Furthermore, contributions include analyses on sexual violence, today's situation in the Congo and the implications of the NATO-led intervention in Libya as endorsed by the UN Security Council.

You will find the New Routes issue in PDF format on
www.life-peace.org/sajt/filer/pdf/New_Routes/NR112.pdf

New book, Elusive Peace, Argues for More Sophisticated Mediators for International Conflicts

Ever wonder why peace seems so difficult in the Middle East? In Africa? In Afghanistan and Pakistan? Too often, the headlines trumpet peace and months later declare failure. Why is it that internationally negotiated peace accords may cause more violence and genocide, not less? Why is it that in fifteen years of international climate change conferences little has been accomplished? Why is it that the Rwandan genocide was directly caused by the Arusha negotiations? That the Oslo accords caused the Intifada? That the Darfur accords encouraged greater violence instead of promised peace in western Sudan? Why is it that a small band

of piqueteros in Argentina are able to block international trade in an environmental justice conflict that has persisted for years? That the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unreconciled? Why is it that too often international mediators and negotiators fail to bring peace to the world?

Elusive Peace penetrates the headlines and takes a critical look at peace negotiations through the eyes of a professional mediator and peacemaker. The international community's approach to peace negotiations are based on outdated and flawed assumptions of human behaviour, sovereignty, and power. These ideas, and the diplomatic technologies based on them, are inadequate to solve our 21st century problems. The complexity of our problems requires modern attitudes, assumptions, and experience based on what works today rather on than what worked 300 years ago for an elite group of Europeans. Elusive Peace applies these 21st century concepts and shows how they might be applied more effectively to bring peace to the table. For the general reader, Elusive Peace removes the mystery from the headlines. The "aha!" moments will flow as the reader gains an appreciation and understanding of what it will really take to solve our most intractable international problems.

Elusive Peace is published by Prometheus Books and was released in late April 2011. The author is Douglas E. Noll, a nationally recognized mediator and peacemaker. For more information, go to *www.elusivepeace.com*

Roundtable report on the future of Sudan

International actors and stakeholders continue to ponder over the future of Sudan particularly the role of international and regional actors in the overcoming numerous challenges in the wake of the independence. As the South Sudan citizens celebrate the outcome of the referendum a peaceful transition and peace depends on amicable resolution of key issues between the North and South. While this is an exciting period for the people of South Sudan, the future presents them (and their neighbours in the North) with many difficult challenges. The status of Abyei and post referendum issues between North and South e.g., citizenship, oil sharing, border demarcation, currency, and debts, among others are yet to be resolved.

On March 14th, the International Peace Institute held a meeting that brought together experts working on Sudan from the UN Secretariat, UN member states, the African Union, and the NGO community to discuss the post referendum environment and state building in South Sudan. In particular, the discussions focused on strategies that the UN, its member states, other multilateral institutions, and NGOs can pursue to help the parties to resolve post referendum issues and the Abyei impasse, and to assist the people of South Sudan in building an effective, inclusive, and legitimate state.

For more information, please follow this link *http://reliefweb.int/node/403483*

The Sentinel Project's new report on the risk of genocide in Kenya

The Sentinel Project has conducted an assessment of the risk of genocide in Kenya by examining a range of political, social, and economic factors. This process revealed a high risk of inter-communal violence which may escalate into genocide due to Kenya's deeply divided nature and history of ethnic rivalry and antagonism. While the country once enjoyed relative peace and stability, the recent transition to democracy has seen episodes of large-scale violence as different groups compete for power. The post-election violence of 2007-08 was the most notable example of this potential for violence and atrocities in Kenya. Unless addressed effectively, this situation is likely to produce further unrest. The upcoming national election in late 2012 is the most likely event to trigger further violence, and the situation in the country needs to be addressed effectively to prevent this from happening. For this reason, the Sentinel Project has declared Kenya to be a situation of concern (SOC) and is now monitoring events there for indicators of the genocidal process.

To read the full report and learn more about our monitoring efforts, visit the Kenya SOC page at: *http://thesentinelproject.org/situations-of-concern-2/kenya/*

Voices of survivors: The different faces of gun violence

The publication features 16 testimonies acquired by IANSA of women survivors of gun violence from a number of different countries. The violence occurs in various contexts and situations but the one common denominator in all of these stories is the misuse of guns. The choice of the countries featured is based on responses from IANSA women, and it is striking to see the similarities that exist even though the countries in which the armed violence occurs may be 'worlds apart'. Full report access link:
http://www.ces.uc.pt/ogiva/media/iansa_wn_voices_of_survivors_2011_web.pdf

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Editorial information

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Editorial principles

The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.